

# Information Communications Technology for **Community Oriented Policing**: An international Handbook for Kosovo



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# **Information and Communications Technology for Community Oriented Policing:**

An International Handbook for Kosovo

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## Content

<b>List of Abbreviations</b> .....	7
<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	10
<b>Preface</b> .....	11
Who is this Handbook for? .....	11
What can you find in this Handbook? .....	11
How to use this Handbook? .....	12
Why is ICT a focus of this Handbook? .....	14
ICTs don't Solve Problems – People Solve Problems .....	14
<b>1. Introduction</b> .....	16
The Societal Context of this Handbook .....	16
ICT for Societal Change .....	18
Peacebuilding in Kosovo .....	19
Challenges Ahead .....	20
A Humble Position .....	20
<b>2. COP: An Introduction</b> .....	22
COP as a Concept.....	22
COP in this Handbook .....	24
A Brief History of COP .....	27
COP and Police Reform.....	29
Risks of COP.....	32
Concluding Remarks.....	37
<b>3. COP in International Police Missions</b> .....	40
Introduction .....	40
UN Police Missions .....	41
COP in UN Missions.....	43
Criticism of UN Peace Missions .....	45
OSCE Missions .....	46
COP in OSCE Missions.....	47
EU Missions.....	48
CSDP Missions in Detail .....	49
Critical Assessment of CSDP Missions .....	50
CSDP in the Western Balkans and Kosovo .....	51

The Security Gap and Military Police Forces .....	52
CSDP Missions and the Relation to OSCE and UN .....	55
Concluding Remarks .....	56
<b>4. Information and Communications Technology for COP .....</b>	<b>58</b>
Introduction.....	58
A typology of ICTs .....	61
Intelligence-Led Policing .....	62
Crime Mapping .....	64
Predictive Policing .....	66
Critical Issues of Predictive Policing .....	68
Social Media and Policing .....	71
Aims and Goals of Social Media Used by the Police .....	72
Social Media Strategies for Policing .....	73
Social Media and COP .....	76
Challenges .....	77
Do-It-Yourself Policing (DIY policing).....	84
The Challenges of DIY Policing .....	86
Social Media and Policing: Some Critical Issues .....	88
Other Technologies for COP .....	90
Body-Worn Cameras .....	91
CCTV .....	91
ICT in (Post) Conflict Settings .....	93
Concluding Remarks .....	96
<b>5. COP in Kosovo .....</b>	<b>100</b>
Introduction.....	100
History of COP in Kosovo .....	101
Forums for COP in Kosovo .....	108
Community Safety Action Teams from ICITAP .....	109
LPSC and MCSCs.....	113
Municipal Community and Safety Councils .....	114
Sustainability and Voluntarism in Kosovo.....	116
COP in the North of Kosovo .....	118
COP in Kosovo Today: People are the Police, Police are the People .....	121
The Kosovo Police Service .....	124
Concluding Remarks .....	127

<b>6. Youth, COP, and ICT</b>	130
Introduction	130
Youths with Minority Backgrounds	133
Youth and Gender	133
Youth and Police	135
Trust in Police	138
Communities, Police and Youth	139
Police Contacts	141
Bullying and Cyberbullying	143
Use of ICT by Youths	143
The Role of Adults	145
Where Does Bullying Happen?	146
ICT and Bullying in Schools	148
School Violence and COP	148
Teacher Student Violence and Corporal Punishment	150
COP and School Violence	154
Sexual Harassment	156
Schools and Universities	159
COP Responses to Sexual Harassment	159
<b>7. COP and Corruption</b>	162
Introduction	162
Corruption in the Western Balkans	164
Corruption and the Police	165
Corruption and EULEX	167
Corruption and Gender	168
Corruption and ICT	168
<b>8. COP and Domestic Violence</b>	172
Introduction	172
Extent and Impact of Domestic Violence	173
Domestic Violence and Vulnerable Groups	176
Men, Boys and Gender Equality	179
State Response to Domestic Violence	181
Implications for COP	182
ICT and Domestic Violence	184

<b>9. Drug Abuse and COP</b>	186
Introduction	186
The Harm of Drugs	187
The Link between Crime and Drugs	188
Young People and the Gender Gap in Drug Abuse	189
Drug Prevention Strategies	191
Drug Problems in the Western Balkans	193
Youth and Drug Use in Kosovo	195
Nightlife and Drugs	196
COP Engagement in Nightlife Related Drug Prevention	199
<b>10. COP and Radicalization</b>	202
Introduction	202
Radicalization Processes	204
Gender, Radicalization, and Motivation	206
The Role of ICT in Radicalization Processes	209
Radicalization and Terrorism in the Dark Web	212
Radicalization and Foreign Fighters in the Western Balkans	213
Regional and Historic Factors Facilitating Radicalization	214
COP Strategies against Terrorism and Radicalization	217
Limits and Risks of COP in Terrorism Prevention according to the OSCE	218
Concluding Remarks	222
<b>11. COP and Public Places</b>	224
Introduction	224
Traffic Safety	228
Police and Traffic law enforcement	229
Traffic Safety in Kosovo	230
COP and traffic safety in Kosovo	233
Other Areas of Traffic Safety	233
Public Safety Needs of Women	237
Illegal Dumping and Littering	238
Stray Dogs	241
<b>12. Literature</b>	244

## List of Abbreviations

API	Application Programming Interface
ATP	Attitude towards the Police
BAC	Blood Alcohol Level
CCTV	Close Circuit Television
COP	Community Oriented Policing
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CPRLV	Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence
CSAT	Community Safety Action Team
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
DIY	Do-It-Yourself
DVIU	Special Domestic Violence Investigation Unit
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EGF	European Gendarmerie Force
EIMS	Education Information Management System
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EUFOR	European Union Force
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUOK	European Union Office in Kosovo
FIQ	Forum for Civic Initiatives
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
IC	International Community
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
ICPC	International Centre for the Prevention of Crime

ICT	Information and Communications Technology
ILP	Intelligence Led Policing
IS	Islamic State
KAPS	Kosovo Academy of Public Safety
KFOR	NATO Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corp
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
KP	Kosovo Police
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
LMT	Liaison Monitoring Teams
LPSC	Local Public Security Committee
MCSC	Municipal Committee Safety Council
MMA	Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising,
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OMIK	OSCE Mission in Kosovo
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PFTO	Police Field Training Officer
SARA	Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SE Europe	South Eastern Europe
SOCMINT	Social Media Intelligence
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPU	Specialized Police Unit
SSP	Safer School Partnership
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System



UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
VCAP	Virtual Community and Police Meeting
YCPD	Youth Crime Prevention Desk
YMI	Young Men Initiative

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This Handbook was written as a deliverable in the EU Horizon2020 Research Project Information Communications Technology for Community Oriented Policing (ICT4COP) in the framework of Work Package 10 – South Eastern Europe. It is based on field research carried out by the Ruhr-University Bochum in Kosovo in 2016 and 2017. We conducted over 30 interviews with local and international experts on community policing, local police officers, representatives of non-governmental organizations and with citizens from a variety of communities. To achieve this, we traveled to remote and rural areas as much as to the urban centers of the three Balkan countries. We experienced a unique, multifaceted and by all means, fascinating region of this world whose old and new conflicts seem to have shaped the landscapes as much as the people living in it.

We would like to thank all the people that have contributed to this handbook, first and foremost our interview partners that dispensed a considerable amount of their time answering our questions. We also would like to thank the experts that took the time to review this handbook and provided us with valuable advice and critique, namely Ingrid Nyborg, Kari Osland, Rifat Marmullaku and Oliver Schemmer.

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University of Bochum  
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## Preface

### *Who is this Handbook for?*

This handbook is written for everyone who wants to contribute to the security in his or her community or neighborhood. It is written for social activists, local politicians, teachers, police officers, representatives of international organizations and all citizens, men and women, young and old, who believe that human security starts in their communities. It is written for practitioners and those who want to become one. It is for those who want to address a pressing security problem of any kind in their community or to prevent a specific security problem from developing.

But this handbook is also a piece of “applied science”. As academics, we believe that the main aim of science is to serve people, and we also believe that it is up to us as academics to provide information and results in a way, everybody can understand and make use of. After having done research on Community Oriented Policing (hereafter COP) in theory and practice in many countries (such in transition included) for more than 30 years, we also know that the success of COP projects or models depends very much on those who take over the responsibility to implement and evaluate such projects. One of the most important and at the same time most challenging issues in these projects is sustainability. ‘Sustainability’ means to have a long-lasting and societal impact beneath the surface of security policies that are mere cosmetics. But sustainable are only those projects which are well developed by a tandem of practitioners and academics, well drafted and structured and well implemented by motivated people. Even more importantly, in the end, all projects have to be thoroughly evaluated by independent experts. We have seen too many projects whose modest outcomes and results have been sugar coated by their very own reviewers. Providing new wine in old bottles does neither serve the public nor the institutions, who are officially responsible for the projects.

This handbook reaches out to a variety of people with different backgrounds. Therefore, not every topic discussed in here is relevant for everyone. As police scientists, we know that police officers often assess and approach security problems in a different way than community representatives. And as social and educational scientists we are aware, that social workers, social activists, teachers and other people with “social impetus” often assess such problems from an opposite point of view than the police. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of COP is to bring all together in a cooperative manner, not to diminish the distribution of competencies and responsibilities. COP is policing for the community, not policing the community. Police have to realize, that they have to serve the citizens, not the politicians. Only by bearing this in mind, COP can be successful.

### *What can you find in this Handbook?*

This handbook deals particularly with community policing. It is not a handbook on policing in general. Simply spoken: The ideas and recommendations in here will not help to detect or punish criminals or reduce crime rates – at least not immediately. Community policing in its

essence is a preventive approach to making life in communities safer for everyone. It needs a sound philosophy and a long breath.

All recommendations and examples are based on our long lasting experience in COP and research conducted in South Eastern Europe (in the following short SE Europe). This comprises numerous interviews with different stakeholders from civil society, police, international organizations and academia. In addition, we have thoroughly analyzed a huge amount of information and training material as well as scientific literature on community policing. All suggestions, approaches, and recommendations in this book have a strong basis in research and practical experience. The scope of this book is for the use of practitioners. The focus, therefore, remains on practical approaches instead of a mere academic analysis of the topic.

### *How to use this Handbook?*

This handbook is not written to be studied from the beginning to the end (although we leave it to the reader to do so). It is best used as a reference book for those who have identified a specific security problem in their community and would like to know how the problem can be approached from a community policing perspective. Therefore, we have decided to structure this book by specific security issues we identified during our research in the communities in SE Europe. These problems are neither exhaustive nor do they reflect a specific rank order by importance. In some communities, street security may play the most important role, whereas in others drug abuse or family violence is much more pressing.

### *Boxes*

In this handbook, we feature a number of different boxes, namely Case Boxes, Background Boxes and Police Boxes. These boxes serve the purpose of providing a better overview for the different target groups this handbook addresses

### *Case Boxes*



The Cases Boxes contain case examples of projects, initiatives or other topics we find worth mentioning. Our idea of a practitioner's handbook is that it should be as specific as possible and give concrete and real examples from the field to serve this purpose. The selection of projects is based on our own and independent criteria. We did not receive any support or are affiliated with any of these projects we present. We simply believe they are good ideas and more or less relevant to the topic this handbook tries to explore. This, however, does not necessarily mean that all these case examples have an Information and Communications Technology (hereafter ICT) component or are specifically related to COP. Neither does this mean that every project has been successful or implemented in the right way. It is important to notice that these projects should inspire and not advise on how things have to be done. It is crucial to acknowledge the fact that there is not the one and only way of implementing COP strategies.

### *Background Boxes*



The Background Boxes feature information based on recent scientific data. This handbook takes a science-based approach to COP and all data provided give valuable background information for those who prefer an in-depth view on the topic.

### *Police Boxes*



The Police Boxes contain information that is focused on best practices or other information directly related to law enforcement agencies. This, however, does not necessarily mean that they are of no interest to readers with no law enforcement background. Working interrelations between police and communities/civil society are based on mutual understanding. From our experience, we know that the police agencies and their work often appear as a black box to communities. The police boxes, therefore, serve the purpose to bridge this information gap and create a better understanding of the dynamics of policing.

### *Why is ICT a focus of this Handbook?*

A universal definition of ICT does not exist as the concepts and applications constantly evolve. Wikipedia describes the role of ICT as stressing “unified communications and the integration of telecommunications (telephone lines and wireless signals), computers as well as necessary enterprise software, middleware, storage, and audio-visual systems, which enable users to access, store, transmit, and manipulate information.”<sup>1</sup> More simple is to think of ICT as digital technologies to support individuals and organizations to make use of and interrelate information. The applications of ICT in the field of COP are manifold and reach from social media tools, over specialized policing software, crime mapping to mobile apps for the reporting of crimes, sexual harassment, corruption and illegal dumping. In this handbook, we will try to map out these various possibilities by giving numerous and specific examples from the field.

There are a number of reasons why this handbook puts a strong focus on ICT. To name only two:

1. Social interaction today is strongly influenced by ICT and it is likely that this will continue to increase in the future.
2. ICT is easily accessible, can be used by nearly everyone and is cheap.

We believe these are good reasons for the ICT focus in this handbook. This is not to say, that every problem can or should be solved by implementing ICT. Frankly, the systematic use of ICT for community policing in post-conflict settings is unexplored territory. The innovative potential of ICT is nearly unlimited and at the time this book is published, many more good ideas might have been developed while others might have failed. The authors of this handbook do not claim that ICT is the solution to every existing security problem. We don't deny that sometimes ICT might not only be part of a solution but can also create new risks. Data protection issues are one of those risks, fake news and the misuse of ICT for political aims are others. But we believe that ICT has the potential of being used as a tool to improve community police relations, increase cooperation and make communities safer. This handbook is an attempt to explore this potential.

### *ICTs don't Solve Problems – People Solve Problems*

During our research, we came across a number of technology ideas that address various community problems in a creative and unique way. Most of these technologies are made to raise awareness, not to tackle the problems directly. For example, a mobile app that enables the user to report and geo-tag illegal dumpsites and to share photos of the trash on a platform might help to raise awareness for the problem and makes it easier to locate the trash. Probably, it does even support the detection of the offenders who are responsible for illegal dumping by making an early response more likely. But the mobile app does not solve the problem: the work of cleaning up has to be done by the community members or a contractor.

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<sup>1</sup> See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information\\_and\\_communications\\_technology#cite\\_note-2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_and_communications_technology#cite_note-2) with further sources.

Other mobile apps, such as reporting apps for domestic violence, work more directly. If a user experiences an incident of domestic violence she or he can notify friends or sometimes even directly the police. One of the biggest problems with domestic violence is that it never gets reported in the first place. But the main reasons are that the victim is either not aware that domestic violence is illegal or supposes that the police will do nothing anyway. In both instances, a mobile app does not solve the issue. And frankly spoken: you might not need an extra app to notify your friends or the police if you have become a victim of domestic violence. The possibilities of notifying someone are manifold, including SMS or telephone. Moreover, a mobile app, if discovered by the perpetrator, might bear the risk of worsening the situation for the victim.

Then there are apps that probably have a direct impact on security. For example, the 'walk freely' app collects data where sexual harassment has occurred and provides the data in form of heat maps online. The user can easily see harassment hotspots in cities and can avoid them systematically. In turn, the police might decide to patrol certain hotspots more frequently and show presence. Also, community leaders might take action by providing more street lighting at certain spots or even opt for CCTV.

However, raising awareness is very often the first step in tackling a problem. Undoubtedly, ICT has this potential to link and bring people together as well as to foster communication, the essence of all awareness raising. Nevertheless, solving the problems requires much more than a mobile application. It requires coordinated human action. Some of the presented ICT solutions may have an impact on a neighborhood, a street, a village or probably just for a group of friends or a family. But they bear the potential of multiplying. In this regard, this handbook takes a humble view on the potentials of ICT.

## 1. Introduction

### The Societal Context of this Handbook

The year 2007 must be viewed as an important point in time: according to the UN, for the first time in human history, an estimated number of 3.5 billion humans and with that, the majority of mankind lived in urban settings. Every month, around five million people in the world move to cities, of whom 95% live in developing countries. A third of them are living in informal settlements adding up to a total number of 828 million people that live in slums today. This number keeps rising.<sup>2</sup> Whereas some consider this shift towards a more urbanized world as an opportunity to address global challenges, including poverty, inequality, unemployment, environmental degradation, and climate change, other stress the fragility of these urban areas and the inability to guarantee for the inhabitants' safety.

To address these issues, on a UN Summit in September 2015, the world leaders adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, comprising 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Goal 11 called *'Making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable'* is specifically linked to the problems related to urbanization. In the same direction does the New Urban Agenda go which, according to the UN, "sets global standards of achievement in sustainable urban development, rethinking the way we build, manage, and live in cities through drawing together cooperation with committed partners, relevant stakeholders, and urban actors at all levels of government as well as the civil society and private sector."<sup>3</sup> This "rethinking" of the way to govern these cities is, in turn, closely linked to the smart-cities concept. This concept, promoted within the UN by the UNECE (Economic Commission for Europe) and other industrial partners through the United Smart Cities program, sets out among others to decrease the vulnerability of cities to urban migration and demographic changes through the use of ICT.<sup>4</sup> The transformative role of ICTs in addressing urban challenges is stressed in various fields, such as in urban mobility, health, and education. In a paper from UN habitat drafted in partnership with a telecommunication company, the city of the future is described as "one that grows, evolves and responds according to the needs of its inhabitants. ICTs can open new opportunities for citizens to more actively shape the future of their cities by sparking new forms of civic participation, increasing social inclusion and accessibility for persons with disabilities, reducing infrastructural barriers, sharing resources, accessing relevant information and enabling a real-time dialogue in which city administrators and citizens can learn from one another."<sup>5</sup>

The smart cities of the future in the words of UN habitat sound no less than a modern utopia: "In the near future we expect to see smart cities with buildings that are net producers of renewable energy, connected and optimized transport systems, electric cars that drive a zero

<sup>2</sup> Cited after ICPC 2016: The 5th International Report Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 3.

<sup>3</sup> See the official UN website <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/10/newurbanagenda/>

<sup>4</sup> <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=10009>

<sup>5</sup> UN Habitat/Ericsson 2015: The role of ICT in the proposed urban sustainable development goal and the new urban agenda, 6.



emission economy and a range of e-services, such as e-health, e-education, e-commerce, e-governance and teleworking resulting in major changes across society. These examples also highlight areas in which ICTs are expected to have a significant impact.”<sup>6</sup>

In these fast-growing mega cities of the future, safety becomes an increasingly important issue. Different strategies are proposed to tackle the various problems arising from the growing cities: Connecting the different levels of government from the national to the community; municipal governments localizing crime prevention efforts through their own plans; multilevel coordination when implementing crime prevention and urban safety strategies; engagement of diverse and inclusive communities through bottom-up approaches; and a multidimensional and multi-stakeholder approach to understanding and addressing crime and violence is essential across all levels.

However, as promising as these well-formulated policy programs and global approaches may sound, the implementation appears to be very complex difficult. One of the crucial problems with urbanization and migration to urban areas is that it is occurring much faster than municipal infrastructures are developing and urban services can be expanded.<sup>7</sup> This is particularly true for police services that are confronted with significant changes on multiple fronts: police forces have to adjust to new forms of scrutiny, transparency requirements and governance. The role of police officers shifts increasingly towards managing threat, harm, risk, and vulnerability of communities and its members.

Not only are the needs of communities changing. The same dynamics that transform communities are mirrored in crime that local police services are confronted with. Higgins and Hales describe these challenges as follows: “[...] the internet has created new forms of crime and transformed old ones, while growing international mobility, migration, and ever-more globalized markets have created new opportunities for criminals that manifest as harm in local communities. In some neighborhoods, the forces of global socio-economic change play out as increased transience, social heterogeneity, and atomisation, which may lead to populations that are less visible to the police, more isolated, more difficult to engage and less capable of dealing with problems as a community.”<sup>8</sup>

In view of these problems, the term ‘fragile cities’ has been coined as a reference to fragile states. It describes a metropolitan unit whose governance arrangements exhibit a declining ability and/or willingness to deliver on the social contract. They are characterized by high rates of violence and low trust in the government and the law enforcement institutions with the result that the elites retreat in gated communities, using increasingly sophisticated security systems to guard themselves. Cities like Nairobi, Port Harcourt, Rio de Janeiro, Johannesburg and San Pedro Sula with their privately maintained and spaciouly gated communities show how perceived insecurity is shaping fragile cities and social exclusion.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> UN Habitat/Ericsson 2015: The role of ICT in the proposed urban sustainable development goal and the new urban agenda, 6.

<sup>7</sup> ICPC 2016: The 5th International Report Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 43.

<sup>8</sup> Police Foundation 2016: Police Effectiveness in a Changing World - Cutting crime in the 21st century: Informed proactivity in the midst of social and organizational change, 1.

<sup>9</sup> Muggah 2014: Deconstructing the fragile city: exploring insecurity, violence and resilience, 345-351.

When governance and authoritative law enforcement have reached their limits and trust in their abilities is low, the remaining way of keeping urban communities safe is to enable citizens to co-create security. The idea of co-creation of security is at the core of COP strategies. In fact, the challenges posed by the mega cities of the future might be one of the reasons why COP concepts, despite being existent for over three decades, have experienced a comeback in recent years.

### ICT for Societal Change

In this regard, bringing together ICT and COP to co-create safety in the urban communities of the future seems to be a promising approach. The mere scale of the challenges which urban areas encounter in the future can only be solved with the transforming potential of technological development. Of all ICT developments having impacted societies in the recent years, social media platforms have been probably the most important ones. The number of worldwide users has been growing constantly and rapidly. The most well-known platform Facebook had around 1.4 billion users in 2015. At the end of 2016, this number had risen to 1.86 billion users. Estimates for 2015 suggest that there existed 2 billion active social media accounts worldwide. On a normal day, Facebook users spend 9.7 billion minutes on the site, share 4 billion pieces of content and upload 250 million photos. But social media is far more than the most famous Facebook, Twitter and Youtube platforms. A much more diverse family of platforms spans social bookmarking, micro-media, niche networks, video aggregation and social curation. The Russian VK network, for example, has 190 million and the Chinese QQ network 700 million users. Niche platforms based on mutual interests, such as Reddit, reported 400 million visitors in 2012 and Tumblr reached over a 100 million blogposts.<sup>10</sup>

It is, however, important to recognize that the density and penetration of ICT use vary around the world. Generally one can assume that ICT use in developing and post-conflict countries is considerably lower as in western countries. As this might be true for some world regions a closer look at Kosovo reveals that this is not the case. In Kosovo, the number of Facebook user in mid-2016 mounted to 860 thousand a penetration rate of 45 % of the population.<sup>11</sup> According to the Regulatory Authority of Electronic and Postal Communications (RAEPC), the total number of fixed and mobile Internet users in 2015 was 927,436, representing a 51% penetration rate. This indicates a significant increase from a penetration rate of 26.1% as of 2014.<sup>12</sup> The Kosovo Agency of statistics in its statistical yearbook 2016<sup>13</sup> estimates that in 2011 approximately 53.9% of rural households had a computer, while 73.9% of urban households had a computer. Internet access is slightly lower, with 47.3% of rural areas with Internet access, while 69.7% of urban households have internet access. In addition, mobile telephony penetration in Kosovo is over 97.7%, covering over 99% of inhabited places and 88% of Kosovo's territory.

<sup>10</sup> Bartlett, Reynolds 2015: The state of the art 2015 - A literature review of social media intelligence capabilities for counter-terrorism, 9.

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.internetworldstats.com/europa2.htm#kv>

<sup>12</sup> The Regulatory Authority of Electronic and Postal Communications (RAEPC) (2016). <https://www.export.gov/article?id=Kosovo-Telecommunications-Industry>

<sup>13</sup> Kosovo Agency of Statistics (KAS). (2016). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2016, 160ff.

The potential of ICT to foster societal change for the better seems to be limitless and is by no means reduced to urban areas or smart cities. The EU in its Global Strategy optimistically states: “Global growth, mobility, and technological progress [...] enable us to thrive, and allow ever more people to escape poverty and live longer and freer lives.”<sup>14</sup>

## Peacebuilding in Kosovo

In its Global Strategy, the EU considers itself as an influential actor on the world stage that keeps citizens safe, preserves the EU's interests, and upholds its values. Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions have been deployed in numerous countries around the world, focusing on peacebuilding and security sector reform. EULEX, the EU Rule of Law Mission to Kosovo, one of the most extensive missions ever deployed with a huge contingent of police officers, is a good example for the EU's ambition of being a global player in peacebuilding.

In reality, however, these international efforts very often had minor impacts or even failed in the past for various reasons. One reason is that all too often top-down approaches to security were implemented. But the last twenty years of peacebuilding in the Balkans have shown that an authoritative approach to peacebuilding is hardly working or even counter-productive. The UN mission UNMIK (1999-present), for example, was criticized for being a top-down approach and in complete disregard of local ownership. EULEX (2008-present) seemingly had learned from these mistakes and put local ownership (to a certain extent at least) at the core of the mission. When results were moderate, the reasons were quickly identified as having not emphasized local ownership enough.

During our research, we constantly came across allegations claiming that the international community and respectively EULEX had failed in Kosovo. Aside from the fact that perception of international engagement has always varied depending on different factors, there is some truth to it. Despite some economic data identifying Kosovo as one of the few European countries with a positive economic development since the economic crisis in 2008, the overall situation has in many parts of the country deteriorated since the deployment of EULEX. According to the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, the small Balkan country was ranked in 2014 on place 110 of 175 countries.<sup>15</sup> Unemployment rates are with up to 40% shockingly high, particularly for young people, while the average income remains between € 300 and 400 per month. The low-point of this downward spiral was probably reached in 2015 when an estimated 100.000 Kosovars fled the country, seeking asylum within the EU. This was a considerably high number of people for a country with an estimated population of 1.8 million. While this mass exodus of Kosovars was not solely the fault of EULEX but rather due to the economically gridlocked situation, the EU has to ask itself some inconvenient questions pertaining the success of its efforts in this country.

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<sup>14</sup> EU 2016: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, 7.

<sup>15</sup> Transparency International 2015: National Integrity System Assessment Kosovo, 28.

## Challenges Ahead

The allegation of EULEX having failed in Kosovo is only half the truth. The other half is that EULEX had all the means to achieve substantial development in this country. It was an ambitious experiment from its beginning, probably the most ambitious one ever conducted in the field of nation-building. The funding was enormous and the staffing mounted up to the biggest number of EU employees outside of Brussels. Since the end of the conflict in 1999, the EU and its member states alone have invested over € 4 billion in developmental aid in the country, which is by far the largest annual per capita contribution ever provided to a third country. In 2011, Kosovo received 19 times more developmental aid than the average developing country.<sup>16</sup> There are some doubts that this money was always invested in the right places. In fact, in the chapter on Kosovo, we will show that this has not been the case, especially during the UNMIK era. But one cannot simply argue that EULEX was underfunded.

In addition, the EU had and still has a number of very good reasons for its presence in the country. One of this admittedly more selfish reasons being that an instable Kosovo is a security threat to the EU. Powerful criminal organized crime groups made Kosovo a basis and transit post for smuggling, money laundering and the trafficking of women, migrants, fuel cigarettes and weapons.<sup>17</sup> The Balkan-route is one of the most established international supply routes for illicit drugs especially for heroin, cocaine, and cannabis connecting Afghanistan to the large markets of Russia and Western Europe. Moreover, the region remains a prime source of foreign fighters traveling to the conflict in Syria.<sup>18</sup>

Another reason is, that Kosovo had become no less than a litmus-test for the EU Foreign and Security Policy: If the EU fails to build sustainable peace and a working rule of law system in its direct neighborhood, the justification for state-building efforts, for example, in Africa becomes difficult. Especially as external state-building is considered as being a way to prevent the large migration flows from the African continent to the EU. Failure in Kosovo, would undermine this strategy and damage the role of the EU as a global player and provider of security.

## A Humble Position

‘Technological progress as a tool to escape poverty and live longer and freer lives’ – the EU Global strategy could not have described better the thin line between innovative power and technological hubris. It does not come as a surprise that the strategy does not specify how exactly technological progress would end poverty and give us freedom. The convenient thing about innovations that are yet to come is, that every encountered problem and every challenge, even impossibilities, only become a matter of time to be solved. The strongest believers in the transforming powers of technological powers have the mindset much like the astronauts for the Mars program, dedicating their lives and preparing for the journey to the planet with a technology that yet has to be invented.

In view of these two above described developments – ICT as a key approach to societal problems and COP as an approach to safety in post-conflict settings – the scope of this handbook should become clear. ICTs have impacted police work and more general the co-

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<sup>16</sup> Capussela 2016: State Building in Kosovo, 12.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 45.

<sup>18</sup> Shtuni 2016: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo, 2.

creation of community safety in recent years. This dynamic is likely to intensify in the near future. ICT and COP have in common that both run the risk of being viewed as a panacea to the security challenges of the future. Both are based on a democratic approach to societal change and both are seemingly anti-authoritative by enabling citizens to express their voice. But the reality outside the comfortable think tanks, policy planning departments, police academies and technology labs is much more sobering: Neither COP nor ICT alone or in combination provides the solution for the security challenges societies in post-conflict countries are facing.

At the risk of stating the obvious: There is no simple recipe for peace, security, prosperity or development. Societal change cannot be prescribed. Neither countries nor societies change by the influence from the outside. Only people do, in a slow process that even might take generations. This is particularly true for COP, a concept that by its very philosophy cannot be imposed on but must rather be embraced by all people involved. The ICT solutions we present in this handbook, if at all, bear the potential to direct or to speed up this process. They do it by facilitating collective action by enabling to identify and bring together among the thousands of users the ones that share the same views and ideas and that strive for the same goals. If people are the driver for political change, collective action is the motor. In this metaphor, ICT is no more than the navigation system: it is not crucial for operating the car but it can give guidance and enable to reach the right destination in the fastest time.

This handbook must be regarded as a snapshot of the current state of the art of ICT use for safer communities. It is a collection of ideas that we think are worth being featured. It gives some advice on how they could be best implemented in a post-conflict setting. It must be viewed as a manual and an inspiration giver for those who want to make their communities more secure. Not more. But not less either.

## 2. COP: An Introduction

### *Summary*

*This brief chapter on COP serves the purpose to lay out the main principles, challenges, and risks related to COP. A clear definition of COP is not existing up to date. The same counts for the goals and underlying principles that are widely debated among scholars and practitioners. Instead of opting for a rigid definition of the concept, this handbook chooses a more open approach to the concept. A brief historical outline contributes to a better understanding of contemporary COP approaches. The chapter touches upon some of the potentials of COP in the framework of police reform in post-conflict settings. In conclusion, it is deemed particularly important to acknowledge the limits of the approach which is far from being a panacea for police reform.*

### COP as a Concept

"[...] community policing is like democracy – everyone agrees it is a good thing but the consensus extends little further."<sup>19</sup> Nearly everything about COP is contested, including its goals, methods, best practices, and value. Even the definition of COP is vague. Numerous concepts to describe COP have emerged over time. There is, for example, Hot Spot Policing, Community Policing, Neighborhood policing, Proximity Policing, Problem Oriented Policing, Reassurance Policing, Citizen Focussed Policing, and Democratic Policing. There is even Community, Community Based, and Community Oriented Policing, all three basically having the same meaning. In addition, it is frequently described as a 'paradigm', a 'body of ideas', a 'philosophy' and a 'management style'.

But not only is there disagreement about the policing part of the concept, the term 'community' as well is widely debated. It is divided into different notions, comprising "Communities of Interest", bringing together individuals, groups and institutions that have one or more interests in common, and "Geographic Communities" which are made up of the individuals, groups and institutions within a specific territorial space, such as a neighborhood. With the developments in ICT, the latter concept has become increasingly blurred, as geographically dispersed individuals and groups are increasingly linked up around issues of common interest.

Moreover, within the community framework, minorities play an important role for COP and should be distinguished from the concept. Here again there is no agreed definition of the term but according to the OSCE, they can be understood as groups whose identities lie outside the dominant, mainstream, cultural, social and political norms in terms of race, ethnicity, gender, age, physical and mental ability, class, religion and belief, language or culture. They constitute a subgroup within the population, may be in a position of political,

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<sup>19</sup> Police Foundation 2009: Getting the best out of Community Policing, 1.

economic or other disempowerment, and seek not only to maintain their identities but also to give stronger expression to those identities.<sup>20</sup>

Finally, the goals and principles of COP are subject of discussion. In the academic literature, numerous principles of COP have been proposed, such as the 'Nine P's of COP: "A **p**hilosophy of full service **p**ersonalised **p**olicing, where the same officer **p**atrols and works in the same area on a **p**ermanent basis, from a decentralized **p**lace, working in a **p**roactive **p**artnership with citizens to identify and solve **p**roblems."<sup>21</sup> Others identify four components of COP comprising the philosophy, the operational strategy, the required organizational structure, and the management policy while others suggest eleven COP assumptions.<sup>22</sup> Condensing all these different approaches into one is an impossible task. So much has been said by so many police officials, policy analysts, researchers, and theoreticians that sometimes it is even unclear if they talk about the same thing.<sup>23</sup> As this handbook considers itself a practitioner's handbook, we have no ambition of adding to these discussions about definitions as they are mostly of academic interest.



#### How can police contribute to prevention and safety?<sup>24</sup>

- Providing a visible presence;
- Being more integrated into the community;
- Providing information to the public;
- Helping to mediate and resolve conflicts;
- Offering support to victims;
- Acting as mentors and role models;
- Participating in local crime prevention partnerships.

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<sup>20</sup> OSCE 2014: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that lead to terrorism, 62.

<sup>21</sup> Cited after ODI 2013: Securing communities: The what and the how of community policing, 8-9.

<sup>22</sup> See for further sources ODI 2013: Securing communities: The what and the how of community policing, 9.

<sup>23</sup> ODI 2013: Securing communities: The what and the how of community policing, 8.

<sup>24</sup> ICPC/National Police Directorate of Norway (2007): The role of police in crime prevention, 12.

### **COP in this Handbook**

In sum, the understanding of what COP is and how it is best implemented is as diverse as police cultures themselves. This diversity of concepts is not necessarily a disadvantage. If there is a common feature for effective COP approaches than this might be the responsiveness and sensitivity to the different needs and characteristics of communities that vary, depending on location, time and culture. For a better understanding of the concept, it can be useful to include a negative definition by acknowledging what COP is not. For the risk of stating the obvious, COP is not military-style policing, reactive crime fighting or authoritative policing.<sup>25</sup>

Of more value, however, is an approximation to the concept by acknowledging some underlying principles without claiming to be complete. Saferworld, for example, has provided ten principles for Community Based Policing:

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid, with further sources



**Ten principles of community based policing<sup>26</sup>**

1. philosophy and organizational strategy, allowing the police and community to work closely together to solve a variety of problems and improve the quality of life in the community;
2. commitment to community empowerment by translating the philosophy of power-sharing into practice including granting greater autonomy to line officers and view citizens as equal partners in identifying, prioritizing, and solving problems;
3. decentralized and personalized policing by developing a new type of line officer who acts as direct links between the police and the people in the community and is visible, accessible and accountable to the people he serves;
4. immediate and long-term proactive problem solving through continuous and sustained contact with the law-abiding people in the community and to develop and explore new solutions to local concerns, with private citizens serving as supporters and as volunteers;
5. ethics, legality, responsibility, and trust by creating a new contract between the police and citizens including the challenging of people to accept their share of responsibility for the overall quality of life in the community without promoting vigilantism;
6. expanding the police mandate by adding a proactive element to the traditional reactive role of the police to make a greater impact on community safety;
7. helping those with special needs by exploring new ways to protect and enhance the lives of those who are most vulnerable – youth, the elderly, minorities, the poor, the disadvantaged, the homeless;
8. grass-roots creativity and support by promoting the judicious use of technology while relying on individual dedication, talking and working together;
9. internal change by fully integrating everyone in the organization, bridging the gap between the police and the people they serve and eventually being a style of policing that is practiced by all officers;
10. building for the future by providing decentralized, personalized police service to the community while acknowledging order cannot be imposed from the outside. It is not a tactic to be applied and then abandoned, but a new philosophy and organizational strategy that provides the means and flexibility to meet local needs and priorities as they change over time.

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<sup>26</sup> Saferworld 2006: Ten principles of community-based policing. Handout.

Perhaps one of the greatest divides in contemporary understanding of COP is the question if the state alone holds the monopoly over the use of force, making COP a strategy solely for the police 'in blue uniforms'. The reality in many contexts and particularly in post-conflict settings is that there is a plurality of local, informal or self-help policing providers. Moreover, with the internet and the increasing use of social media, a phenomenon called do-it-yourself policing (DIY policing) is on the rise where people with the help of ICT are more and more involved in the production of security.<sup>27</sup> Governments differ considerably in their approaches, with some viewing these community-initiated practices as a threat to government control. Others see in them a useful way to address community needs with an additional service, complementing the often limited capacities of state policing and even cooperate in such practices.<sup>28</sup> However, concerns remain of expanding the COP concept to vigilante groups or even gangs, providing them with a legitimacy that may have potentially damaging consequences for the communities they are active in.

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<sup>27</sup> See the chapter on COP and ICT.

<sup>28</sup> ODI 2013: Securing communities: The what and the how of community policing, 10.



### Some elements of community policing<sup>29</sup>

- Be visible and accessible to the public;
- Establish a partnership between police and law-abiding members of the community;
- Adopt a community relations policy and plan of action;
- Recruit from all sectors of the community;
- Train officers to deal with diversity;
- Engage and mobilize the communities;
- Establish community outreach and public information programmes;
- Liaise regularly with all groups in the community;
- Build contacts with the community through non-enforcement activities;
- Assign officers to a permanent neighborhood beat;
- Increase community participation in policing activities and community-based public safety programmes;
- Involve the community in identifying problems and concerns;
- Use a creative problem-solving approach to develop responses to specific community problems, including non-traditional tactics and strategies, mediation and conflict resolution;
- Coordinate policies, strategies, and activities with other government agencies and with non-governmental organizations.

### *A Brief History of COP*

For a better understanding of the potentials and challenges COP is facing today, a (very) brief look at the history of COP is useful. Although some scholars trace community policing further back in history, the contemporary community policing emerged in the 1970s and early 1980s in the UK, North America, and the Netherlands. The policing style was a response to a widening gap between the communities and the police, as a result of car patrols replacing foot patrols and of police stations no longer open 24/7.<sup>30</sup> In these early years, it was designed as a break from more bureaucratic styles of policing with a focus on crime control, limited

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<sup>29</sup> Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2004): Human Rights Standards and Practice for the Police.

<sup>30</sup> Police Foundation 2015: Neighborhood policing: Past, present and the future, 9.

public interaction, random car patrols, shift work, coordinated central and territorial organization of responsibility. It sought to broaden the police mandate to address wider issues, such as fear of crime, social and physical disorder and neighborhood problems. Moreover, it enabled police officers to work together with residents to identify priorities and solve problems in a cooperative way.<sup>31</sup> From its beginning, COP was influenced by a somewhat romantic view of the community regarded as a coherent entity with a shared value system that would not change much over time. This enabled officers who considered themselves as 'citizens in uniform' to identify concerns by merely keeping regular contact with the people.<sup>32</sup>

It is, however, important to acknowledge that COP has not constantly been a popular approach to policing since its beginnings. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, something like a return in policing occurred, replacing COP strategies with more traditional policing and law enforcement approaches. This included particularly zero-tolerance and tough-on-crime policing strategies, respectively in the aftermath of 9/11. It almost seemed that the fight against terrorism, suddenly one of the number one priorities of police agencies in western countries, made a 'back to the roots' in policing popular. But soon these tough-on-crime approaches proved widely ineffective in fighting terrorism and radicalization, leading to an increase of distrust between the police and communities, reduced sources of information, focused police time on minor infractions and lead to the widespread violation of minority rights.<sup>33</sup>

COP was reintroduced as it became evident that traditional policing concepts did not succeed in reducing crime rates. In addition, the repressive, politicised and militarised police responses to social unrest during race riots in the UK and civil rights and anti-war protest movements in the US had backlashed and damaged the image of the police considerably.<sup>34</sup>

In more general terms, the revival of COP might have to do with the challenges law enforcement agencies are confronted with in the 21<sup>st</sup> century: the increasing urbanization, preventing and responding to terrorism as well as reducing citizen's fear of crime and increasing the perception of security. Especially for the prevention of extremism and radicalization, a community policing approach is considered fundamental to increase trust between the community and the police. The fact that COP has been globally exported through the global deployment of police forces as part of a broader justice sector reform and state-building strategy has increased its popularity even further. Today the rise of social media and the wide range of possibilities the internet offers police agencies to communicate and cooperate with citizens is another important factor for its wide distribution.

*"The police system that we used to work with was a 100% Yugoslav system. And we have moved you know from Yugoslav system to good knows which system: German, French, British, American, Slovenian system."<sup>35</sup>*

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<sup>31</sup> Bullock 2013: Community, intelligence-led policing and crime control, 126. With further sources.

<sup>32</sup> Police Foundation 2009: Getting the best out of Community Policing, 1.

<sup>33</sup> ICPC 2016: The 5th International Report Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 169.

<sup>34</sup> ODI 2013: Securing communities: The what and the how of community policing, 6. With further sources.

<sup>35</sup> Interview Project Coordinator Center for Legal Aid and regional Development.



### Dimensions of COP<sup>36</sup>

COP is defined by different dimensions. In the context of ICT use by police organizations two particularly important being the strategic and organizational dimension.

#### Strategic Dimension

- Re-Oriented Operations - Police look beyond traditional strategies of routine patrol, rapid response, and detective investigations and utilize proactive strategies and tactics;
- Prevention Emphasis - Whenever possible, police should emphasize preventing crime rather than simply reacting after the fact;
- Geographic Focus - Policing should be organized and deployed to maximize the extent of identification between specific officers and specific neighborhoods.

#### Organizational Dimension

- Structure - Police agencies should re-examine their structures to assure that they support and facilitate community policing; such a re-examination could include issues such as the devolution of decision-making authority within the police, or the introduction of performance indicators that acknowledge specific (soft) skills required for establishing and maintaining policed-public partnerships;
- Training - Police agencies should offer extensive training and mentoring of the officers that goes beyond the traditional technical skills and basic requirements for policing, covering an even broader range of skills, including the ability to communicate, to listen to different opinions, to build trust and to mediate in conflicts;
- Management - Police agencies should re-examine the way people are supervised and managed to assure consistency with community policing;
- Information - Police agencies should re-examine their information systems to make sure they support and facilitate community policing.

### *COP and Police Reform*

COP in the context of security sector reform is expected to address a wide range of typical problems in post-conflict settings: the proliferation of small arms, the tackling of organized crime, generating political legitimacy, improving the image of the police and even offering an

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<sup>36</sup> UNODC 2013: Training Manual on Policing Urban Space, 14.

answer to human rights problems.<sup>37</sup> The problem, however, is the fact that most of the actors involved (community representatives, NGOs, police agencies, international actors) have very different views on what COP entails and how it should be implemented. This is even true for the international police officers stemming from different countries with different police cultures. This does not only influence the different COP styles but also the expectations of the diverse actors, often resulting in frustration on all sides. For example, a simplistic but widespread view of COP likewise among citizens and police officers is that COP is primarily aimed at information gathering in communities to either fight or prevent crime. As this might be partly true, it disregards the expectations of communities to be actively involved in the co-production of community security, in the identification and prioritization of problems as well as in the policing of their neighborhoods. With a view to the production of security in communities, it is worthwhile having a closer look at the security concepts this handbook is operating with.

**Definition: Community Security**

According to the OSCE, community security refers to the mutually desirable goals of protecting local residents of, and visitors to, an area from threats posed by anti-social behavior, social disorder, crime, and terrorism.<sup>38</sup> It seeks to operationalize human security, human development and state-building paradigms on a local level. The concept is very similar to others, such as citizen security, community safety or armed violence prevention/reduction. Clear boundaries between the concepts do not exist. According to UNDP, the concept of community security includes group, personal and human security and focuses on ensuring that communities and their members are 'free from fear'. In a broader sense, it even includes the 'freedom from want'.<sup>39</sup>

Another increasingly important term in that context is 'community resilience'. It describes the ability of a community to withstand, respond to and recover from a wide range of harmful and adverse events. Originally pertaining to conflict or disaster resilience, this term is increasingly broadened to the ability to prevent and respond to crime.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> ODI 2013: Securing communities: The what and the how of community policing, 11.

<sup>38</sup> OSCE 2014: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that lead to terrorism, 14.

<sup>39</sup> UNDP 2009: Community Security and Social Cohesion – Towards a UNDP Approach, 13.

<sup>40</sup> OSCE 2014: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that lead to terrorism, 14.

The advantage of the community security concept is that it bridges the gap between the focus on the state and other concepts that focus on the individual. In the state-building framework, it refers to the development of effective institutions that are accountable to citizens for the effective delivery of services.<sup>41</sup> From a practical perspective, the nuances of the different above-named concepts are of minor relevance. Again, in view of developing a practically oriented handbook, we will use the terms community safety, community security and human security interchangeably as they cannot easily be differentiated and are all relevant for COP.

*“After sixteen years working daily on programs and managing community safety issues that affect peoples’ lives. [...] We are struggling somehow to establish a mechanism for a sustainable transition for this entire program.”<sup>42</sup>*



### Stakeholder for COP identification<sup>43</sup>

Identifying relevant stakeholders for COP Projects requires having an idea of the following:

- The issue at hand;
- Those who are directly affected;
- Those who must deal with the consequences;
- Those who would benefit if the issue could be prevented;
- Those who require particular attention (e.g. marginalized groups, youth);
- The outcome(s)/goal(s);
- Knowledge of existing services and sectors in an urban community that can offer additional support to the police.

Building a partnership may involve several stages

- Agree on a strategy to address the issue. This may be facilitated by developing a formal or informal structure which has known objectives, goals and mandates;
- Secure broad-based participation;

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<sup>41</sup> UNDP 2009: Community Security and Social Cohesion – Towards a UNDP Approach, 13.

<sup>42</sup> Interview Representative OSCE, National Programme Officer Community Safety Development Section

<sup>43</sup> UNODC 2013: Training Manual on Policing Urban Space, 19-20.

- Train or inform partners if needed;
- Clearly determine roles and responsibilities;
- Advertise the partnership to spread awareness and extend reach;
- Provide the space and time for debate and adjustment to existing ideas;
- Reflect on efforts and evaluate the outcomes.

The Community Safety Steering Group<sup>44</sup>

Stakeholders can be organized in a so-called Community Safety Steering Group (CSSG). They should be selected carefully taking into account the socio-demographic structure of the community including minority groups and young people.



### *Risks of COP*

Despite the fact that COP has become an integral part of police reform in post-conflict settings, it is important to acknowledge that COP is not a panacea or antidote as which it is all too often portrayed. In fact, the examples where COP was successfully implemented in the framework of security sector reform with a sustainable effect remain rare. This

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<sup>44</sup> EFUS (2007): Guidance on Local Safety Audits, 8.



sustainability is a key factor and often forgotten in the fast-paced cycles of international engagement.

To implement COP structures takes a considerable amount of time and effort, especially within (police) cultures that are traditionally used to authoritative law enforcement styles. This is particularly true for post-conflict countries where trust in the police is typically low and where the police themselves might have played a role in the conflict. Positive results of COP take a considerable amount of time to be visible and are not easily evaluated. This bears the risk that the state will not be able or is not willing to finance COP projects as soon as outside donor support dries up. O'Neill, for example, stipulates that "police reform is a multi-faceted, multidisciplinary effort that takes careful coordination among many actors and will require many years and a great deal of money."<sup>45</sup> He sees one of the major challenges in how to ensure the sustainable generation of financial resources and to avoid dependence on foreign largesse.

Yet, sustainability does not only pertain to funding COP programs. With a view to international engagement, respectively police missions, one of our interview partners in Kosovo stressed the fact that one of the biggest disadvantages for the implementation of a community policing strategy is the constant change of staff.<sup>46</sup> Personal contacts and trust that are crucial for COP take time to build up and cannot be simply handed over to the successor on the post. The same is true for the various COP forums. The Municipal Community and Safety Councils (MCSCs) in Kosovo, for example, consist to a considerable part of members that are politically elected by the municipalities. With every new election, new members arrive that do not only have to be trained in the mechanisms but very often first have to be convinced that the forum itself is useful at all.<sup>47</sup> Often the success of COP approaches rests heavily on the engagement and enthusiasm of individuals. As soon as they are replaced or leave the forum for any reason, the performance may drop. One of our interview partners, therefore, stressed the importance that COP strategies put in place a reliable system with clear responsibilities independent of individual involvement.<sup>48</sup> This, in turn, bears the risk of creating bureaucratic hurdles and suffocating personal engagement.

Besides this challenge of sustainability, a number of other challenges and risks are related to COP approaches respectively in post-conflict settings. The following are identified by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) as being specifically relevant:

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<sup>45</sup> O'Neill 2005: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know, 5.

<sup>46</sup> Interview Representative OSCE, Senior Community Policing Officer

<sup>47</sup> Interview Representative OSCE, National Programme Officer Community Safety Development Section

<sup>48</sup> Interview Representative EULEX, Chief regional advisor North Regional Directorate Mitrovica



### The Risks of COP according to ODI<sup>49</sup>

**Efficiency:** One of the greatest risks of COP is the highly contested evidence as to whether it actually works or not. O'Neill in that matter speaks of a mixed record of success of the various objectives that are attributed to it.<sup>50</sup> He deems it unlikely that COP has the potential to reduce crime but it may positively influence community-police relations. According to Shearing, the predominantly positive rhetoric has transformed COP into a "hurrah" word which carries with it warm connotative meanings that have been employed to paper over denotative difficulties.<sup>51</sup>

**Detraction:** Even if COP is successful in implementing good policing in communities, this may detract attention away from transforming the overall quality of policing at the national level. An important issue is the question of how community-level practices can be better connected to broader state-building processes and by that unfold its transformative potential.

**Inequality:** COP can create and reinforce inequalities between communities. Often communities which are most able to mobilize and generate resources are more successful in implementing COP initiatives. But these communities are not necessarily the ones that are most in need of COP. This can even foster a dynamic leading to more stratified policing between, on the one hand, wealthier and safer communities, and, on the other hand, poorer and more dangerous communities.

**Representation:** The implementation of COP practices can mean to cooperate with groups that have weak democratic representation and accountability. This may even go so far as to risk the support of groups that enjoy strong local legitimacy, despite exhibiting discriminatory, oppressive or brutal practices at times. Moreover, representation of women, young people, and minority groups is typically low in community-innovated policing practices for various reasons. One of them may be that these groups are systematically excluded by those being in power at the community level. However, such a lack of representation is not an issue solely pertaining to COP but typically found in most state policing organizations in developing countries.

**Ambivalence:** A practical problem of COP is to distinguish very clearly between information gathering and community policing. This is particularly an issue when COP is used for the prevention of radicalization and extremism. Intelligence gathering on individuals at risk can easily blur the line between enforcing counterterrorism measures and the trust-based community policing approach.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> ODI 2013: Securing communities: The what and the how of community policing, 32-34.

<sup>50</sup> O'Neill 2005: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know, 20.

<sup>51</sup> Cited after ODI 2013: Securing communities: The what and the how of community policing, 32.

<sup>52</sup> See chapter 10 in this handbook

Besides the named risks there are also challenges that have to be overcome for successful implementation of COP. According to UNODC research has shown that community policing has not always worked well. COP requires certain conditions to be met and sometimes even fundamental changes. The following examples are identified as being challenging and sometimes even led to unsuccessful COP projects in urban spaces:



### Challenges for COP<sup>53</sup>

- Legacies of authoritarianism, use of force and vertical institutional structures led to mistrust of the police and repressive policing strategies;
- Pressure from high rates of urban crimes has reduced the focus on COP and prevention strategies;
- High incidence of violence has led to the militarization of urban spaces and prevented close collaboration;
- Consultations/meetings with community members were infrequent and information was not transferred to police departments;
- COP remained a token concept used by government;
- Police-community structures were not sustainable;
- Change of government or head of police interrupted or dismantled existing promising initiatives;
- High turn-over of police officers in community police stations;
- Lack of recognition of community policing as “real police work”;
- Community policing is rarely a career choice among young officers;
- Difficult to measure accomplishments in crime prevention and community safety;
- Lack of training or ongoing guidance to help the police adapt or effectively implement new strategies;
- Lack of development of a formal community policing unit with goals, objectives, strategic plan or only a few officers were assigned to community policing;
- Prevention does not play a role in the institutional framework or strategic plans of the police;
- The implementation of such a strategy is not advertised to the community.

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<sup>53</sup> UNODC 2013: Training Manual on Policing Urban Space, 22.

## COP as Problem Based Policing: Safety Audits

It is important to understand that COP is a science-based approach to community safety. Instead of one-size-fits-all approaches, it puts an emphasis on specifically tailored solutions that may differ between communities. COP Strategies therefore necessarily require different forms of problem analysis to be effective.<sup>54</sup> One common strategy is so-called safety audits. A safety audit is a systematic analysis undertaken to gain an understanding of the crime and

- victimization-related problems
- to identify assets and resources for preventive action
- to enable priorities to be identified
- to help shape a strategy that will enable those priorities to be tackled<sup>55</sup>

A safety audit is based on the assumption that the design of physical environment affects safety and therefore an environment can be designed to enhance safety and perceptions of safety. Historically safety audits were used to tackle the problem of violence against women in public spaces. Today they can be used to address a much broader range of safety issues with the goal to create a more participatory approach to address the issues in question. For the police, they can be a useful tool for setting out project goals and priorities, identify crime hot spots or re-orient policing strategies.<sup>56</sup> The European Forum for Urban Security suggests the following principles that should underpin the safety audit process<sup>57</sup>:

- The purpose of the audit should be to gain an understanding of crime, related problems and their causes to inform the development of a prevention strategy.
- The audit should be based on the recognition that crime results from a complex interaction of social, economic, legislative, environmental and other circumstances.
- The audit should adopt practices which model and contribute to good urban governance and sustainable development.
- The audit should be undertaken with respect to the law and human rights and used to promote a culture of lawfulness.
- The strong commitment of stakeholders with competence in relevant policy areas is critical since success depends on their ability to respond to the findings. A participative approach that involves engagement with civil society and community interests is critical throughout the audit process.
- Positive action is needed to ensure the voices of the poor and most victimised people are heard, recognizing that official data will not adequately reflect their experiences.
- The audit should incorporate the distinctive perspectives related to gender, minorities, and youth.

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<sup>54</sup> See for example the SARA model in Chapter 4.

<sup>55</sup> EFUS (2007): Guidance on Local Safety Audits, 10.

<sup>56</sup> UNODC 2013: Training Manual on Policing Urban Space, 33-34.

<sup>57</sup> EFUS (2007): Guidance on Local Safety Audits, 11.

- The audit should identify relevant assets in an area, including social capital and successful projects, which may provide the basis for building effective responses.
- The audit should not be used as a tool to encourage or justify vigilantism or punitive activity but should be solely used as part of the preventive process.

The methods of how to conduct a safety audit are manifold and include interviews with key informants, open meetings, focus groups, or even exploratory walks. The implementation of Safety audit must be tailored to the specific situation, community and identified problem.

**UNODC suggest the following five steps<sup>58</sup>:**

Step 1. Identify crime, violence and insecurity issues in the target community. Tap the knowledge and experience of a variety of sources such as municipal services, the police, schools, local firms, community leaders, previous studies, etc.

Step 2. Identify local stakeholders already participating in prevention activities and projects in the target locality or with the target population groups. These stakeholders could include government agencies, NGOs, research centers, universities, and representatives from the business and commercial sectors.

Step 3. Analyze the individual and social characteristics of the target group and the physical features of the intervention area.

Step 4. Decide on the priority problems requiring intervention.

Step 5. Analyze those problems, seeking to discover when and why they arise and identify their main characteristics

## Concluding Remarks

This brief chapter on COP served the purpose to lay out the main principles, challenges, and risks related to COP. All issues that are mentioned will be elaborated upon in the following chapters. However, we consider some issues particularly important to address at this point. COP, at least as we understand it, is no educational instrument for police agencies, although it might have some elements of it. As much as COP can hardly be imposed on communities (although in reality this is frequently done), it is also a weak instrument to re-educate or to transform perceptions of community members. It is important to acknowledge these limits of the approach. For example, very often racism, prejudice, and xenophobia, particularly towards minorities, can be a crucial problem in communities with negative impacts on the feeling of security of these groups. Expecting COP to transform these, often deep-rooted attitudes run the risk to overburden the potentials of the approach. In fact, the police force might struggle itself with the aforementioned resentments. After all, police officers are often

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<sup>58</sup> UNODC 2013: Training Manual on Policing Urban Space, 35.

recruited from the same communities, have the same attitudes and prejudices and mirror the citizens they serve.

During our research we came across numerous publications and experts that seem to view COP as a method to create social cohesion, building inclusion and integration. The reason for this might be that there is a strong relationship between social exclusion and insecurity.<sup>59</sup> To a certain degree, the term 'cohesion' alone suggests a homogeneity that barely exists, with the result that the heterogeneity of many communities, particularly in urban areas, encapsulate a wide variety of competing interests. This leaves COP with the dilemma of having to prioritize certain problems. Effective COP-strategies, therefore, depends on a certain degree of social cohesion in communities as well as the ability among community members to identify and negotiate their way through conflicting interests in a constructive manner.

Limits of COP also derive from the implementation in communities itself. COP is only rarely introduced by the request of communities. In fact, sometimes there is not even a prior consultation of communities. In Kosovo, for example, the above mentioned Municipal Community and Safety Councils are important institutions for COP but were established by the UN by decree. This left the majors of the municipalities with not much of a choice than to comply, even though neither capacity building nor funding was offered.<sup>60</sup> The problem with these top-down approaches is not only that it undermines local ownership from its very beginning but also that it runs diametrically opposed the principles of COP. Moreover, it bears the risk that community priorities are assumed and policing styles implemented which are not necessarily in line with community needs. For example, often the human rights focus that is promoted by international actors is not favored by local communities. As O'Neill describes, "[s]ome maintain that controlling crime requires "tough" policing and that the population, too, will call for more robust police action if they feel threatened by crime, even if this encroaches on human rights."<sup>61</sup> As both, communities and the police, are thus susceptible to the belief that community policing is 'soft' on crime, police reformers are required to convince them of the opposite.



### Crime Observatories<sup>62</sup>

An important precondition for successful COP approaches is to first identify the problems and needs of the communities. An effective way to do so is to establish crime observatories. These are permanent mechanisms for collating and assessing information on crime and related problems. They are monitoring centers that bring together data and information from multiple sectors. According to the International

<sup>59</sup> UNDP 2009: Community Security and Social Cohesion – Towards a UNDP Approach, 14

<sup>60</sup> Janssens 2015: State building in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective, 247-248.

<sup>61</sup> O'Neill 2005: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know, 3.

<sup>62</sup> UNODC/ICPC 2010: Handbook on the crime prevention guidelines - Making them work. Criminal Justice Series 59-60.

Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC), numerous countries, regions, and cities have developed these observatories to improve information and the understanding about crime and the social and economic problems associated with it. The observatories enable them to target resources more efficiently in order to reduce crime and insecurity and to increase community safety. The territories that are covered by observatories vary, reaching from:

- local level e.g. Madrid and Bogotá have city observatories,
- sub-regional e.g. Regional Observatory on Security Policies in Italy,
- national e.g. l' Observatoire national de la délinquance in France, and
- regional e.g. OCAVI for the Central American region.

While some of these observatories focus on specific topics, such as school violence or organized crime, most are concerned with overall safety issues. The primary aim is to inform policy decisions based on information that goes beyond police data and include data from municipal services, transport services, social housing, landlords, business, traders etc. To develop a better understanding of local crime issues, often geographical information systems, victimization and fear of crime surveys, and self-report delinquency surveys, as well as information from qualitative interviews and focus groups, are processed. By establishing crime observatories, governments can facilitate the analysis of the incidence, causes, and trends in crime and violence and related problems as well as monitoring progress with strategic plans over time.

For an example of an observatory, see the crime observatory of Belize at <http://crimeobservatory.bz/>

### Recommended Readings

For a brief overview of the challenges of COP in police reform see O'Neill, W. 2005: Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know. Policy Paper, The Security-Development Nexus Program.

This report gives insights into the role of COP in police reform ODI 2013: Securing communities: The what and the how of community policing

For an in-depth account of COP with a focus on Britain see Police Foundation 2015: Neighborhood policing: Past, present and the future.

### 3. COP in International Police Missions

#### *Summary*

*Int. Police missions have been mostly conducted by the UN, the OSCE, and the EU. The success and effectiveness of the missions remain contested among scholars and practitioners. Especially the UN and its peace missions have been widely criticized. The challenges for police reform from the outside are manifold. The deployment of qualified personnel, a coherent mission concept, cooperation between the different stakeholders and the ability to adapt to difficult circumstances in post-conflict settings are crucial factors for success. Over the past years, COP played an increasingly important role in these missions. At the same time, more authoritarian military policing styles are on the rise. The contradiction between both approaches have yet to be overcome.*

#### Introduction

After having explored the topic of community policing in the past chapters in the following we will cast a closer look at international police missions and the role COP plays within them. We will analyze the three international organizations we deem the most important in terms of COP for the Western Balkans and specifically for Kosovo: The UN, the OSCE, and the EU.<sup>63</sup> As an international police mission is here defined as any deployment of police officers in an operation in a post-conflict setting under the umbrella of one of the organizations. Societies in these settings can differ considerably in the amount of violence, political stability and the effectiveness of police institutions. However, most post-conflict settings where international police operations take place are characterized by a lack of the ability to use coercive force by state institutions. Sometimes no police forces are present at all as it was the case in Kosovo after the conflict in 1999. Consequently, the International Community (IC), was obliged to create a new police organization from scratch.

Even if some rudimental police structures still exist, the IC is confronted with the fact that very often police organizations were parties in the underlying conflict, sometimes even perpetrators of heinous crimes against the same civilians whose security they are to provide for after the conflict. The vetting of police officers with regards to their past and their attitude is therefore often a starting point for police reform. But there is also a limit to this approach. For example, in the case of Iraq, so many members of Hussein's Baath party were discharged from their police duties with the effect that the Iraqi police was too weak when they were needed most.<sup>64</sup>

Police components can be part of all kinds of operations and missions, ranging from crisis management with an integrated approach, combining military and civilian resources and

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<sup>63</sup> NATO although increasingly involved in COP will be left out for reasons that are explained below.

<sup>64</sup>Janssens 2015 2011: Blur the Boundaries! Policing in Contemporary Peace Operations, 9.



purely civilian missions.<sup>65</sup> The roles police officers can take over in these missions are manifold and include but are not limited to executive tasks, international border security tasks and Training, Mentoring, Monitoring and Advising (MMT&A) functions. An important role in the context of police missions plays the approach Security Sector Reform (SSR).

**Definition: Security Sector Reform**

Nearly all Police mission today are embedded in the wider concept of Security Sector Reform/System (SSR) which is based on the assumption that development and security mutually reinforce each other. The Clingendael Report defines SSR as “transforming the security sector/system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that they work together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.”<sup>66</sup> In the past and still today, SSR mainly addressed state security actors excluding non-state actors, armed groups and civil society organizations that may play a role in either providing or undermining SSR.

It is important to note that SSR efforts are strongly dependent on voluntary local support from politicians, state institutions and, more importantly, the civil society. For example, in Bosnia, the attempts of the international community and in particular the EU to reform the police by centralizing it, were perceived as intrusive. Local Politicians feared this would break down the autonomy of their entity and rejected it. This shows a certain dilemma of SSR: enforcing political changes from the outside by simultaneously being dependent on voluntary cooperation from the inside.<sup>67</sup>

**UN Police Missions**

Of all organizations involved in police missions, the UN is probably the most prominent one. In the 71 peace missions since 1949, the first police officers were deployed from the 1960s on as part of an integrated or comprehensive mission concept. The number of deployed police officers grew steadily over the years, from 35 in 1988 to 9000 by February 2000. These numbers again increased significantly between 2006 and 2010 from 7300 to 14000.<sup>68</sup> Currently, the UN deploys 16 peace missions with a total of more than 13500 police officers stemming from over 90 countries with a 10% rate of female officers.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Clingendael 2016: The future of police missions, 14.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>67</sup> Tolksdorf 2014: Incoherent Peacebuilding: The European Union's Support for the Police Sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2002–8, 70.

<sup>68</sup> Greener 2011: The rise of policing in police missions, 184.

<sup>69</sup> Status: January 2017. For more information see <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>

According to the UN Police (UNPOL), the objective of the deployments is to “to enhance international peace and security by supporting Member States in conflict, post-conflict and other crisis situations in their quest to realize the ideal of an effective, efficient, representative, responsive and accountable police service of the highest professional standard possible.”<sup>70</sup> This role of UNPOL has evolved over the past decades from a mission objective focused on observation and reporting to a much more active one encompassing training, mentoring, reforming the police and other law enforcement forces as well as executing police tasks whenever the local police are not in the position to do so. The reasons for that can be seen in the increasingly challenging environments UN police missions are deployed to but also more complex mission aims making a more robust and diversified mandate necessary.

Today, UNPOL mission mandates have a strong focus on transformation. The overall aim is to reform the practice of the local police and the broader security sector through training and mentoring. This includes means of depoliticisation, vetting officers, recruiting new police officers and reforming police structures and strengthening civilian control. In the case of Kosovo where local police structures were not yet established by the beginning of deployment UNPOLs mandate was even broader, entailing all executive policing and law enforcement tasks.

However, it is important to keep in mind, that a great deal of the police, justice, and rule of law reform happens outside the UN Peace operations and is conducted by other UN bodies, such as UNDP (UN Development Programme), UNOHCHR (Office of the High commissioner for Human Rights) or UN Women.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> UNDPKO 2014: United Nations police in peacekeeping operations and special political missions, 6.

<sup>71</sup> Clingendael 2016: The future of police missions, 40-42.



### The Gender Imbalance in UN Peace Missions

Although the numbers have slightly increased over time with only about the 10% female officers the UN peace missions suffer from a significant gender imbalance. There are a number of reasons on the national and international level why female participation is so low. At the national level, traditional and cultural factors can hinder women's recruitment and promotion in the police service, which often depends on possibilities for part-time service, the nature of specialist training, and an ability to drive and to use firearms. At the international level there are additional impediments to female recruitment apart from country selection processes, including harsh conditions of peacekeeping host countries limiting the ability of women with family commitments to participate. Positions often demand considerable previous experience which can lead to the paradoxical situation that women are turned down for the lack of experience giving them no opportunity to gain such.<sup>72</sup>

But the deployment of female police officers can be crucial to the success of police missions. Very often a significant problem in conflict-torn environments is the situation of women and children. They are the weakest part of the population and very of subjected to violence and abuse. During conflict rape and other forms of sexual violence are often perpetrated by men in uniform. After the conflict women and children often mistrust local police, mostly men in uniform. But studies have shown that perceptions towards female police officers are more favorable.

### *COP in UN Missions*

UNPOL consider itself as a community-oriented service. As it deploys to environments with weak, fragile or no police legitimacy the restoring of consent of the public in their own police is a core task. This includes the promotion of the concept of 'policing by consent' and the encouragement of the public to become partners in preventing and detecting crime in their communities.<sup>73</sup> COP is embedded in Operations, one of the four key elements of peacekeeping operations (the other three being Command, Administration, and Capacity-Building & Development). According to UNPOL:

"the Operations element is responsible for assisting the host State police in fulfilling core policing and other law enforcement tasks, including the areas of public safety, investigations and the conduct of special operations. [...] An overarching approach to

<sup>72</sup> Carpenter 2011: Female UN Police Officers: Boosting Protection for Women and Children, in International Centre for the Prevention of Crime: Practical Approaches to Urban Crime Prevention, 116-117.

<sup>73</sup> UNDPKO 2016: Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, 6.

many operational tasks is that of community-oriented and intelligence-led policing.”<sup>74</sup>

More specifically, this operational support role is provided directly and indirectly to the host state police comprising from the development of operational plans, patrolling and public order management, to advice and mentoring on reporting, the conduct of investigations, COP and traffic policing.

UNPOL defines four cornerstones for implementation of COP in post-conflict settings<sup>75</sup>:

1. *Consulting with communities*: this includes regular solicitation for input from communities and community organizations about crime, disorder, and activities that generate fear. Consulting with the public is deemed crucial for demonstrating that the police serve the public rather than simply themselves or those in positions of power.
2. *Responding to communities*: public cooperation is best obtained by demonstrating the willingness and ability to respond to public security needs. This may include advice on alternatives strategies if UNPOL is not able to provide what is requested.
3. *Mobilizing communities by building trust*: this includes to assist communities addressing and managing crime and security problems. Assistance may take many forms, for example, providing information about crime and criminals, serving as volunteers in crime prevention campaigns and other outreach programs, donating facilities and equipment, adopting self-protection measures, and mediating local disputes.
4. *Solving recurring problems*: this is based on the approach of police and communities working preventively together to change conditions that lead to crime rather than responding over and over again to individual incidents. This includes UNPOL to broaden the range of preventive activities undertaken, supplementing law enforcement with regulatory, educational and developmental activities.

In terms of capacity building and development tasks, a number of police services are enlisted including some that can be considered classical COP tasks, such as designing community security patrols, introducing community policing concepts, piloting crime prevention and community safety initiatives and support community mechanisms, to prevent and address crime.<sup>76</sup> For example, these activities include:

- The creation of consultative committees in each patrol area and police station composed of representative members of the public, including women.
- Share timely information about crime in local areas with consultative committees and the media.
- Create a toll-free emergency telephone number and assign competent, well-trained staff to telephone and police station reception duties

<sup>74</sup> UNDPKO 2014: United Nations police in peacekeeping operations and special political missions, 11.

<sup>75</sup> UNDPKO 2016: Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, 9.

<sup>76</sup> UNDPKO 2014: United Nations police in peacekeeping operations and special political missions, Annex 1, 3.

In addition, educational measures are taken encompassing for example:

- Assignment of police officers to work with youth and schools to enhance safety and reduce the risk of victimization.
- Development of joint programs with public and private social agencies to address the concerns of women and children, especially domestic violence and sexual abuse and exploitation.
- Developing the capacity of all police stations to detect crime patterns and “hot spots” for police attention.
- Training of supervisors at all levels in the management of COP, in particular how to encourage and facilitate COP activities by subordinate officers.

Depending on the mandate and local legislation, UNPOL may either undertake itself these tasks or support the host-State police to perform the tasks themselves.<sup>77</sup>

### *Criticism of UN Peace Missions*

In the past years, UN missions have come under strong critique from scholars as well as from practitioners claiming that missions often fail to perform despite reasonable expectations in the field. Based on various sources a study by the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands names a number of critical points challenges UN missions (and other peace missions) have yet to overcome<sup>78</sup>:

- The operational context remains one of the biggest challenges. Especially the worsening of security and political conditions requires flexible adaptations to new situations. Often UN peace missions are not sufficiently equipped and trained for such changes resulting in a failure to achieve the mission goals.
- UN Mandates, in general, have become more complex and at the same time more specific making them less manageable, realistic and achievable. This is partly due to the so-called “Christmas tree mandate” dilemma where template language for many tasks is routinely reused in missions in disregard of the fact that one size does not fit all.
- UNPOL missions tend to underestimate or even ignore local contexts and conditions that may have an undermining effect on assistance attempts. Local police and security cultures have to be respected and reforms must be designed accordingly. This includes local staff that understands local processes as can estimate what is possible in a given context.
- Support of state institutions may have controversial effects on communities especially when these institutions are perceived as being part of the problem. The legitimacy of the supported institution in the eyes of local communities is therefore highly important.

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<sup>77</sup> UNDPKO 2016: Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, 7.

<sup>78</sup> Clingendael 2016: The future of police missions, 47-53.

- The quality of deployed police personnel has been widely criticised. Giving the high prize the UN puts on anti-corruption measures and human rights its credibility is at risk given that increasing number of officers come from countries whose standards for that matter are considerably low.
- The UN is relying too much on paramilitary-style policing in disregard of the fact that increasingly complex missions require more complex policing approaches. Preference is to be given to a small number high-quality capacity providers instead of big numbers of law and order providers.
- Enhanced civilian expertise and longer term-specialized expertise in the staffing of missions are required. This includes the ability to transfer knowledge as having special expertise and skills does not automatically mean that the knowledge will be accepted.

In the next chapter, we will have a closer look at these shortcomings and how they specifically impacted peacebuilding in Kosovo.

## OSCE Missions

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) with its Secretariat in Vienna is comprised of 57 member states. Its activities are not reduced to policing but cover three main areas namely political and military issues, economic and environmental challenges, human rights and democracy. The OSCE region stretches between South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

In the late 90s, the organization emphasized the importance of a police component in its missions to address threats to stability leading to the first police deployments in Croatia (1998) and Kosovo (from 1999). However, different from the UN or EU the OSCE never performed executive Police tasks during its deployments.<sup>79</sup> Its activities can be summed up to training, development, and monitoring of local police units. More specifically this comprise

- Institution- and capacity-building;
- Confidence-building, police monitoring and advice;
- Police training in line with international policing standards;
- Facilitation of information sharing and exchange of best practices;
- Analysis of lessons learned to develop programmatic, conceptual and methodological guidance.<sup>80</sup>

The thematic priorities of the organization range from police development to address threats like organized crime in general, terrorism illicit drugs, trafficking in human beings and cybercrime. Currently, the OSCE employs about 2000 international and locally recruited personnel in its operations. Typically, the OSCE deploys a small number of staff as part of less extensive field operations. For example, the recently launched police mission in Kirghizstan Community Security Initiative is staffed with 28 international police officers. However, in its mission to Kosovo (OMiK), the OSCE deployed at its peak in 2002 no less than

<sup>79</sup> Clingendael 2016: The future of police missions, 57.

<sup>80</sup> OSCE 2014: Permanent Council Decision No. 1049: OSCE Strategic Framework for Police Related Activities, 3-4.

267 police officers. Although, usually being relatively small all OSCE missions have in common that they run for a relatively long period.<sup>81</sup>

### *COP in OSCE Missions*

COP has been at the very core of OSCE police missions from an early stage of its activities to in host countries.<sup>82</sup> Public-police partnerships are at the center of this approach. With regards to the police the OSCE promotes fundamental changes in structures and management styles of police organizations namely:

- Devolution and decentralization of decision-making and resource management from mid-level management to front-line officers.
- Transformation of responsibilities of all police officers, with subordinate ranks becoming more self-directing, and supervisors and senior ranks assuming a coordinating, guiding and supporting role in encouraging front-line officers.
- Shift of communication within the police, from a predominantly top-down approach to more emphasis on a bottom-up approach.
- Training and mentoring of officers, going beyond the traditional technical skills and basic requirements for democratic policing and including an even broader range of specific community policing skills.
- Focus on performance evaluation on the officers' ability to effectively address community problems and to involve the community in this effort.

With regards to the public, the OSCE focus on the

- Empowerment of communities, with the police facilitating the organization of community meetings and forums, and educating community members on how they can be actively involved in the problem-solving process.
- Education of the other government agencies about their role in the problem-solving approach and the establishment of formal structures for smooth cooperation in the interest of avoiding duplication, division of labour, mutual assistance and the development of synergies in the use of public resources.

The changing of police cultures as well as the perception of police by the public are an ambitious endeavor in post-conflict settings. The challenges and obstacles to this approach are manifold and require a considerable amount of time. With regards to its achievements the OSCE states:

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<sup>81</sup> Clingendael 2016: The future of police missions, 59-60.

<sup>82</sup> OSCE 2009: Report by the OSCE Secretary General on Police-Related Activities of the OSCE Executive Structures up to the End of 2009, 38.

“Although a number of pilot projects on community policing were completed successfully in various host countries, one has to be pragmatic and accept that people who have had reasons to distrust the police for decades will not develop trust overnight, nor will the police immediately embrace the notion of the public as an equal partner in the fight against crime. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that the building of police-public partnerships is a complex and long-term process.”<sup>83</sup>

This statement exemplifies one of the core difficulties of all police reforms that set out to change entire police cultures may it be at the top or even more at the mid-level of police management as much as the public’s deeply rooted negative image of the police.<sup>84</sup>

## EU Missions

The EU considers itself as a global player in when it comes to security. Police Officers from EU-member states are deployed to Palestine, EU border guards patrol the borders between Ukraine and Moldova, EU-Marines cruise the horn of Africa, and military personnel instruct soldiers in Mali. Since 2003 the EU has launched 34 civilian and military Missions in the framework of the so-called Common Security and Defense Policy (in the following therefore referred to as CSDP missions).

### Definition: Common Security and Defense Policy

According to Art 42 the Treaty of Lisbon from 2009, the CSDP “shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.” The EU-member states provide the capacities to implement this policy which in practice has taken the form of military and civilian operations covering a wide spectrum of activities aimed at contributing to the security and stability of third countries, mainly in the Balkans and Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>85</sup> However, since the beginning of mission deployment and relatively active phase between 2003-2008 the military component of CSDP has become less prominent.

The CSDP is not an isolated approach but rather embedded, streamlined and sometimes even conflicting with other EU-policies and political strategies. The wider context of EU’s approach is reflected in its Global Strategy on Foreign and Security which sets out the core interests and principles for engaging in the wider world with “an ambition to make Europe

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<sup>83</sup> OSCE 2009: Report by the OSCE Secretary General on Police-Related Activities of the OSCE Executive Structures up to the End of 2009, 40.

<sup>84</sup> Clingendael 2016: The future of police missions, 64.

<sup>85</sup> Missiroli (ed.) 2016: The EU and the World: Player and policies Post-Lisbon – A Handbook, 45.



an even more united and influential actor on the world stage.” Acknowledging that these are times of crisis the strategy deals with challenges like energy security, migration, climate change, violent extremism, and hybrid warfare by emphasizing a coordinated approach between EU-member states.

An important concept within EU foreign and security policies is the so-called internal-external security nexus. It describes the fact that internal security of the EU and external security as part of the foreign affairs is increasingly blurred. For example, if Libya fails as a state (external dimension) this results in major security challenges for the internal security of the member states including illegal immigration, human trafficking, and terrorist threats. For the same reasons, the EU has been so engaged in the stabilization of southeastern Europe over a long period of time. It is important to acknowledge that CSDP missions are not merely deployed for humanitarian reasons but rather serve vital security interests of the EU Member states. In consequence, the CSDP is increasingly dependent on interaction with EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies like FRONTEX, the border protection agency, the EU Police office EUROPOL and EUROJUST, the agency dealing with judicial cooperation in criminal matters in Europe.

In SE Europe another policy instrument has played an important role over the past years as well: the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Through this policy, the EU seeks to promote close relations with countries in the realm of European territory in the east and the south. The idea is to give a long-term perspective of becoming an EU member state or at least being more closely integrated. The ENP includes countries like Armenia, Ukraine or Georgia but does not apply to the western Balkans as these countries are already part of the EU enlargement agenda.

### *CSDP Missions in Detail*

CSDP operations and missions are created by the Council of Ministers of the EU on basis of political assessment of the situation in the potential host country, various planning steps, and decision-making procedures. The missions are only one of the numerous options of response to a conflict situation, others being diplomatic or humanitarian action, restrictive measures, or abstention in certain crisis situations. The Planning of CSDP missions takes place on two levels, on a strategic and operational one, both comprising different planning procedures. In addition, there exists a fast-track procedure that is tailored for emergency situations. Mandates for Missions are usually provided for one- or two years and renewed on basis of strategic reviews that may lead to the missions modification or termination.<sup>86</sup>

CSDP Missions are, generally spoken designed to achieve three goals:

1. *Responding to external conflicts and crises:* According to the Council of the European Union,<sup>87</sup> this covers the full range of CSDP tasks in civilian and military crisis management. The aim is to enhance CSDP's awareness and responsiveness in all phases of the conflict cycle, including conflict prevention, in order to promote peace and security within a rules-based global order.

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<sup>86</sup> Missiroli (ed.) 2016: The EU and the World: Player and policies Post-Lisbon – A Handbook, 52-54.

<sup>87</sup> Council of the European Union Brussels, 14392/161, 4 November 2016.

2. *Building the capacities of partners:* Capacity building of partners include the tasks of training, advice and/or mentoring within the security sector with the aim to contribute systematically to the resilience and stabilization of partner countries recovering from or threatened by conflict or instability. This is to be achieved in synergy with other EU instruments and actors, notably along the nexus of security and development

3. *Protecting the Union and its citizens:* Protecting citizens inside the EU is pursued through CSDP missions by tackling challenges and threats that have an impact on EU security. This means specifically the strengthening of networks and critical infrastructure; the security of its external borders as well as building partners' capacities to manage their borders; civil protection and disaster response; ensuring stable access to and use of the global commons, including the high seas and space; countering hybrid threats; cybersecurity; preventing and countering terrorism and radicalization; combatting people smuggling and trafficking; building capacities to manage irregular migration flows; promoting compliance with non-proliferation regimes and countering arms trafficking and organized crime.

### *Critical Assessment of CSDP Missions*

A lot has been written on the effectiveness and actual impact of CSDP missions. The measurement of any crisis management activity is difficult and very often subject to debate as the case of Kosovo in the next chapter will show.<sup>88</sup> True is that each mission has to be assessed individually by its mandate, scope, and results.

For example, the anti-piracy mission Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden is widely considered as a success as piracy activities have declined significantly. The military training mission in Mali may have contributed to the reorganization of the armed forces. But the long-term effects can hardly be estimated and are highly influenced by factors that are not related to the mission performance. For example, the state-building efforts in several missions, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, have produced rather underwhelming results despite the fact that they were based on sound concepts.<sup>89</sup>

One issue that has been repeatedly raised by critics of the CSDP missions and the peacebuilding activities of the EU, in general, is a lack of coherence in its political approaches. Simply spoken this incoherence breaks down to the application of two different policy approaches namely an interventionist top-down approach and a bottom-up approach that puts a focus on local ownership. Top-down approaches to police reform are based on the assumption that cultural and policy change at high levels will permeate through the levels of law enforcement. This results in a focus of reform activities at national- or state-level institutions and working mainly with senior personnel. Bottom-up, in contrast, puts local bodies at the center of reform assuming that sustainable change originates from a grass-roots level. Both approaches are not contradictory per se and can be simultaneously incorporated in police reform.

Nevertheless, according to Moore, CSDP police missions so far have mainly focused on high-level reform, on central security institutions and national policies with senior personnel at

<sup>88</sup> Missiroli (ed.) 2016: The EU and the World: Player and policies Post-Lisbon – A Handbook, 54.

<sup>89</sup> Tolksdorf 2014: Incoherent Peacebuilding: The European Union's Support for the Police Sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2002–8, 57.

its center.<sup>90</sup> Different reasons can be identified for this EU approach, such as cost-effectiveness and safety reasons for CSDP personnel being located at central Ministries. These issues have been repeatedly raised in the case of Kosovo and we will go more into detail in the next chapter. The EULEX Mission as a capacity-building mission with a reform agenda must be considered as one of the most difficult approaches to state-building. Nevertheless, the mission indeed puts a focus on local ownership but with mixed results.

However, the number alone of CSDP mission that has been conducted, with currently 16 ongoing operations are proving that the EU considers them as an effective tool for peacebuilding. According to the Clingendael Report, EU's own reviews and lessons learned exercises are rather poor due to the problem lessons learned processes are perceived as blame and shame exercise'. Moreover, the consensus-making process, in the end, tends to soften review instruments, such as evaluation, benchmarking, best practices and lessons learned.<sup>91</sup>

It has to be kept in mind that performance assessments can hardly be made on macro-level by the impact on the host country's or region's peace and security.<sup>92</sup> CSDP missions usually not take the form of large-scale operations that are designed as drivers for major societal change in the regions they are deployed to. In this respect the western Balkans specifically Kosovo are an exception with EULEX being one of the largest mission ever deployed.

### *CSDP in the Western Balkans and Kosovo*

The EU has identified the Balkans and the Eastern Neighborhood as areas of vital geopolitical interest and strategic importance for European security. Moreover, in the long-term, the EU strategy for the region expressed the commitment regarding a membership perspective of the countries in the region. In 2003 the Thessaloniki Declaration stated, "unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries". Indeed, it is a crucial aspect of the EU enlargement policy to promote democracy and security. But with every new enlargement, the EU is confronted with new neighbors and new challenges to security. This policy naturally has to have a limit defined by the ENP and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), both policies that emphasize cooperative relations by simultaneously excluding membership for a foreseeable future.

This, however, is different in the Balkans where the EU-membership perspective offers both, a strategic and an incentive for reform. EU leaders had realized that after the Balkan conflict a policy of emergency reconstruction, containment and stabilization was not enough to bring long-lasting peace and stability to the region. Only a real prospect of EU integration was considered of being able to achieve that. With a view to the experience of the UN engagement in the region, it was assumed, that it would be much more effective and cheaper to involve the countries in an accession process than to run international protectorates and military occupation for a long lasting period.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Moore 2014: CSDP Police Missions: Comparing Bottom-up and Top-down Approaches, 286.

<sup>91</sup> Clingendael 2016: The future of police missions, 29.

<sup>92</sup> Missiroli (ed.) 2016: The EU and the World: Player and policies Post-Lisbon – A Handbook, 55.

<sup>93</sup> Juncos 2017: CSDP strategy in the Balkans and the Eastern neighborhood, 19-20 with further sources.

With Croatia joining the EU in 2013 the prospect of membership for the other Balkan countries is pushed beyond 2019 leaving Albania, Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, and Serbia as candidate countries whereas Kosovo and Bosnia remain potential candidates. For Kosovo, the latest development was that a Stabilization and Association Agreement entered into force in April 2016. The reasons for this hesitation to expedite the association process are manifold and differ between the countries of the region. In general major challenges remain with respect to the rule of law and independence of efficiency and accountability of judicial systems, the capacity of public administrations, and the functioning of democratic institutions.<sup>94</sup> For the case of Kosovo, the Commission specifically name problems concerning normalization of relations with Serbia, the obstruction of parliamentary work by different political parties, the increase of parliamentary oversight of government activities and the need for structural economic reforms addressing the high level of unemployment. In the field of law and security, the commission particular refers to the administration of justice as inefficient and insufficient accountability of judicial officials resulting in a vulnerability to undue political influence. Rule of law institutions suffer from lack of funding and human resources. Moreover, Kosovo is still at an early stage in the fight against corruption and organized crime partly due to the lack of political will to tackle these problems in a comprehensive manner.<sup>95</sup>

Recent EU priorities in the region are, despite the maintenance of stability, especially counterterrorism and the fight against Islamic radicalism due to the fact that high numbers of foreign fighters originate from the region.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, the migration crisis in 2015 along the so-called Balkan-route with hundreds of thousands of migrants crossing the region but also a considerable amount of citizens from the Balkans seeking for asylum in the EU made an impact on the EU security agenda.

### *The Security Gap and Military Police Forces*

The so-called Security Gap is an important issue in police missions and arises when the deployed police forces are hindered to perform police tasks due to the destabilized environment. At the same time, the military component of the mission is unable to perform police tasks, either because of the intensity of the prioritized military tasks or because of the lack of trained forces for that task. Consequently, gendarmerie forces have been viewed most suitable to rapidly deploy alongside the military and to perform both substituting and strengthening police tasks.<sup>97</sup>

Their hybrid nature of being trained in military as well as in police tasks, combining the best of the two worlds is assumed to enabling them to respond more efficiently during disturbances than their military counterpart without running the same risks as civilian police officers.<sup>98</sup>

As a result, gendarmerie forces were deployed in numerous missions including Kosovo under the name tag of Specialized Police Units (SPUs). Moreover, the EU Member states

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<sup>94</sup> Missiroli (ed.) 2016: The EU and the World: Player and policies Post-Lisbon – A Handbook, 114.

<sup>95</sup> European Commission COM(2016) 715 final, Brussels 9.11.2016, 29.

<sup>96</sup> Missiroli (ed.) 2016: The EU and the World: Player and policies Post-Lisbon – A Handbook, 54.

<sup>97</sup> Clingendael 2016: The future of police missions, 84.

<sup>98</sup> Janssens 2011: Blur the Boundaries! Policing in Contemporary Peace Operations, 14-15.

France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain created in 2006 created a European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) (which was later joined by Romania and Poland) with the aim to enhance international crisis management capabilities in all phases of conflict. The EGF with a capacity of 800-900 men can be deployed under the command of the EU, UN, NATO, OSCE or other international organizations as well as Ad-hoc coalitions. It has since been deployed in Bosnia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Ukraine.

In the reality of a police mission, the drawing of a distinction between police and military tasks is neither easy nor always practicable. For example, the EU mission to BiH (EUFOR Althea) had two key military tasks: firstly, to support the High Representative's Mission Implementation Plan dealing with the economy, the rule of law, the police and defense reform and secondly to support the fight against organized crime. But at no point was the mission mandated to enforce laws or make arrests which remained a task of the Bosnian police. This led to a situation described by the former force commander of EUFOR Althea, David Leaky who writes:

"I laid down one clear principle to guide EUFOR: soldiers would create the conditions in which the BiH law enforcement agencies not only 'could' but 'would have to' do their duty. In other words, EUFOR would help discover a crime or illegality (e.g. fuel smuggling or illegal timber cutting), but would 'freeze the scene' and hand it over to the BiH authorities to deal with the legal and law enforcement technicalities."<sup>99</sup>

There are some convincing reasons for the deployment of gendarmerie forces when certain conditions are met. But this does not necessarily count for COP a strategic approach considerably different from the authoritarian style of military police. In this regard, their role has been reduced in the past to support of regular COP officers. For example, in Afghanistan, the ratio of deploying EU gendarmerie forces was to allow the Afghan police to engage in COP, while the gendarmerie forces would take over the fight against the Taliban, other insurgents, and the opium industry.<sup>100</sup>

With regards to its operational effectiveness, the EGF faces a number of challenges. Decisions on deployments are strongly dependent on the political will of the Member States as they have to be reached unanimously. For the deployment in BiH, for example, lengthy political discussions unfolded among the EGF Member States as they had troubles agreeing either on the nature of the mission as of in which area it should be deployed.<sup>101</sup> Moreover, the EGF remains a relatively unknown instrument which is partly due to the fact that some member states due to constitutional reasons are less familiar with this concept of policing. In Germany, for example, it is prohibited under constitutional law for the military to take over police tasks. Nevertheless, there exists a military police ('Feldjäger') which interestingly enough was deployed to Kosovo until 2001/2002 taken over police tasks in the country. Nevertheless, skepticism towards the deployment of EGF remains high in these countries.

Besides this political dimension, there are also practical challenges. Janssens, for example, writes, that the cooperation with the civilian police does not always run smoothly as gendarmerie units tend to bring along their own chain of command, rules of engagement

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<sup>99</sup> Leakey 2006: ESDP and Civil/Military Cooperation: Bosnia and Herzegovina. 63-64.

<sup>100</sup> Janssens 2011: Blur the Boundaries! Policing in Contemporary Peace Operations, 15.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, 6.

and methods. He cites an UNMIK police officer stating that “in order to justify their *raison d’être*, some gendarmerie units in Kosovo withheld vital information from the civilian police and acted completely on their own, without informing the other partners within the mission.”<sup>102</sup>



### NATO and COP

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is focused on military missions and in principle does not undertake police missions or even a police component in its operations. However, in practice, the NATO has not only employed several missions that contained activities that lie in the larger conceptual field of SSR but actually executed police duties and trained local police forces.<sup>103</sup> Interestingly enough NATO even provides a COP Concept within the framework of its stability policing approach supporting all other activities conducted within it.<sup>104</sup> According to the NATO, COP can be used for force protection by either establishing

“a shield against hostile forces, through social control or facilitate their deactivation or the mitigation/stabilization of hostile or non-permissive environments, leveraging the synergy stemming from networking and collaborating with local actors. Moreover, the role COP can play in counter-insurgency measures is stressed by being conducive to the protection of civilians and NATO forces.

However, some doubts have to be voiced whether NATO-forces have the necessary capabilities to successfully engage in COP. Our research in Kosovo suggests that KFOR, the NATO Kosovo force, is a well-respected institution among citizens and had managed to establish a quite good relationship with the public. Trust in KFOR by the population has been constantly high over the past years.<sup>105</sup>

But there is a difference between liaising with citizens on basis of more informal relationships for the gathering of intelligence and integrating local communities as partners in the framework of COP. NATO still stands, if at all, for a military style of policing which is fundamentally different from COP approaches to human security. The latter requires a high degree of expertise, intensive training on both sides as well as a long-lasting engagement. Our research with KFOR suggests that the military had indeed received some training in community liaison before deployment. But most of their community engagement was based on learning by doing.<sup>106</sup> But a ‘learning-by-doing’ approach to COP as practicable it might be, is not a very promising strategy. In fairness, the above-cited COP-strategy of NATO was released in 2016 which leaves it likely that specific measures are not implemented yet.

<sup>102</sup> Janssens 2011: *Blur the Boundaries! Policing in Contemporary Peace Operations*, 15.

<sup>103</sup> Clingendael 2016: *The future of police missions*, 67.

<sup>104</sup> NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence 2016: *Stability Policing Framework Concept for Community Policing in NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction operations*, 1.

<sup>105</sup> Saferworld 2011: *Public perceptions of safety and security in Kosovo: Time to act*, 18.

<sup>106</sup> Interview KFOR Soldier Liaison and Monitoring Team.

## CSDP Missions and the Relation to OSCE and UN

*"This is no time for global policemen and lone warriors."<sup>107</sup>*

After having briefly analyzed the three main actors of peacekeeping the question arises how they coordinate their efforts in terms of peacekeeping and state-building? In its Global Strategy to foreign and Security Policy, the EU states that it "will strive for a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinated responses with international and regional organizations, states and non-state actors."<sup>108</sup> This cooperation with other International Organizations is at the core of CSDP missions.

For example, in the framework of the CSDP, representatives of UN and EU meet on a regular basis to discuss and coordinate activities. As one of the main instruments for dialogue and policy coordination functions a Steering Committee. These activities have been institutionalized with a 'UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management' covering the period 2015-2018. This cooperation includes support in the areas of mentoring, train & equip and operations, as well as logistics, and the exchange of information and analysis. In reality, however, this cooperation has come under tensions over the past years due to divergences on certain aspects of crisis management and has suffered from a certain reluctance of the EU to support UN peace operations with niche capabilities.<sup>109</sup>

The EU considers the OSCE at the heart of the European security order and states that the "EU will strengthen its contribution within and its cooperation with the OSCE as a pillar of European security."<sup>110</sup> As the main link between OSCE and EU serves the Delegation of the EU to the International Organizations in Vienna coordinating their daily work especially in non-decision making instances and identifying synergies. One of the main areas of cooperation between the both remains Eastern Europe respectively the Western Balkans where they have strengthened coordination between CSDP missions and OSCE field operations. Here they share a number of common interest and grant mutual support in developing human rights and democratic institutions as well as crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.<sup>111</sup>

*"What you shouldn't do is to force people. It doesn't work. You have to approach in a different way. I think that EULEX, OSCE, and UN get good results but you have to explain it in a proper way."<sup>112</sup>*

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<sup>107</sup> EU 2016: Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Strategy, 4.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, 10.

<sup>109</sup> Missiroli (ed.) 2016: The EU and the World: Player and policies Post-Lisbon – A Handbook, 57.

<sup>110</sup> EU 2016: Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Strategy, 33-34.

<sup>111</sup> Missiroli (ed.) 2016: The EU and the World: Player and policies Post-Lisbon – A Handbook, 115.

<sup>112</sup> Interview Representative EULEX, Chief regional advisor North Regional Directorate Mitrovica



## Concluding Remarks

International police missions are confronted with a number of challenges. The rapid deployment not only of a large number but also of well trained and qualified police officers is probably the most crucial one. Moreover, the mission environment and the degree of pacification plays an important part in how successful police reform measures can be implemented. But stability is a fragile condition and can easily tip over to become violent again as will be shown in the case of Kosovo in the next chapter. In these cases, heavily equipped military forces might prove more efficient. Military organizations are, however, not designed to take over and implement law enforcement activities and soldiers are not trained to deal with policing the public. Most certainly military personnel is not prepared to be engaged in COP processes. In fact, COP is at the heart of a trend that asks how to demilitarize democratize the police rather than importing military police styles.<sup>113</sup>

It is important to underline that reforming the law enforcement and judiciary sector is best addressed by the civilian governmental and non-governmental organizations. Military organizations like NATO can only play a constructive role in COP when security situation does not allow for civilian engagement by taking over most urgent tasks of the otherwise civilian capabilities.<sup>114</sup>

Police mission can be roughly divided into two types, strengthening missions and substitution missions. While the first one is focused on to train, monitor mentor and advise local police the latter one is tasked to restore public security as former security structures are basically nonexistent. In reality, however, both types of mission are intertwined with substitution missions being often directly followed by strengthening components.<sup>115</sup>

One issue that must be considered crucial to the success of police missions but can only be mentioned briefly as it is not within the scope of this handbook is the so-called institution gap. This describes the fact that the success of police reforms is not only depending on a functioning police but also on effective legal and judicial institutions following up on cases. Weaknesses in judiciary services can have an undermining effect on the motivation of the police to implement reform processes.<sup>116</sup> Our research in Kosovo showed that this was a crucial problem, having invested significantly in the training of the police force which was not matched by prosecution offices. Especially in the field of organized crime and high profile corruption cases this lead to the fact that numerous cases weren't either dismissed by the courts or not prosecuted at all.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Bruggeman 2011: Gendarmeries and the Security Challenges in 21<sup>st</sup> Century – Some introductory remarks, 60.

<sup>114</sup> Clingendael 2016: The future of police missions, 69.

<sup>115</sup> Janssens 2011: Blur the Boundaries! Policing in Contemporary Peace Operations, 9.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>117</sup> Interview Representative Kosovo Law Institute partner. For EULEX role in that matter see Capussela 2016: State Building in Kosovo, 116 ff.



**Recommended Readings**

The Clingendael Report: The future of police missions 2016 gives an excellent overview of the current state of affairs of police missions by the UN, OOSCE, and EU.

For the broader context of the EU's role, a self declared global security player see Missiroli (ed.) 2016: The EU and the World: Player and policies Post-Lisbon – A Handbook.

For a glimpse of NATO's future approach to COP see NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence 2016: Stability Policing Framework Concept for Community Policing in NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.

For an overview of how the UN approaches COP see UNDPKO 2016: Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions

## 4. Information and Communications Technology for COP

### *Summary*

*To understand the use of ICT in COP this chapter starts by taking a close look at Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) and the trend of predictive policing. “Big Data” is analyzed to create crime maps and even to predict where crimes will occur in the future. For COP, recent developments in the field of social media will be identified as most promising with regard to the potential of involving citizens in the production of security. But when used by police agencies, a functioning social media strategy is much more complex than simply setting up a police Facebook page. After all, the use of social media must be viewed as a two-edged sword with numerous implications and potential for backlashes. In the third part of this chapter, the growing phenomenon of do-it-yourself-policing (DIY-policing) is analyzed. In the past years, more and more civil society organizations have been engaged in data collection or the development of social media applications to deal with security issues. In the last part, we will have a look at the certain issues and challenges that ICT for COP is facing in post-conflict settings.*

### **Introduction**

Whereas in the previous chapter we had closer look at the concepts of COP, this chapter introduces ICT. Although the focus will be on ICT for COP we chose a broader perspective and included the wider range of policing and the growing field of so-called ‘do-it-yourself policing’ (DIY-policing). The latter describes a societal dynamic of citizens increasingly taking the production and provision of security in their own hands. We try to identify some trends and developments that we deem most significant for COP. However, we are not claiming of giving a complete overview. After all, the field of technological innovations is constantly changing and developing. This is one of the biggest challenges of our scientific approach to the topic: analyzing the changing landscape of ICT in policing and human security cannot be more than a snapshot. We, therefore, focus on three major trends that are relevant for COP and all interrelated: Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP), social media and DIY-policing. ILP processes data derived from social media networks. Social media, in turn, is an integral part of DIY-policing, probably even one of its driving forces.

This handbook takes a practical approach to ICT as well as to COP. During interviews with ICT and social media experts, we found out that often inspiration comes from looking at other stakeholders, how they are using ICTs for the implementation of COP and to achieve an understanding of what is working and what not. ICT and especially the field of social media is a universal approach. If something is working in a small town in the UK, it might be working in a rural area near Prizren in Kosovo as well, presumed that the ICT infrastructure is similar. This is the first assumption not only this chapter but this entire handbook is based

on: what is working somewhere in the world, might work somewhere else in the world as well. It results in the fact, that the chosen examples are from all over the world and not limited to certain regions or countries. The second assumption is that by providing and describing these examples might give citizens and police agencies a clearer picture of what the possibilities and limits are of ICT in COP.

Some of the topics in this chapter might seem focused on the needs of police agencies. But this is only partly true. Initially, social media was developed by and for the civil society and is only slowly explored by the LEAs for the purpose of security, image building and trust relations with citizens. After all, social media is not only an information but a communication tool and works most effectively as a two-way street. Users of these platforms have to be considered more as partners in the provision of security than as subjects to a top-down policing approach. Mutual trust is a pre-condition for an effective cooperation. A challenge is that LEAs are based on secrecy to a certain extent. A crucial question for LEAs engaging in social media or supporting DIY-policing is, therefore: To what extent should the police be transparent online? We believe that large parts of our research results and advise in that matter is not just interesting for police agencies but can be applied to civil society organizations, to NGOs or whoever is engaged in the field of community security.



### Smarter Cities

A report by the International Center for the prevention of Crime addresses the issue of urbanization.<sup>118</sup> The rapidly increasing urbanization worldwide leading to more and more people living in cities is one of the major challenges for COP in the future. Proving “urban safety” will no longer be the task of the police or law enforcement agencies alone but rather strongly build on the role of residents and communities in developing and implementing these policies. The term “fragile city” describes the growing inability of city governance structures to keep up with the rapid urbanization and find the right answers to challenges particularly in relation to security issues. This fragility causes the citizens to lose trust in law and order systems and makes the cities even more vulnerable to extreme poverty, crime, and violence.


One proposed solution to these challenges is the concept of “smart cities”. This approach includes specifically the wide use of ICT to improve living conditions in cities targeting social, economic, infrastructural and environmental development. In terms of urban safety, this approach involves a networked connection of safety and security systems (CCTV, police, traffic, etc.), across four stages: prevention, protection, response, and recovery. ICT is supposed to encourage participatory governance and can facilitate the participation of typically excluded groups in city life.

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<sup>118</sup> ICPC 2016: The 5th International Report Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 50-54.

Data derived from various ICT tools can be used to improve urban safety plans and to make public safety information open and accessible.

It is important to keep in mind that particularly private sector players and security technology companies promote the concept of smarter cities through the development and commercialization of technology solutions. Also, there are some considerable risks related to this approach such as growing social division and exclusion by access to ICT. Therefore, "it is important that the possibility of engagement through ICTs be complementary to other methods in order to accommodate broad and inclusive participation."<sup>119</sup> But there is a darker side to the increased access to ICT such as its use for illicit and criminal activities which we will elaborate on in detail below. In consequence, current crime prevention efforts must understand the cyberspace as an extension of the city space, closely linked to real potential for urban crime and violence.



Source UN-Habitat: The Role of ICT in the Proposed Urban Sustainable Development Goal and the New Urban Agenda, 4.

<sup>119</sup> ICPC 2016: The 5th International Report Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 54.

### A typology of ICTs

Before dealing in more detail with the development of ICT for COP and its practical use it is helpful to have a closer look at a typology of ICT to gain a better understanding of how it is used in the production of security. For this typology, we have identified three categories of ICT that are relevant for COP in this handbook namely collaboration, empowerment and control.

1. Collaboration: The ideal types of ICTs are used to foster cooperation and collaboration between citizens and law enforcement agencies. The various social media tools are a good example for this when used for awareness raising campaigns or for the distribution and exchange of information. Twitter or Facebook, for example, is often used by law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to quickly disseminate information on incidents like catastrophes, mass gatherings or terror attacks. Mutually through the same channels information, LEAs are provided with sometimes vital information from citizens. Another example relevant for COP are searches on Facebook where LEAs encourage the engagement of citizens to provide information on fugitives or criminals. Overall these applications are based on the idea of collaborative security production by treating citizens as partners in the process of creating security.

2. Empowerment: There exist ICT applications that enable people to enhance their own safety. Especially the worldwide growing phenomenon of Do-it-yourself policing (DIY-Policing) falls within this category. It describes the growing tendency of citizens taking security into their own hands using various ICT applications.<sup>120</sup> Good examples are the various reporting apps (e.g. on sexual harassment, urban safety) that enable to map out insecure hot spots in cities or other locations that can then be avoided by the users.

3. Control: A wide range of ICTs are used by the police or other LEAs to control and gather information on citizens. COMPSTAT, for example, a predictive policing and management software used by the New York Police is the basis for the widely criticized stop and frisk policy targeting particularly minority communities. Another example are so-called school management systems that are used to detect radicalization tendencies among pupils. These systems process information about children at risk that are identified by teachers and cross-reference the data with law enforcement, social welfare, and other databases.

These technologies are characterized by treating citizens less as partners in the production of security but rather as subjects that have to be controlled and policed.

This suggested typology is not to be considered as a fixed one but a rather fluent concept. Collaborative applications such as social media tools can be used in a controlling manner. DIY-policing does often involve the police at some point in the process. But it can also become a tool for controlling. We will discuss these issues in much more detail on the following pages. But first, we will shed a light on the development of ICT for policing.

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<sup>120</sup> See chapter 4 on ICT in this handbook.

## Intelligence-Led Policing

*“It is important to understand that Community Policing is a process and Intelligence Led Policing is the product, so it is very linked.”<sup>121</sup>*

For a number of years, ILP has been an influential theory in the growing study of law enforcement practices. The focus of intelligence-led policing is on crime data, analysis, and targeted police efforts in response to that data.<sup>122</sup>

### Definition: Intelligence-Led Policing

A clear definition of ILP is not existing. According to Carter, it can be characterized “as an underlying philosophy of how intelligence fits into the operations of a law enforcement organization”. ILP must be created through an inclusive development process that ensures it is integrated with an agency's goals and functions, its capabilities and the characteristics of both the agency and jurisdiction it serves. It is an adaption to more efficiently and effectively deal with multijurisdictional threats and crime that touches communities.<sup>123</sup> Some authors consider ILP as a new paradigm in policing which has its roots in the post 9/11 environment. Since then it has been adopted by modern law enforcement agencies around the world.

*“Community Policing is the driving mechanism for ILP. All the information are coming from the community. Police need to use Community Policing as sources of information and intelligence for not only their day to day work but also for strategic planning.”<sup>124</sup>*

There exist a number of overlaps and interlinks between ILP and COP. Very generally spoken, both share a desire to reform police practices.<sup>125</sup> But ILP approaches police reform more as a business model and managerial philosophy of improving the efficiency of existing policing processes. COP, however, was, at least in its beginning, conceived as an alternative to reactive policing styles. Over time, COP evolved and became more embedded in the same policing framework as ILP, dominated by efficiency, crime control, and law enforcement. Although ILP and COP are different approaches today, they interact in practice. Information gathering and strong community ties are a key feature for COP. But ILP as well is strongly

<sup>121</sup> Interview Representative EULEX, Chief regional advisor North Regional Directorate Mitrovica.

<sup>122</sup> Ferguson 2016: Predictive Policing and reasonable suspicion, 271.

<sup>123</sup> Carter et al. 2014: Intelligence-Led Policing: Conceptual and Functional Considerations for Public Policy, 316.

<sup>124</sup> Interview ICITAP National advisor Kosovo on community Safety.

<sup>125</sup> Bullock 2013: Community, intelligenc-led policing and crime control, 126.

depending on data input for intelligence analysis. COP officers have immediate access to local and neighborhood information.



### **ILP and Radicalization**

An example to illustrate how ILP works is the growing problem of radicalization processes and extremism among so-called ‘foreign fighters’ or ‘home grown terrorists’. Since the Syrian war, an increasing number of young people from western countries travel to the Middle East to join terror organizations, like the Islamic State (IS). The radicalization process itself, that is a precondition for recruitment, is not taking place completely isolated from society but rather is facilitated through different channels, such as social media networks or religious groups in the home countries. Law enforcement agencies try to tackle the phenomenon through prevention concepts. But these work best when they directly target individuals most prone to radicalization, i.e. youngsters at a very early stage of their radicalization.

The biggest challenge, however, is to identify endangered individuals. A number of factors can play a role here. Very often problems in school, social welfare issues and radical views expressed in class or on social media platforms are early symptoms. An ILP approach would be to collect all available data for analysis, such as school records, teacher’s testimony, reports from imams, doctors, and social welfare agencies, police records and data retrieved from social media profiles. From the collected data, risk profiles can be retrieved. Theoretically, this could be done for every youngster and powerful IT would be required to process and analyze this “big data”.

How does COP fit into that framework? COP approaches can contribute to ILP by providing high-quality data for analysis. For example, COP includes the creation of forums or roundtables where different stakeholders from the community are brought together at a local level. Through dialogue certain risk factors can be identified, awareness can be raised and early warning mechanisms can be trained. Information can be gathered and early interventions initiated that do not necessarily include law enforcement measures.

However, these examples also show the dangers that are related to both concepts and which will be discussed in detail below: the issues of data protection and the problem of investigating people on basis of a very general suspicion.

For now, the relation between COP and ILP can be described in short: community policing strategies encourage citizens to provide COP officers with new information that might be relevant to preventive police work and long-term problem-solving. ILP, in turn, employs community policing principles and even builds on tactics and methodologies developed during years of community policing experimentation.<sup>126</sup> Two popular methods of applying ILP in current years is through crime mapping and predictive policing.

*“All police officers in Kosovo are considered to be Community Policing officers. [...] In the training they learn about intelligence-led policing as this is fed by Community Policing”.<sup>127</sup>*

## Crime Mapping

Crime mapping has become increasingly popular for police agencies as well as for civil society organizations in the past years. It uses objective crime data to determine crime hot spots in cities and to guide police deployment as well as the distribution of resources. It is based on the criminological insight that crime does not randomly disperse across geographic areas but is rather clustered in certain neighborhoods. It can be explained as a function of certain environmental factors.<sup>128</sup> Crime mapping is often embedded in the concept of COP. In Great Britain, for example, the Crime maps and Community Safety Partnership Reform Programme from 2007 heavily utilized crime mapping and GIS-based analysis of partnership data sets (such as ambulance call out data, fire service data on arsons, local authority records on antisocial behavior incidents and probation offending data) for visualizing crime patterns and directing resource allocation to local areas of need. Moreover, those data sets were shared between Community Safety Partnership partner agencies.<sup>129</sup>

But much simpler applications for the use of citizens have become quite popular in the past years. The Berlin Police started a campaign where they published crime maps of pickpocketing in the city in order to warn citizens to be particularly cautious in these areas. There are mobile apps available that collect all reported crime data and flag dangerous areas in cities red, recommending the user to avoid visiting these neighborhoods.

But crime mapping in the framework of COP is not restricted to hotspot identification and visualization or deploying community police officers. Longstaff et al. name a number of other applications for GIS technology that potentially support neighborhood policing efforts. These include:

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<sup>126</sup> Carter et al 2014.: Intelligence-Led Policing: Conceptual and Functional Considerations for Public Policy, 319.

<sup>127</sup> Interview KP Officer

<sup>128</sup> Ferguson 2016: Predictive Policing and reasonable suspicion, 272.

<sup>129</sup> Police Foundation 2015: Neighborhood policing - past, present and the future, 47.



- recording and mapping police activity, crime reduction projects and calls for service/incidents;
- helping to understand the distribution of crime and to explore the mechanisms and dynamics of criminal activity through analysis with other data;
- using the maps visually to show crime statistics to the public and initiatives that are being implemented;
- mapping the fear of crime;
- assessing vulnerable targets for terrorism in local communities.



### Analyzing Emergency Calls in Kosovo

Emergency call maps go beyond crime statistics but include a human security dimension in their scope. Open Data Kosovo, an NGO based in Pristina, in cooperation with UNDP analyzed incoming emergency call data from Pristina over the period of one year, based on keywords found in the text of the call. On basis of these keywords, various categories were identified, such as traffic accidents, thefts and burglaries, violence, fires and wild animals. Linked with the exact location of the incoming call, a map can be created that can be of great value to the design of local security architectures. Certain trends can be identified, such as that calls about stray dogs are more common in the winter months when the animals have trouble finding food. In summer, calls about traffic incidents peaked, as a result of a considerable high number of diaspora Kosovars entering the country with their cars. This way, hot spots for various threats to human security can be identified and patrols can be located more efficiently. Moreover, long-term planning and staffing for first responders is made easier.

Like crime statistics, crime maps are often made publicly available by police agencies via the internet. This may increase transparency and accountability of the police and, by that, have a positive effect on the relation between the police and communities. Moreover, it gives the individual valuable information on crime hot spots and how to avoid them best. But there is also a downside to this: the fear of crime may rise if crime data is published regularly. Moreover, certain neighborhoods, for example, those populated by ethnic minorities, are quickly stigmatized and flagged as 'no-go areas'. This bears the risk of initiating and perpetuating a certain dynamic of discrimination as well as becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

## Predictive Policing

Recent developments in the field of ILP are summarized under the term “predictive policing”. Simply put, this approach is based on the idea of stopping crime before it even happens. Predictive policing uses crime mapping and research data showing that repeat incidents account for a relatively large proportion of most categories of offenses.<sup>130</sup>

### Definition: Predictive Policing

‘Predictive policing’ refers to any policing strategy or tactic that develops and uses information and advanced analysis to inform forward-thinking crime prevention. It makes use of “big data” to isolate patterns and generate computer models that predict areas of future crime locations. Predictive policing has become a generic term for any crime-fighting approach that includes a reliance on information technology (usually crime mapping data and analysis), criminology theory, predictive algorithms, and the use of this data to improve crime suppression on the streets.<sup>131</sup>

According to Ferguson, predictive policing can be viewed as part of an evolution to intelligence-driven policing techniques that rely on scientifically grounded principles and decades of criminological theory on crime and place.<sup>132</sup> It has its roots in a strategy called “hot spot policing”. This strategy takes account of the uneven distribution of crime between and within neighborhoods, sometimes concentrated in a small number of streets or even in only one building-complex. Based on these findings, police interventions and patrols focus on micro-locations instead of whole neighborhoods. In addition, hot spot policing often introduces measures that reduce the opportunities for committing crimes. These situational crime prevention measures include the installment of better door and window locks, surveillance measures like CCTV or improving the environment by, for example, cleaning up graffiti, removing abandoned cars or improving street lighting (broken windows theory).<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Police Foundation 2015: Neighborhood policing - past, present and the future, 24.

<sup>131</sup> Ferguson 2016: Predictive Policing and reasonable suspicion, 265.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid, 270.

<sup>133</sup> Police Foundation 2015: Neighborhood policing - past, present and the future, 22.



### **Skala Software in North-Rhine Westphalia, Germany**

To cope with the significant growth of burglaries in Germany, the Police Office of North-Rhine Westphalia (LKA-NRW) conducted a predictive policing project called SKALA in 2015. This software is supposed to predict burglaries in large cities like Cologne, Düsseldorf and Essen with the use of big data. This data is comprised of crime statistics, data of the infrastructure and data of social and socioeconomic structure of the cities. The software calculates every week the probability of burglaries in certain neighborhoods of the named cities and provides local police stations with the results. The latter can then adapt their policing strategies, for example, by organizing more police patrols in high-risk areas. According to the developers, the software is three times more accurate in predicting burglaries than traditional methods.

The basic principle of the software is the assumption that burglaries tend to spread in clusters across cities. Burglars are inclined to use the same escape routes and operate in neighborhoods they have thoroughly observed beforehand. This means that the likelihood of burglars choosing the same neighborhoods more than once in a short period of time is relatively high. A simple principle for police strategies is to enhance their activities in those neighborhoods where burglaries have occurred recently.

How successful the software is, in reality, is difficult to estimate. Since the introduction of the project, the high rates of burglaries could be reduced in certain neighborhoods. However, it remains unclear if these successes are based on the software or if other measures and circumstances have contributed to this reduction. Critics argue that the police do not need a software to be told that crimes cluster in local areas. The police itself warns of too high expectations of the impact of SKALA in fighting crime. After all, it is no magic bullet but only one piece of a holistic policing approach.

Predictive policing is heavily relying on the computer and IT. Data of past crimes, types, and locations are fed into an algorithm to identify neighborhoods with a weekly, daily and sometimes even hourly forecast of crime. Police officers are deployed to the so identified crime hot spots to deter and catch criminals during or sometimes even before their act.<sup>134</sup>

These strategies use social network analysis and social maps, link friends, gangs, and enemies together and create a visual web of criminal networks. In fact, the analysis of big data gathered on social media platforms is an increasingly important branch of policing. Monitoring of platforms like Facebook or Twitter for threads, incidents, rumors and other critical information has become a substantial part of prevention as much as predictive activities of the police. Countering fake news and rumors will be one of the biggest challenges for authorities in the nearer future.

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<sup>134</sup> Ferguson 2016: Policing predictive Policing, 2.

Moreover, in the United States, for example, statistical risk assessment tools are increasingly used to inform bail, sentencing and parole decisions in an effort of bringing greater efficiency, equity, and transparency to the criminal justice system.<sup>135</sup> Particularly in the US, there is predictive analytics on the rise as a growing industry of startups sells specific software solutions to cities, claiming that the systems which process empirical data are free from human biases and inefficiencies.

### *Critical Issues of Predictive Policing*

Police officers have always made their decisions based on risks and probabilities. In that sense, predictive policing is nothing new. New is that it offers the possibility to base those decisions on large amounts of empirical data and by that replacing to a certain extent the gut feeling or instinct of police officers with a more objective system. What makes these systems so appealing to police organizations is that in times of budget restraints, they promise relatively cost-efficient solutions by simultaneously increasing arrests. In addition, a certain media hype around predictive policing spreading the misconception that the algorithms actually predict crime led to an evolution of predictive policing worldwide.<sup>136</sup>

But also a number of critical issues have been raised concerning the implementation of predictive policing. The approach is limited to relatively small areas that can be targeted. Its success is strongly dependent on the quality and quantity of the collected data. Data protection issues play an important role in that matter. Moreover, underlying causes of crime and risk factors in certain areas are not analyzed by predictive policing software. The police are fighting the surface of crime without being able to address the roots of community problems. Constitutional issues of predicted offenders play a role. A predictive forecast alone cannot justify a legal stop and search as it fails to provide any personal knowledge about an on-going crime or provide any characteristics of the offender.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Goel et al 2016: Personalized Risk assessments in the criminal justice system, 119.

<sup>136</sup> Ferguson 2016: Policing predictive Policing, 13.

<sup>137</sup> Police Foundation 2015: Neighborhood policing - past, present and the future, 25.



### Prediction of Crimes

Pilot projects from the US where patrol officers were provided with crime predictions for small spatial areas reached impressive results. In some cities, crime rates fell by more than 20%. According to Langstaff et al., in Richmond, California, violent crime fell by 21 %, property crime by 28 %, vehicle crime by 34 % and residential burglary by 50 % one year after the introduction of predictive policing. Similarly, successful was the introduction in Great Britain where trials from Manchester were based on the so-called 'optimal forager' theory. According to this theory, the risk of further crimes being committed is greatest at the home of the original victim and spreads out to neighboring properties. Accordingly, one incident of burglary could serve as a predictor for an increased rate of burglary for properties within a range of 300 to 400 meters from the originally burgled home for a period of the following one to two months.<sup>138</sup>

A good example of a problematic underbelly of predictive policing is COMPSTAT as it used by the New York Police. With the adoption of the COMPSTAT program (a predictive policing and management software), a significant drop in crime rates over the past years was reached. This success came at the price of complaints from police officers pressured to make arrests as well as from certain communities that experienced the negative impact of the "stop and frisk" approach. Over half a million were stopped every year, most of them people of color, as a result of this data-driven policing strategy.<sup>139</sup> Further developments of this technology (COMPSTAT 2.0) try to enhance police legitimacy by including data on citizen satisfaction, procedural justice, problem-oriented policing as well as complaints and use of force.<sup>140</sup> The future will show if this can enhance the acceptance among citizens.

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>139</sup> Ferguson 2016: Predictive Policing and reasonable suspicion, 323.

<sup>140</sup> <https://www.policefoundation.org/projects/compstat-2-0/>



### Introduction and Acceptance of ICT in Police Forces

Police organizations function in accordance with some principles that are similar all over the world. As bureaucratic and hierarchical organizations, there exists a certain reluctance to organizational and societal change. Entrepreneurship and creativity are only gradually rewarded and therefore are no specific characteristics easily found within law enforcement agencies. The Composite Project particularly addressed the problem of ICT acceptance by police organizations.<sup>141</sup> It is one thing to introduce ICT in police forces. Technical difficulties, such as limited access to mobile devices and network coverage, might play a role here and undermine the impact of ICT. Especially on patrol, mobile systems add a layer of complexity to be handled by the officer on-site.

Despite these technical issues, another thing is the acceptance of ICT by the police. This is particularly true for social media where acceptance still remains relatively low. It has already been mentioned that thorough training is required for the efficient use of social media in policing. This is also true for the use of ICT in general. Changing interfaces and the rapid development of new ICT devices confront police officers with a considerable amount of innovations that can be overwhelming, especially for older police officers. E-learning platforms and materials that are constantly updated and providing officers with training courses on ICT when needed are particularly useful in that matter.

But more training alone or a simpler design of applications will not solve all these problems. ICT challenges police practices and even police cultures. For example, the increasing need for data exchange requires new cultures of cooperation within and, more importantly, with other agencies. Long lasting practices and previously established responsibilities and ownership change when digital systems are implemented.<sup>142</sup> Sometimes a decrease in speed or even delaying the introduction of new technology is beneficial to make sure that the users can keep pace. Help desks, the involvement of users in design processes and pilot projects are a good way of doing so. Often a source of frustration is the lack of streamlined data and unified standards between different systems. But even if systems are adopted well, the danger of police officers stopping to use their own judgment and blindly relying on technology might arise sometimes.

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<sup>141</sup> COMPOSITE 2011: ICT Trends in European Policing, 31.

<sup>142</sup> COMPOSITE 2011: ICT Trends in European Policing, 31.

## Social Media and Policing

Social media as a subject for ILP has already been mentioned above. However, as this handbook deals with COP, a closer look at social media in policing is inevitable. After all, social media can be considered as one of the most important current developments in the policing of communities. But either way, as the new media provides opportunities, it simultaneously produces challenges and even threats.

### Definition: Social Media

Social media are defined as a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content.<sup>143</sup> Unlike traditional communication channels, such as television advertising, social media provide an opportunity to establish a two-way dialogue with audiences, actively engaging people in conversations rather than simply providing them with information.<sup>144</sup> Social media include but is not limited to email, messenger services (i.e. Whatsapp, Snapchat), Social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Reddit) Websites or video platforms (Youtube).

Social media has become a powerful mechanism for social, economic and societal change. The role of social media in policing or, more generally, in the provision of security is manifold and developing daily. It offers police organizations the opportunity to connect with people. It is a tool for the police to cooperate with citizens, for example, for the purpose of information sharing, in cases of emergency to send information instantaneously, and to interact with a range of civil society groups.<sup>145</sup> But it also has generated new problems, new types of digitized crimes and terrorism as well as grey areas like cyber-bullying and grooming that challenge the police.

Not just the manner in which social media is used but also the technology itself is a challenge that is not easy to handle. New trends appear suddenly, whereas others disappear with the same speed. Police organizations try to hold pace with these developments, while others have given up or reject social media in principles. But the question whether or not social media should play a role in policing has become more and more replaced by the question of how it can and should be used.

For example, the police in the Netherlands proactively make use of digital media to involve citizens and even perceive them as co-creators of security. Police agencies from other countries are much more reluctant to use social media for various reasons, such as legal constraints, organizational cultures and the perception of their own roles. In Germany, private data protection laws make the use of social media platforms difficult for the police. It is not allowed to publish photos of suspects directly on platforms like Facebook as their server is located outside Germany. Police officers are not allowed to have individual

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<sup>143</sup> Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, 1.

<sup>144</sup> Police Foundation 2014: Police Use of Social media, 2.

<sup>145</sup> Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, 1.

Facebook or twitter accounts to get in contact with citizens. In comparison: in Great Britain in 2014 there were over 2000 individual twitter accounts from police officers alone with a growing tendency.<sup>146</sup>

Given the increasingly important role of social media in almost all parts of society, it seems inevitable for security providers to react by integrating digital tools as key parts of their operations.<sup>147</sup> This is even more true for COP as it is based on communication and cooperation with citizens.

### *Aims and Goals of Social Media Used by the Police*

The purposes for which social media is used by police organization vary. The police foundation broadly identifies three main areas of police engagement on social media:<sup>148</sup>

- Providing information: enabling specifically targeted information to be shared quickly, easily and cheaply
- Engagement: providing the police with a way of connecting and building relationships with local communities and members of the public
- Intelligence and investigation: allowing the police to listen to what their communities are saying and to build evidence for investigations by monitoring social media content.

The EU research project medi@4sec collected a number of reasons why police organizations use social media: to increase engagement, reputation, transparency, and legitimacy, as well as trust, confidence, collaboration and community participation. Moreover, for the police, social media can be a source of intelligence and enhance emergency management. Different purposes require the use of different social media. For example, twitter is often and best used for real-time purposes, such as monitoring crowds during protests or keeping people updated in cases of emergencies. Facebook, however, is much more popular for planning activities or the distribution of information such as mug shots. The most effective use of social media is also depending on the target group the police are trying to reach out to.<sup>149</sup> In addition, more practical purposes play a role: Recruiting through social media channels has proven highly effective for the police. This is especially the case in terms of specialized staff with an IT-background where social media platforms are a good way of getting in contact with potential applicants.

The overreaching goal of the most social media activities is to proactively create and maintain a two-way communication, meaning that some sort of reaction should be triggered at the user end. This reaction is not necessarily an answer through the same channel but could also be a certain behavior or the raising of awareness for a certain issue. All this can positively contribute to the image of the police and the way it is perceived by citizens.

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<sup>146</sup> Police Foundation 2014: Police Use of Social media, 3.

<sup>147</sup> <https://www.iao.fraunhofer.de/lang-en/about-us/press-and-media/1291-on-patrol-in-social-networks.html>

<sup>148</sup> Police Foundation 2014: Police Use of Social media, 2.

<sup>149</sup> Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, 5.



Moreover, it provides the opportunity to reach out and communicate with people who would never have contacted the police proactively.<sup>150</sup> Young people or people with a minority background can be named as an example. Surveys have also shown that citizens are significantly more willing to interact with the police if they could remain anonymous. Social media provide a way of doing so, at least as long as the police protect the anonymity of social media users.

### *Social Media Strategies for Policing*

The successful development and implementation of a viable social media strategy for policing purposes is not a simple task. A certain entrepreneurial attitude of trying out new things is important, due to the fact that no training manuals or static advice are available for the new and rapidly changing social media environment. Social media work best through learning by doing which does not mean that no systematic approach is existing at all. In fact, training of officers for the correct usage of social media is absolutely vital for the implementation of a successful strategy.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Police Foundation 2014: Police Use of Social media, 3.

<sup>151</sup> Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, i.



### Social media strategies

Most police organizations develop social media strategies, if at all, on a force by force basis. This means that each police station or city has its own policy, often depending on the will and skills of individual police officers. The possibilities of open interaction with the public are manifold. For example, in the German police, three main categories of engagement can be identified: law enforcement, prevention, and public relations. On which of these categories the police agency puts its focus varies, depending on the city. A closer look shows that these main categories can be broken down into subcategories of engagement<sup>152</sup>:

1. Searches for wanted or missing persons as well as the identification of persons
2. Asking users for information after traffic accidents or crime incidents
3. Crime prevention campaigns
4. Feedback to tips received by users to encourage further engagement
5. Results of police actions and arrests
6. Information on incidents and events of social relevance or on the daily work of police officers
7. Specific questions on a variety of social topics or best wishes to encourage comments from users

A coherent social media strategy in the German police is lacking. In comparison, the Dutch police, one of the leading police organizations in terms of social media, based its strategy from 2013 on nine pillars<sup>153</sup>:

1. Media channel to communicate
2. Active engagement
3. Crisis monitoring and communication
4. Web care
5. Crowd control and event monitoring
6. Real-time intelligence
7. Investigation
8. Knowledge sharing
9. Professional private channel within the organization

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<sup>152</sup> Steinkemper: Web 2.0 – wie nutzt Polizei soziale Medien, 71.

<sup>153</sup> Cited after Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, 8.

The most common use of social media by the police so far is in the case of an emergency and crisis management, specifically when a large number of people have to be informed or guided very quickly. The possibilities for that matter are quite manifold. The medium of choice is mostly twitter, a microblogging platform with over 300 million active users worldwide. It allows users to send short messages (tweets) and reach a wide range of other users.



### Twitter and Police

Here are some examples of twitter used by the police from around the world and its potential for positive as well as negative impact on police work:

**Berlin Twitter Marathon (Tweetathon):** The Berlin Police has conducted several times since 2010 a so-called Twitter-Marathon or Tweetathon. For 24 hours, all emergency calls that reached the control room were posted on twitter. Besides the awareness raising for the complexity of police work and the increased transparency, the police want to inform people about the misuse of the emergency call lines. Tweets like these were posted by the Berlin police:

*"Caller dialed emergency number to wish us a good weekend. Thank you very much but please not by using 110"*

*"Not a prank anymore: five-year-old is calling us repeatedly from a coin telephone."*

As entertaining as these examples are, false or fake emergency calls are a serious issue.

However, the efforts of such a twitter marathon are considerably high: in 2016 the Berlin Police engaged 25 police officers to send out 1830 tweets in 24 hours.<sup>154</sup> Despite the impressive amount of publicity the Berlin Police received through this campaign, the overall impact of it remains difficult to estimate. A number of other police organizations, including the police of Manchester and Zurich, conduct Tweetathons as well.<sup>155</sup>

**Boston Marathon Bombing:** The Boston Marathon bombings in 2013 and the search for the suspects are a famous example of police using twitter to keep the public informed at every stage of the search. Even the announcement that the suspect of the bombings was caught was first published in a tweet. One key to the success of the Boston twitter strategy was that the police already had protocols in place on how to deal with terrorist attacks via social media.<sup>156</sup>

<sup>154</sup> <http://www.morgenpost.de/berlin/article207612419/Die-besten-Tweets-Polizei-beendet-Twitter-Marathon.html>

<sup>155</sup> There is even a global initiative <http://poltw.net/>.

<sup>156</sup> Police Foundation 2014: Police Use of Social media, 5.

But the involvement of the public also had a downside. On a social news platform, Reddit, an unprecedented manhunt occurred involving thousands of people declaring to find the bombers. Photos and videos of the events, as well as background information of suspects, were posted and analyzed. Apparently, even the Boston Police retrieved some useful information for their investigations from this platform.

The downside of this mass engagement was misinformation about suspects and rumors being widely circulated on social media and even picked up by the press. The consequences were several incorrect identifications of alleged suspects that were consequently put in serious danger.<sup>157</sup>

**England Summer Riots:** The summer riots of 2011 that spread from London to other English cities gave rise to levels of looting, destruction of property and violence not seen in Great Britain for more than 30 years.<sup>158</sup> During the riots, police and neighborhood officers used twitter to calm the public and refute rumors of disorderly incidents. Some twitter accounts soon functioned as networks where people exchanged news and voiced their concerns towards other like-minded people. However, the rioters widely used social media themselves to coordinate their looting activities and to inform other rioters of how to avoid police engagement. In turn, they produced a large amount of data that was afterward available for the police to identify criminal individuals as much as for scientific analysis to reconstruct social and communicative dynamics of the riots.<sup>159</sup>

**Munich Shooting:** An example of the mixed effects twitter and social media, in general, may generate were the Munich shootings on July 22, 2016. On a killing spree, a 18 year-old killed 9 people and injured 36 in a shopping center and the neighborhood nearby. The police reacted by deploying over 2300 police officers in the city as the scope of the attack remained relatively unclear for some time. Although a coherent and well functioning social media strategy of the police was immediately put in place, false tweets about shootings at different places in town undermined it and led to mass panics at several spots. In the famous Hofbräuhaus, people shattered a back window to escape the restaurant as rumors had spread that the shooter had entered the inner city. As a result of this misinformation, nearly the entire city was shut down until the next days with no public transportation running, all trains cancelled and the central station evacuated, leaving a high number of people stranded around town overnight. Over twitter, residents offered their homes for temporary stays. Afterwards, the police were confronted with allegations, that their social media strategy had contributed to a disproportionate reaction of the public. But it also showed how important it is that the police engage in social media if only to react to and refute fake information.

## Social Media and COP

The important role of social media as a tool for crisis management is undisputed. It enables the distribution of crucial information to a large number of people in a very short period of

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<sup>157</sup> Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, 19.

<sup>158</sup> Procter et al. 2013: Reading the riots: what were the police doing on twitter? 413.

<sup>159</sup> See for example Procter et al. 2013: Reading the riots: what were the police doing on twitter? 427.

time. But reducing the use of social media to a crisis response tool would mean to only make partial use of its potential. COP can strongly benefit from different forms of social media either as an image tool, for the gathering of intelligence or to foster a two-way communication. Today social media occupies an integral part of communicative practices for many community policing teams around the world.<sup>160</sup> After all, an integral part of COP is an interaction with people of the communities. But walking the beat, introducing themselves and their work to the citizens is sometimes time-consuming, ineffective and exhausting for police officers. By using social media, police officers can enhance their visibility and reassure the public that they are active in an area as well as making it easier for the public to contact them.<sup>161</sup> Better communication fosters an 'active citizenship' as well which again has a positive effect on COP. Successful COP strategies are highly dependent on feedback from the communities in identifying problems, proposing possible solutions and helping to implement preventive measures.

De Vries and Smilda identify three ways communities can actively participate in COP via social media<sup>162</sup>:

1. citizens give the police information through social media
2. citizens put experts or police under pressure through social media
3. citizens help with investigations

Of particular use is the potential of social media to motivate people to volunteer for various activities. In this context, the term 'crowdsourcing' plays an important role. It describes the strategy of including an unidentified mostly large network of people through an open call in the undertaking of a certain task or function. A very simple form of crowdsourcing that has been used for a long time by the police is the identification of wanted or missing persons by addressing the public. Social media platforms have proven to be very effective for that purpose and are widely used for this. A more complex form of crowdsourcing occurred in the aftermath of the already mentioned Boston bombings. The police had retrieved a small part of the backpack that had contained one of the bombs. The challenge was to gather all available material, like photos and videos, from the event and to analyze it in the search for this one backpack in the crowd of thousands of visitors at the event. With the help of a large network of social network users that engaged in this search and posted their results online the police were able to identify the bombers relatively fast.

### *Challenges*

It is a common misconception to view social media as a somehow self-sustaining or self-perpetuating tool that is used to provide information of any kind from time to time. Users will engage as soon as they have relevant information to share. But this is a too simplistic view. A functioning social media presence, therefore, takes up a considerable amount of time and efforts and requires substantial skills and training. Key to user engagement on social media is the creation of interest. Posting information of little or no relevance at all as well as

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<sup>160</sup> Bullock 2016: (Re)presenting 'order' online: The construction of police presentational strategies on social media, 4.

<sup>161</sup> Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, 9.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid, 13.

longer periods of inactivity will lead to a decrease in user activity. The good thing about security-related information, like committed crimes or missing persons, is that these have a high news value.

But social media platforms are not solely used for news but for image management as well and this is where it can get complicated. A certain communication culture on social media demands that the performers are personable, humorous and honest to create a positive image among users. Especially the humorous dimension, which is a very efficient way of creating interest, can easily clash with the expectation of professionalism by police organizations as well as users. As much as social media activities can improve the image of the police, they can also damage it. Bullock gives the example of a neighborhood policing team in the UK that posted a tweet depicting a female car passenger having a seatbelt over her mouth under the headline 'New Seatbelt design: 45% less car accidents!'. The author commented 'A car designer has won an award for designing a seatbelt which helps to cut down on vehicle noise pollution #IwantOne'. This tweet was widely regarded as offensive and it received (negative) exposure in the mainstream media.<sup>163</sup> We will give some more examples below of how certain performances may undermine the good impression COP teams seek to create. We chose this example-based approach for the reason that there is no such thing as a script or best practice rules for performances on social media. In fact, overtly directed performances, at least for the purpose of image building, may be perceived as static and inappropriate for the medium and may result in the opposite of the intended outcome.<sup>164</sup>

Nevertheless, all examples we give and assess should be viewed with caution: we lack a clear measurement whether the outcome of a certain interaction with the public is negative or positive. After all, the old saying 'there is no such thing as bad publicity' may still have some truth to it in times of social media. In the following, some of the challenges will be described that police agencies face when implementing social media strategies.

## The right tone

One of the challenges for police using social media is to find the right tone when addressing the users. Whereas some police organizations keep a more formal, others prefer a more personal approach. Both ways have their benefits and disadvantages. Studies have shown that an informal tone or more expressive style of communicating might help to create a close relationship with the public and appeal, particularly to young people. But this, in turn, can also lead to a more negative response by followers when certain boundaries are overstepped and the authority of the police is undermined. Nevertheless, a too formal style might reduce the ability of the police to connect with users and make it more difficult to raise interest for certain information.

To illustrate these two approaches, the police foundation gives two examples of tweets asking for the identification of suspects:<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Bullock 2016: (Re)presenting 'order' online: The construction of police presentational strategies on social media, 5.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid, 13.

<sup>165</sup> Police Foundation 2014: Police Use of Social media, 7.

“New CCTV images of people police need to identify on our Flickr page [...] Please look and retweet”

“Can you help identify these people? Check our Flickr gallery of wanted suspects and call [...].

The latter tweet is more informal and might alienate users who prefer being addressed more formally especially when in contact with a state authority. Young people might prefer this way of communication as the use of a more playful youth language (“check out”) might have a positive impact on their willingness to cooperate. Adapting the tone to the target group might be an option for the police to increase the outreach to users.



### **Virtual Neighborhood meetings<sup>166</sup>**

Public meetings between COP officers and community members are a good opportunity to build a trust-based relationship through the exchange of problem-oriented information. But often participation in these meetings is slim. The reason for this might be a general disinterest in community safety issues, time constraints or aversions towards the formal settings of these meetings. In Whitby, UK, the police introduced so-called Virtual Community and Police Meetings (VCAP). Residents were given the opportunity to interact with their local police staff and raise issues which are affecting their neighborhoods by using a virtual chat room. A special software provides a room where comments can be made and questions asked that are answered in real time by the responsible police officer. The forum can be moderated and individuals that log in to disturb can be barred. The project was supported by a local newspaper to create the necessary publicity to engage people in the forum. Experiences were promising and more people logged in to the chatroom as there were meetings in person.

It is a good example of how new technologies can create opportunities for people that would normally not have the opportunity to attend meetings with COP officers due to various reasons, such as disabilities, locality or commitments. However, it is important to once more stress the fact that technology solutions like these should not entirely replace traditional face-to-face forms of police-community engagement.

### **Emotional language**

A related issue is the fact that people tend to react to emotionally charged information. This can affect the social media strategy in two ways. First of all, crime cases with a certain

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<sup>166</sup> See NPJA 2011: Engage: Digital and Social media engagement for the Police Service, 15. The document can be found here <http://connectedcops.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/engage.pdf>

emotional dimension, involving, for example, children, sexual abuse or excessive violence, are more likely to engage people to support police work. Second of all, police on Facebook may be apt to use a more emotional language when presenting information on criminal cases to create more interest among users. A good example for this is a case from the police of Hagen, Germany. There a woman suffered an epileptic attack in public and was mugged while lying on the ground. The police requested information on the offender via Facebook headlining the post with the words: "What kind of scrupulous human being are you? We hope you'll get your rightful punishment." The post received exceptional attention and feedback from users that were overall very positive. The local news reported critically on the incident by focusing on the post and less on the incident itself. The question remains how an emotionalized language might have a negative image effect and undermine the neutrality of police agencies in the long run.

However, both language dilemmas are not new to COP officers when interacting with people from different social backgrounds. It is not particularly related to social media but has indeed become more visible.

### The Balance Between Information and Engagement

Not only the tone of how users are addressed but also the content itself that is shared on social media platforms can be important. A common problem is that police agencies tend to view social media primarily as a news channel to push on time information on the public. There are instances, such as emergencies or disasters, where this is completely legitimate. But for the use of social media for COP purposes where the building of sustainable community relationships is a substantial part of the strategy it becomes more complex. A fine balance should be kept between the provision of security-related information and information that can be trivial, funny or provocative. The twitter marathon of the Berlin Police is a good example of how both can be achieved by posting serious as well as the rather funny emergency calls. The media picked up particularly the latter by reporting countrywide on the funniest twitter posts of the Berlin Police which undoubtedly created publicity and public attention. We collected some more examples to illustrate the problem from the Hagen Police in Germany.





### **Facebook Use by the Hagen Police Department, Germany**

Besides Twitter, Facebook is one of the most popular social media platforms widely used by police organizations around the world. Due to the fact that Facebook messages are not restricted to a certain number of characters, it can be better used for relationship building and awareness-raising campaigns than twitter. The following examples from the German police in the city of Hagen show how people can be sensitized for certain issues that may affect the work of the police. Some of these pictures were shared by over a million Facebook users which are an impressive amount for a small police department like Hagen.

Another interesting example that gained a fair amount of publicity is the posting of the Police Hagen of a checklist of an incident that occurred in the city center during a night in 2015. A drunk man had vandalized and set on fire numerous dustbins before he was arrested. The post took the form of a rather sarcastic checklist where some rather grotesque details of the incident were revealed. It contained, for example, the following:

Being drunk – ☒ check

Causing of substantial damage to buildings – ☒ check

Being seen by witnesses doing so – ☒ check

Resisting during arrest – ☒ check

Being beaten up by the police dog “Yuma” – ☒ check

Having a living hedgehog in his backpack – ☒ check

Spending the night in police custody – ☒ check

This checklist is a good example of a rather humorous police-citizen engagement that has a serious background. The image created is that of an active police, enforcing the law effectively while keeping its humor. The reactions to the posting were overwhelmingly positive and reported about by the media and press nationwide. Other campaigns were a Facebook patrol where police officers would post directly from their operations and prevention consultations where users could inform themselves of crime prevention measures. The police department of Hagen is since then being considered as one of the most innovative in Germany when it comes to the use of social media platforms.

But not only local police agencies can make use of Facebook. An example is a campaign of Europol, the EU police office, conducted in Christmas time 2016 where mug shots of the most wanted criminals in Europe were distributed on Facebook in form of a

Christmas calendar. Each day, a new photo was opened up giving some information on the fugitive.

A less tasteful example is a mobile app that allows playing the popular game 'memory' only by using photos of wanted criminals. The purpose is to address the problem of citizens memorizing the faces of fugitives so that people can recognize them during encounters.<sup>167</sup>

### Searches for Suspects

A number of violent crimes in Germany in 2016 could have been solved through the engagement of the public via social media platforms. Especially searches for fugitives are very popular on these platforms. But there is also a downside to these search strategies. For example, in October 2016, the case of the so-called 'Berlin subway-kicker' (Berliner U-Bahn-Treter) went viral. A CCTV video showed a man kicking an unsuspecting woman in the back on the stairway of a subway station leading to her falling down the stairs and breaking her arm. Two months later the video was leaked allegedly without the knowledge of the Berlin Police Department and went viral via the social media platforms. Only then did the Berlin police ask for the public's help to identify the suspect. He was caught after a few days, apparently as a result of this social media campaign. The public outcry was enormous why the police had not published the image of the suspect much earlier. This resulted in a PR backlash for the Berlin Police department.

This case shows a general problem police agencies often face: public searches are only permissible if certain legal conditions are met. For example, under German law, a public search for a suspect has to be ordered by a judge and is only permissible under the condition that all other investigations were unsuccessful. Very often mug shots are published with a delay of sometimes several months or even longer. This is a constant source of frustration by the public and frequently the police are blamed for working too slowly. The damaging effects on the image of the police of incidents like these are considerably high. On the other hand, the police might develop a tendency to publish pictures of suspects more quickly. This, in turn, might not only have a negative effect on the rights of the suspect who is presumed innocent until proven guilty. But also the public will reach a point of exhaustion if the frequency of searches is too high. Not to mention that too many searches will diminish the ability to recognize suspects.

### Hate speech and Discrimination

Another problematic issue triggered by the case of the subway kicker who was a migrant from Bulgaria was a wave of hate speech and racial slurs on social media platforms. Similar reactions could be observed when a group of young refugees and migrants attempted to set a homeless person on fire in the Berlin subway around Christmas 2016. Here a public search for the suspects was initiated immediately by the Berlin police. Police agencies have to be

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<sup>167</sup> <http://socialmediadna.nl/most-wanted/>

aware of these effects and put a considerable amount of time in the moderation of forums to prevent hate speech.

But not only users can be the source of the problem for that matter. For example, a tweet by the Police of Cologne from New Years Eve 2016/2017 backfired immensely and brought the police under the critique of racial profiling. Moreover, for weeks, a political debate ensued about the immigration of criminals from North Africa to Germany. The trigger was a tweet by the police that informed about the containment of 200 people at Cologne central station using the word “Nafri”, police slang for offenders with migration backgrounds from North Africa. No crimes were committed at this point but the experiences from New Year's Eve one year before where hundreds of offenses were committed by migrants in front of the central station had made the police of Cologne very cautious.

Social media image campaigns of a harmless nature can easily backfire when hijacked by users. For example, in 2014 the New York Police Department launched a campaign to boost their image by asking users to upload photos of themselves with NYPD officers. Instead of friendly photos, users began posting photos depicting aggressive arrests and violent riot controls.<sup>168</sup> The NYPD reacted considerably stating that twitter provides an open forum for an uncensored exchange and that an open dialogue is good for the city.



### Some Advice for the Use of Social Media

When engaging in social media activities police organizations should take into account a number of issues:

- All police officers that will be using social media should be trained properly. Rules should be set up of how to address people, for which instances social media is used and if there is room for more informal engagement.
- Data Protection matters. A clear data protection policy in accordance with applicable law should be put in place before any social media activities are taken up.
- A clear budget should be defined, SMART goals formulated (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound) and a data protection policy created. Depending on these goals a social media platform should be chosen.
- A strict separation between private and professional use should be installed.
- Police officers should use the opportunity to post about their daily work probably by setting up individual accounts. Interactive content sparks dialogue and may foster a conversation with the public.

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<sup>168</sup> <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27126041>

- Information should be relevant and/or interesting. If not, the police run the risk of making the impression that they do not have better things to do.
- Engagement on social media is very time-consuming. It is very important to constantly provide new content in order to keep the interest alive. An inactive or outdated social media account is quickly associated with ineffective policing.
- Social media should not be a one-way street. The goal of every COP strategy should be a two-way communication. If for whichever reason, only a traditional website is used, tools for interaction should be implemented instead of only pushing information on citizens.
- It is absolutely crucial that the posted information can be trusted as truthful and genuine. This may result in the difficult consideration of keeping the public informed while preventing panics and overreactions. Also, the dilemma between posting reliable information under time pressure is not easily solved.
- The tone matters. A balance between a more formal and informal tone when addressing the public through social media should be found. A general advice would be that messages sent from a central account should be more formal whereas in those sent from the personal police officer account a more informal tone is permissible.<sup>169</sup>
- Social media platforms should be used to refute false information and rumors.
- The interaction between the police and citizens should foster a mutual understanding. Debates with political content should be avoided on social media platforms. The discussion platforms must be thoroughly moderated at all times to prevent any form of hate speech and impeach the neutrality of the police.
- Targeting a specific audience or group is often much more effective. Accounts can be created specifically for neighborhoods, minorities, women, and youth. Certain issues, such as burglaries, can be addressed through specialized accounts. Social media accounts can even address special purposes, for example, a twitter account of police helicopters or even police dogs.
- Feedback, follow-ups, and updates are highly important when users were encouraged to engage in identifications or provide information on incidents. If feedback is lacking, the user can end up frustrated and refrain from engaging again.

### Do-It-Yourself Policing (DIY policing)

While on the previous pages, the focus was on social media strategies from a police perspective, in the following we will have a closer look at the user side. With the wide distribution of the internet, smartphones and social media, a trend called do-it-yourself policing (DIY policing) has become increasingly popular worldwide. We have already

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<sup>169</sup> Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, i.

described the phenomenon that users have become more and more active in supporting the police in investigations, identifying suspects and even taking traditional police tasks into their own hands. People use special apps to collect and analyze information and/or, if necessary, organize emergency assistance themselves.

**Definition: DIY policing**

DIY policing describes the phenomenon of citizens employing social media for criminal investigation, crime prevention or public security mainly independent of the police. This may go so far that citizens take over tasks that are traditionally related to the police as a security provider. According to medi@4Sec, DIY policing occurs in three main forms:

- (1) citizens sometimes act entirely on their own and independently of any public security organization to investigate crimes and punish suspects and offenders,
- (2) citizens limit themselves to connecting and finding or checking facts and act as information providers for public security organizations or
- (3) citizens combine aspects of the two.

The phenomenon can be best understood by looking at some examples:<sup>170</sup>

- Private Facebook searches for stolen goods like bicycles are conducted.
- Social media is used to form neighborhood watch groups to prevent burglaries
- After the riots in England in 2011 or Vancouver in 2011, people used Facebook to publicly “name and shame” the rioters by posting photos and videos they had taken of them.
- Initiatives are formed to program mobile applications to report sexual harassments or illegal dumping sites.
- NGOs, such as Transparency International, use their power to develop, distribute and maintain Anti-Corruption reporting apps.
- Police scanner mobile apps are available worldwide to scan police radio communication and report about it on the web.
- In Mexico and Columbia, citizens report under threat or their lives in blogs about the drug wars due to the self-censorship of the mainstream press.

All these initiatives have in common that they intrude into police terrain without including or cooperating with the police. For example, our research in Kosovo showed that a reporting app for sexual harassment was conceptualized without the police even knowing about it. This lack of communication with law enforcement is very often due to the fact that the police are skeptical of civil initiatives in the field of security. After all, police work requires a

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<sup>170</sup> <https://www.iao.fraunhofer.de/lang-en/about-us/press-and-media/1291-on-patrol-in-social-networks.html> Examples taken from Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, 19.

considerable amount of knowledge and training that citizens do not necessarily have. But very often this more or less justified skepticism is accompanied by a lack of knowledge on how to channel the efforts of citizens and incorporate the initiatives into police work.



### **Neighborhood mobile apps in the Netherlands.**

The app *mijnbuur.nl* from the Netherlands was developed by the non-profit organization Stichting Buur and is a free mobile app that connects the user with the direct neighbors as well as with the police. The goal is to increase security, self-reliance, and participation in the users' immediate environment.

The app is based on three options:

1. An alarm option to alarm the neighbors in case of an emergency. Through the app, the location of the user is provided automatically. With the alarm-function, certain neighbors or the police can be notified about a specific suspicion, for example, a burglary or another source of danger.
2. With the help option, users can ask neighbors for help if needed. This is particularly useful for elderly persons who are often depending on help.
3. A third option enables to address annoyances in the neighborhood, such as noise disturbances, vandalism or loitering, and to solve them together in a dialogue. This is a particularly useful feature for the police since, as a matter of fact, small annoyances take up a considerable part of the daily police work.

A similar app is *Burgernet.nl*, available in the Netherlands, that has more than 1.6 million registered users. It was developed to inform people via voice or text message in case of incidents to look out for a person or a vehicle in their neighborhood. It is used, for example, in cases of theft or robbery, missing persons, failure to stop after an accident or burglary. The citizens can call in for free to provide information and on the website news about successful campaigns and searches are published daily. This way the citizens receive feedback which can be crucial for their future engagement. In addition, the user can subscribe to an email newsletter where the latest information on burglaries in his neighborhood is provided.

### *The Challenges of DIY Policing*

DIY policing confronts police organizations with a number of questions that cannot be answered easily. The active involvement of citizens can have negative consequences or even turn against the police. How to deal with false suspicion and baseless information reported and distributed by private persons? How to fact-check information provided by citizens? How to deal with self-administered justice and vigilantism that are serious dangers to an open society?

A state governed by the rule of law cannot tolerate that citizens take justice into their own hands. There are good reasons for the fact that only the police are empowered by the sovereign with the authority of law enforcement. But this formal view of considering the police as the only legitimate security provider in a society has become increasingly obsolete. Some would even argue that it has always been contested. Neighborhood watches, for example, are not a new phenomenon. Especially in rural areas, where police structures are weak, security provision has always been to a more or less extent in the hands of communities. But today's modern societies are confronted with a scale of DIY policing that has never been seen before. We doubt that these developments can be reversed or suppressed. The question security planner and police organizations have to answer is how to deal with these developments? To which extent is a cooperation between citizens and the police beneficial? Where to draw the line between cooperative security provision and vigilantism?



### **Dutch Policing App**

The social media strategy of the Dutch police is to actively encourage and seek the assistance of citizen investigators and co-create security jointly with citizens. Since 2013, it provides a policing app that can be downloaded for free by every citizen in the Netherlands. It allows citizens to easily and quickly contact the police and their local police officer as well as receive push notifications on national or local incidents. It also allows sending a tip to the police on wanted or missing persons including photos or videos on suspicious situations. It provides direct contact to a COP officer of the user as well as an update on his twitter news. It even allows complaining about police control. In the north of the Netherlands, first pilot studies are now being conducted where emergency hotlines send a link to callers on their mobile phones where they can directly live stream and upload videos and photos of the incident they are reporting on. This gives first responders a better overview of the incident and makes an assessment easier.

The Dutch policing strategy might work in the Netherlands. However, this does not automatically mean that it can be copied by other countries.

Another problem of DIY policing is the distribution of volunteers. Studies show that women and young people are commonly underrepresented in support networks and activities affiliated with policing.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, 21.

Also, the question has to be raised which effects it might have on social cohesion if every citizen is a potential investigator willing to provide any information to the authorities. How can they be held accountable if false information leads to the incrimination or even conviction of innocent persons? What if false information is provided on purpose? The derogative German term “Blockwart” stems from the times of national-socialism where people were employed for the political supervision of a neighborhood and to spy on others for anti-Nazi-activities. A tightly woven network of social control maintained by the citizens themselves cannot be the goal of a technology-driven society.

### Social Media and Policing: Some Critical Issues

This chapter has mainly dealt with the opportunities and possibilities social media provide for COP. There is no doubt that with regard to ICT used for COP, social media offer some of the most promising developments for the future. But some of these developments create new problems for police agencies.

Many and diverse social media platforms have occurred over the past years. The police are faced with the challenge as to which of them should be used to reach out to the most or the right people. Monitoring effort for intelligence gathering might receive crucial information late or miss out on it entirely. Validating information in this framework is extremely difficult. The rich information provided by social media is often proved to be poor as the simple context is missing. Threats or hate speech distributed on social media platforms are therefore hard to interpret and very often turn to be less serious than they sound.<sup>172</sup>

Moreover, not only law enforcement agencies profit from the specific features of social media, like speed and time/location independence, but also criminals using it for their own purposes:

- riots can be organized very effectively in a short time;
- recruiters for terrorists use social media channels to recruit jihadists all over the world;
- burglars scan social media platforms for users who publicly announce being on vacation (for example, by posting photos) and use the opportunity for burglaries in the vacated homes;
- during so-called “flash robs”, robbers organize themselves via social media to rob stores in groups;<sup>173</sup>
- social media platforms are used to sell weapons or drugs;
- stalking, identity thefts and various forms of fraud have become common crimes on social media platforms; and
- illegal migration is to a large extent organized via social media used by illegal migrants as much as by human traffickers and smugglers.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>173</sup> Media4sec 2016: Worldwide mapping of best practices and lesson learned, 132.

<sup>174</sup> Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, 25.



But also users with less criminal intentions have become serious challenges for law enforcement agencies. People that film and photograph incidents like accidents to share the material online have become not just a nuisance but a profound problem for police work. An important part of police work during traffic accidents has become to protect the victims from people filming and taking pictures.

In Ingolstadt, Bavaria for example, in 2013, a hostage situation in the city hall was intensified for the police due to the use of social media by onlookers. Special forces prepared for entering the building but were confronted with the situation that people streamed live videos from the location and their tactics on the internet. The footage was apparently watched by the hostage-taker as well alerting him at all times of the location of the special tactics team. During incidents like these, the success of police tactics is strongly dependent on the secrecy of their actions and the moment of surprise. The police face the challenge of how to prevent people from providing live information on the internet while satisfying the urge for news at the same time.

The Belgian police managed this problem in Brussels in 2015 successfully during a major raid of several neighborhoods on the search for terrorist suspects in the aftermath of the Paris terror attacks. Before the operation took place, the polices requested over twitter from the users to refrain from posting any information about the raids and the lockdowns in order to prevent suspects from being warned. The twitter users complied with the request and reacted by posting only cat photos for the whole night under the #BrusselLockdown. The raid apparently was a success and the following day the police thanked the twitter community by posting a picture of cat food.



### **Mass Gatherings and Social Media**

Social media and mass gatherings and political protests are strongly related. It is assumed that the Arab Spring was mainly triggered by the use of social media platforms. For civil society, social media have become a powerful and efficient tool to organize a large number of people to take concerted action for a certain purpose. The police, on the other side, are confronted with the challenge to deal and provide security for these gatherings but also with the opportunity to use social media themselves to monitor and respond to emergency situations.

However, besides the big events, such as the England riots or the Boston Marathon that have been already described, a considerably smaller but yet interesting event is worthwhile to have a closer look at. In 2013, a 15-year old girl from Haren, the Netherlands, invited to her birthday party publicly via Facebook. Through the snowball-effect, after two weeks the invitation was distributed to 24.000 people of whom a considerable number had accepted the invitation. Although the girl canceled the event, other individuals had taken over control of the party under the name 'project X haren'. On the evening of the event, thousands of youths had come to Haren from all over the Netherlands and started massive riots. At the end, 36 rioters and 15

policemen were injured, and the damage to cars and buildings was enormous. An investigative commission found that alcohol and the lack of a coherent police strategy played a significant role in causing the riots. In the aftermath of the riots, dozens of the rioters were identified through videos and photos taken at the event. Similar events were announced via social media for other Dutch cities but were stopped by the police before occurring.

It is worth noting that after the riots in Haren occurred, the Project CleanX Haren was launched, a citizen initiative to cooperatively clean up the city. In fact, similar initiatives were launched after the riots in England where the cleanup campaign was supported by over 60.000 people who even organized charity and fundraising events to support mall business owners whose properties had been damaged severely.<sup>175</sup>

The aforementioned risks are more related to the misuse of social media for criminal purposes. But a 'misuse' of social media can also occur from within the police itself. We already mentioned some examples where image-building efforts backfired and resulted, at least partly, in a negative reputation of the police. However, there is no recipe for good public relations other than trial and error. After all, communication via social media is based on human interaction, a part of its appeal is based on the fact that it works more or less unfiltered by centralized communication departments. This is particularly true for COP where personalized and decentralized social media accounts play an important role. Police officers are no communication specialists but it must be assumed that all their efforts contribute to the overall goals of the police organization (crime fighting and prevention, creating a positive image of the police etc.).

The question remains as to how this affects the communication culture of the police and, more generally, the government-citizen relation as the police remain a government institution. As a bureaucratic institution, its communication is traditionally more centralized and formal, a contradiction to the open network structure and informality a decentralized communication via social media platforms. Meijer and Torenlvied, who studied the twitter use of the Dutch police, therefore even suggest that social media may have created a new hybrid model of a government institution, one that is post-bureaucratic. In case of the police, this model is both designed as "network organization and a centralized bureaucracy, both formalized and informal, and both a closed and an open organization".<sup>176</sup>

## Other Technologies for COP

Other policing technologies worth mentioning are body cams worn by officers as well as CCTV. Both technologies are not communication devices in a technical sense but can still play a role in COP.

<sup>175</sup> Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, 24.

<sup>176</sup> Meijer, Torenlvied 2014: Social Media and the New Organization of Government Communications: An Empirical Analysis of Twitter Usage by the Dutch Police, 15-16.

### *Body-Worn Cameras*

Body-worn video in policing is a very recent development. Nevertheless, it has received extensive attention from the media worldwide. The cameras that are worn by police officers, mostly on breast, shoulder or helmet, record all interactions the user has from a point-of-view perspective, including a sound recording. The aim of the cameras is to reduce police use-of-force and complaints against officers, enhancing police legitimacy and transparency, increasing prosecution rates and improving evidence captured by the police.<sup>177</sup> Due to the fact that this technology is still new, it remains unclear if all these aims can be achieved.

However, studies from the UK and the US are somewhat mixed in their results. In Essex, the UK, findings after trials with body-worn-cameras in policing domestic abuse incidents indicated that a higher proportion of people were charged with an offense when the cameras were worn.<sup>178</sup> Moreover, the cameras were able to capture the layout of a scene, the damage caused as well as the injuries and emotions of a victim. Half of the police officers expressed that they felt more confident with the cameras to secure a conviction and estimated an increase in police accountability, making them more mindful of their behavior. A study from the US found out that body-worn-cameras reduce the prevalence of use-of-force by the police as well as the incidence of citizens' complaints against the police.<sup>179</sup>

However, a number of practical as well as constitutional issues concerning privacy rights are still unanswered. From a practical point of view, the cameras are limited by the angle of filming and are of restricted use in poor lighting. The ethical issue that has to be addressed is as to how the police are allowed to capture citizens whose consent was not obtained. Why should police-citizen encounters be routinely filmed and which threats to rights might this imply? The questions remain if the potential improved mindfulness and respectfulness of police officers with body cams outweigh this intrusion on privacy laws. Although these questions remain widely unanswered, there cannot be much doubt that body cams sooner or later will be a standard tool for policing. Police agencies should implement clear policies for the use of body cams, including clear rules of when the body cams can or should be turned off, policies for the prevention of data tampering, deleting and copying as well as clear protocols for releasing recorded data externally to the public and the news media.<sup>180</sup>

### *CCTV*

Close Circuit Television (CCTV) has been an issue of debate for years now, particularly when used in public spaces. Authorities claim that it is an efficient tool for investigating, deterring and detecting crime. At the same time, it can help to reduce the fear of crime as well as reminding people of the risks of crime in public. Critical voices stress the potential negative effects of CCTV and argue that it undermines the trust in social relationships, intrudes the private life of a majority of non-criminals without consent and that its use can be

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<sup>177</sup> Ariel et al 2014.: The effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens' Complaints against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 510.

<sup>178</sup> Police foundation 2015: Neighborhood Policing: Past present and the future, 48.

<sup>179</sup> Ariel et al. 2014: The effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens' Complaints against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 531.

<sup>180</sup> For a good overview see: [https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/10-2014/body\\_worn\\_camera\\_program.asp](https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/10-2014/body_worn_camera_program.asp)

discriminatory. Moreover, the effectiveness of CCTV as a tool for deterring crime is scientifically weak.

Nevertheless, it seems that these debates about the state as a 'Big Brother that is watching you' have lost a lot of their political potential. In times where nearly everyone is carrying a smartphone camera in his pocket, surveillance has become an increasingly normal part of life. Due to current threats, particularly from terrorism, most mass events, like the Olympic Games, are monitored by a tight network of CCTV. Public transport and popular places, like monuments or museums, have long been under a 24/7 surveillance. A number of highly publicized events, such as the Paris terror attacks or the Boston bombings, have drawn the attention to the investigative value of CCTV police work. Consequently, support for CCTV among citizens has significantly increased over the past years.

Although CCTV can be a useful tool for COP, it is important to recognize that it is no magic bullet. Existing research suggests that the deterrence effect of CCTV is being overestimated with offenders being largely undeterred by the presence of cameras. Surveys show that they often hold the (correct) view that cameras generate poor quality images and are monitored poorly. If at all, a measurable deterrent effect appears only shortly after the installment of cameras in public spaces and is in most cases reduced after a short period of time.<sup>181</sup> Most evaluations of CCTV in city centers came to the conclusion that cameras had a very little impact on violent crime. This is particularly the case when alcohol is at play. During the riots in England in 2011, most rioters acted in strong disregard of CCTV, not even bothering about masking their faces. However, these riots turned out to be a strong argument in favor for CCTV after all: in the aftermath of the riots, over 4.000 arrests were made possible by reviewing footage obtained through CCTV.

For purposes of COP, the crime prevention effect of cameras is of interest, although supportive evidence of this effect is weak. Even though some individuals oppose the feeling of being surveyed, studies showed that it does have a positive effect on the security feeling of a majority of people. Moreover, trust in the justice system might improve if offenders are caught more easily through the processing and analyzing of footage and if convictions are more likely. If used correctly, CCTV helps the police to monitor known crime hot-spots as well as to increase the knowledge of local communities and neighborhoods.<sup>182</sup> Images can be easily circulated via social media channels to a large number of people and engage citizens in supporting the police.

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<sup>181</sup> Police Foundation 2014: Briefing on CCTV, 6.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid, 8-11.



### CCTV for COP

A number of issues should be taken into consideration by the police when deploying CCTV:

- Discriminatory effects have to be taken into account when CCTV is installed. Putting neighborhoods under surveillance that are, for example, inhabited mainly by minority groups can be regarded as discrimination and might backfire.
- Community back-up before the installment is of major importance, as they will be the ones mainly under surveillance.
- The manpower to analyze and process data is very high and requires special training to be interpreted correctly. These processes take a considerable amount of time.
- The effectiveness of CCTV is strongly depending on street lighting. It can have a negative effect on police image if the data obtained during an incident is of low quality or, even worse, cameras were installed but not recording.
- CCTV is very costly with regards to installment and maintenance. It can be relatively easy enabled, destroyed or avoided through disguise.

*"When we had neighborhood watch program I said to them: Ok let's give to our village 30 minutes per month. We made a Facebook group called "30 minutes once a month." It didn't function."<sup>183</sup>*

### ICT in (Post) Conflict Settings

The question remains as to how the presented technologies can be applied in (post-)conflict settings. These settings are defined by a relatively fragile political situation, weak security structures and limited access to ICT infrastructure. This, however, is a very schematic view and does not take into account the specific situation of each country case, if mobile phone technology is available or an internet infrastructure.

In recent years, international, national and local actors have increasingly included ICT-tools in conflict prevention and peace-building programs. It seems there is a consensus among experts that technologies improve the capacity to predict, describe and diagnose conflict by generating, accessing and sharing data in conflict-prone situations.<sup>184</sup> This improved communication that increases transparency and trust-building which, in turn, may facilitate negotiations by building pressure from bottom up. After all, the Arab Spring was widely

<sup>183</sup> Interview Representative LPSC Prizren Region

<sup>184</sup> CIVCAP 2016: Procedures, Personnel and Technologies for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: An Assessment of EU Member States' Capabilities, 29.

organized by social media tools. But also in SE Europe this is true, for example, in Bosnia where the so-called baby-lution, a wide protest against the government, was mainly triggered by social media.<sup>185</sup>

But not only political change can be fostered by social media, also societal change on a grass root level can be promoted. An example is the Girls at Dhabas Initiative in Pakistan which is working to debunk myths that women should not use public spaces by sharing photos on social media platforms of young women at street cafés in areas typically occupied solely by men.<sup>186</sup>



### Ushahidi

Ushahidi (Swahili for "testimony" or "witness") is a website that was created after the Kenyan presidential elections of 2007. A violent crisis erupted after electoral manipulations were discovered and the mainstream media was banned from reporting. The purpose of Ushahidi was to collect eyewitness reports of violence sent in by email and text-message and to use the collected data for the creation of maps on Google maps. It tackled the problem that people were only able to find out about violence that happened nearby but had no broader picture of the situation to understand what was going on or to offer their help. The website used different sources, such as international media, NGOs and Kenyan journalists, to verify eyewitness reports of violent acts. By avoiding official sources and only relying on citizens, the data collected by Ushahidi was superior to that reported by the Kenyan mainstream media at the time.

Since then, the open source software of Ushahidi has been used for a number of different purposes, mainly for data collection, reporting, and mapping. The range of usage includes the reporting of anti-migrant violence in South Africa, mapping oil spills of BP's Deepwater Horizon oil rig in Louisiana/USA, monitoring polling places as well as preventing voter fraud in India and reporting earthquakes, weather and other disasters around the world.

The impact of Ushahidi as an early reporting tool should not be underestimated. Governments that are under observation by their own citizens might think twice before using means of violence and suppression. Some lessons can be learned from Ushahidi: Easy access and simple technology and reporting tools (SMS, email) are crucial to engage people. Moreover, good ideas can be easily replicated and applied in different settings for different problems.<sup>187</sup>

<sup>185</sup> Tellidis, Kappler 2016: Information and communication technologies in peacebuilding: Implications, opportunities and challenges, 78.

<sup>186</sup> <http://participedia.net/en/cases/girls-dhabas>

<sup>187</sup> Shirky 2010: Cognitive Surplus: How Technology makes consumers into collaborators, 9.

The particular challenges COP is facing in post-conflict settings have already been described above. We have argued that there is nothing like “the” post-conflict setting but rather a myriad of different settings and situations. This is even more true when it comes to ICT. The availability of ICT, internet and mobile networks in the Balkans is of course not comparable to the one in South Sudan, Somalia or Afghanistan. As a consequence, possibilities for the implementation and use of ICT are much more advanced in the Balkans.

However, the EU project CIVCAP concluded that coherent strategies for the use of ICT for conflict prevention and peace-building are scarce. The EU is still lacking a devised policy in that matter. With a view to EU goals in relation to early warning and early response, technological instruments would be of great value and are indeed already implemented by various other international and national stakeholders.<sup>188</sup> These instruments encompass the same that police organizations make use of and which have been described in detail above (i.e. smartphones, social media, big data). But they also go further, including Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) that, equipped with cameras, are able to monitor people’s movements or observe whole populations at risk. Satellite systems, similar to UAS, can provide analysis on military activity and border control and assist in humanitarian aid monitoring. For example, Amnesty International, a crowdsourcing project in Darfur in 2016 where volunteers analyze satellite imagery of the country by looking for human rights violations. By comparing different images from different times, for example, the destruction of remote villages can be pinpointed and reported.<sup>189</sup> Even where no satellite imagery is available, crowdsourcing projects are possible. For example, Bellingcat is a platform run by investigative journalists. Among activities worldwide they systematically trace Russian military vehicles in Ukraine and mapping them online by using reports from users.

A use for COP purposes of these technologies is less relevant – at least to date. But unlike in policing where predictive methods proved to be relatively successful, this is to a much lesser extent the case for conflict prediction. It is still undetermined which potential role data from social networks or other web sources might play in our understanding and prediction of conflict dynamics. Most systems have yet proven incapable of forecasting political events.<sup>190</sup>

Moreover, in conflict, as for COP, technologies are not the magic bullet for a solution. Or as Mancini and O’Reilly put it: even if you crowd source your hammer, not every problem is a nail.<sup>191</sup> Information provided on social networks can be used to incite violence and to promote conflicts. This of course is not specifically related to social media. For example, the genocide in Ruanda 1994 was widely coordinated by a radio station that broadcasted racist propaganda creating a hostile atmosphere that made the violence possible.

Nevertheless, restrictive governments can use ICT to prevent information reaching certain groups in society, use it for identifying dissenting groups or simply shut the means of communication down. This, for example, happened in Hong Kong where the government simply shut down the mobile internet to prevent protesters organizing themselves. In turn.

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<sup>188</sup> CIVCAP 2016: Procedures, Personnel and Technologies for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: An Assessment of EU Member States’ Capabilities, 29.

<sup>189</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/10/digital-volunteers-to-expose-darfur-human-rights-violations/>

<sup>190</sup> CIVCAP 2016: Procedures, Personnel and Technologies for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: An Assessment of EU Member States’ Capabilities, 37-38.

<sup>191</sup> Mancini, O’Reilly 2013: New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict, 4.



the protesters used the proprietary mobile app and instant-messenger system called firechat which is not depending on a functioning mobile network. Instead, it uses a so-called wireless mesh network to create a peer-to-peer connection of smartphones via Bluetooth or Wifi. Simply put, it creates its own mobile network and makes the user independent from a network provider.<sup>192</sup>

In conclusion, for ICT in conflict prevention and post-conflict settings, the same is true as for ICT in policing: a balance is needed between ICT and traditional tools, such as diplomacy and political dialogue.



#### **Kenya National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (CEWARN)**

CEWARN is a national information network located at both local and national levels. At the local level, it comprises peace committees, security intelligence committees, CEWARN field monitors, and National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System peace monitors. At the national level, the network comprises data clerks, data analysts, and National Steering Committee staff who are tasked with evaluating the data received from the field.

Various information sources are used, such as peace monitors and field monitors, local or district security and intelligence committees and civil society organizations to gather information on erupting conflicts. Moreover, crowdsourcing is used to gather peace and conflict information from citizens through SMS as well as an online reporter using email, twitter or Facebook. The received information and data is analyzed and verified by security structures on the ground, the field monitors, and peace monitors.

For more information, see: Francesco Mancini, ed., "New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict," New York: International Peace Institute, April 2013. Retrieved from <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi-e-pub-nw-technology-conflict-prevention-advance.pdf>

### **Concluding Remarks**

Predicting the future of ICT in COP is like looking into a crystal bowl: it is impossible to estimate technological developments. At the moment, an overall trend can be observed in the increase of mobile capabilities of the police, making the way back to the police station to enter certain data or write reports obsolete. More cooperation and data exchange is another trend and of course the mentioned processing of big data. CCTV will be increasingly advanced, using better lenses, facial recognition, recreation of 3D models or even identifying

<sup>192</sup> Also see Media4sec 2016: Report of the state of the Art Review, 24.



subjects underneath clothing.<sup>193</sup> The field of biometrics produces constantly new and more precise methods of identifying individuals. UAS or drones might change the face of policing in the future. Miniature prototypes that can be carried in the pocket and that can fly through buildings have already been developed. Who knows, one day every police officer has an “Airborne Partner” that is hovering over him giving real-time information on the surrounding environment.<sup>194</sup>

One can only imagine how social media will change over the next years offering new solutions for problems, some of them old, some of them new. Mass gatherings and crowd control via superfast push-news to mobile devices could help prevent incidents, like the Loveparade catastrophe in 2011. Artificial intelligence software will play an increasingly important role in the analysis of big data derived from social media.

The importance of social media for COP will grow as well. It must be doubted that traditional face-to-face interactions will be entirely replaced by interaction via the web one day. It is more likely that a stronger specialization will occur where all COP officers will be spending more time on social media with some solely focusing on the “policing of cyber-neighborhoods”.



### **The Finish Cyber Police Nettipoliisi**

The Finnish Internet police (Nettipoliisi) was created inside the Finnish Police Service to be a virtual community policing unit specialized in social media.<sup>195</sup> The goal is to explore the possibility of shifting some community policing activities from the streets to the internet. It is based on the idea that effectiveness increases significantly with a virtual approach to community policing. Various tasks can be handled by only one officer stretched over different geographical locations whereas the officer never has to leave his office. Secure chat-services have been launched to communicate with persons with a high degree of confidentiality.

However, a crucial problem remains unsolved and that is as to how a user can identify a police officer as a member of Nettipoliisi. As the officers use normal Facebook pages, there is nothing like a virtual police badge or ID that can ensure the identity of the officer.

The question is if Nettipoliisi might be a COP model of the future and develop into a new type of law enforcement service with the same functions, powers and authorities of a regular COP officer.

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<sup>193</sup> Police Foundation 2014: Briefing on CCTV, 6.

<sup>194</sup> Valdovinos et.al. (2016): Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Guidelines to enhance trust, 1.

<sup>195</sup> Calcara et al 2015: The Finnish Internet Police (Nettipoliisi): towards the development of a real cyber police.

But all these developments, no matter if useful for COP or not, run a common risk: Where law enforcement agencies see an opportunity for controlling crime and increasing public safety, the citizens run the risk of becoming subject to more control and less privacy. This counts particularly for social media tools that run a high risk of being misused.

Whether or not the trend towards DIY policing will continue to grow remains to be seen. Within it lies the biggest potential for COP as it fosters the idea of citizens proactively being involved in the production of security. But governments can and will only accept this as long as it remains clear who is in the driver's seat: the police. Who can predict if in the near future this trend will not be reversed and we will go back to more authoritative forms of policing?

Moreover, there is a natural limit to COP via social media respectively in the difficult context of post-conflict scenarios: Not all people have access to the internet or mobile devices. Even if they have, they might not be interested or able to use them. Even if they use them, they might not use social media platforms. And if they do, they might use other or different platforms than the police. And if they use the same platforms as the police, they might have reasons, good or bad ones, for not getting in contact with the police. In all these cases, the outreach of the police is limited and traditional forms of COP might prove more effective.

For example, foot patrols currently experience some sort of revival for COP purposes. A recent study from the US emphasizes the positive effects of police officers "walking the beat".<sup>196</sup> According to this study, this traditional form of COP facilitates relationship building between officers and community and creates a sense of approachability, familiarity, and trust. Furthermore, it enhances the exchange of information between officers and community members, resulting in increased problem-solving capability. However, challenges remain particularly related to cost and performance evaluations, as well as the requirement of significant planning prior to deployment as key components in achieving successful outcomes.



### Coffee with a cop

Social media should not replace direct communication entirely but rather complement traditional forms of COP. 'Coffee with a Cop' was first launched in Hawthorne, California, in 2011. The idea behind it is to give citizens and police officers the opportunity to engage with each other in a more informal way and outside of crisis situations.

The initiative can be understood as a reaction to the changing character of COP in the US due to the changing composition of communities and the wide use social media. The face-to-face encounter with police officers is free from distractions, as radios and cell phones have to be turned off for the duration of the event to ensure that community members can have stress-free conversations with police officers. The atmosphere is supposed to be

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<sup>196</sup> Cowell, Kringen 2016: Engaging Communities one step at a time - Policing's Tradition of Foot Patrol as an Innovative Community Engagement Strategy, 31.

relaxed, informal and open to discussions about the issues community residents feel are important.

Since its existence, the initiative has spread from California over the US as well as to Canada, Europe, Australia, and Africa.<sup>197</sup>

Similar initiatives are so-called 'Police Popup stations' in Great Britain. Police officers set up mobile stations, for example, in stores, garden centers, car parks or libraries to talk to citizens. Mobile media labs in the Netherlands reach out to citizens and ask for their experiences in communicating with the police via the web.

### Recommended Readings

For an extensive overview of the use, threats and challenges of social media for policing see the website of the EU Project [medi@4sec](#) respectively the published document: Report of the state of the Art Review.

The EU CIVCAP Project is a good source for information on EU policies in conflict prevention and peacebuilding respectively the following document: [Procedures, Personnel and Technologies for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: An Assessment of EU Member States' Capabilities](#).

COMPOSITE is an EU research project already finished for some time but nevertheless offers some valuable documents on the website dealing with ICT for policing.

The Police Foundation UK has published numerous reports and briefings on their website dealing with various police-related issues. See, for example, Neighborhood policing: past, present and the future; Police Use of Social media; Briefing on CCTV.

The SocialMediaDNA collects and shares information in the field of social media and law enforcement.

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<sup>197</sup> More information on the initiative see <http://coffeewithacop.com/>

## 5. COP in Kosovo

### *Summary*

*This chapter gives an overview of the history and the current state of affairs of COP in Kosovo. From its beginning, COP was strongly related to the peacebuilding and police reforming efforts of the international community. The police reform in Kosovo can be roughly divided into three phases: After the conflict in 1999 UNMIK with the support of KFOR ruled by force, allowing very little local ownership and public involvement in terms of police building. After 2004 UNMIK began to retreat and transferred rapidly more and more responsibilities to the Kosovo government. It was only then that a more bottom-up approach was adopted by introducing different COP forums like Community Safety Action Teams Programs (CSATs), Local Public Safety Community Councils (LPSCs) and Municipal Community and Safety Councils (MCSCs). In a third stage, after independence in 2008, the EU took over from the UN and emphasized approaches relying on partnership while at the same time pushing heavily for reforms in the police sector. Since 2011 the Kosovo Police has introduced and implemented different strategic approaches to COP with the strong support of the OSCE and with mixed results so far. The sustainability of these efforts remains the biggest challenge for the future.*

### **Introduction**

The origin of COP has been thoroughly examined above. With a view to Kosovo, the roots of a Western-influenced COP strategy reach back to the beginning of the engagement of UNMIK in 1999. A lot has been written on the Kosovo conflict and the Yugoslavian war. There is no doubt that this war has had a major influence on the structure of today's police in the country. Nevertheless, we deliberately abstain from giving an overview or short summary of the events that led to the birth of Kosovo and its police force as the limited space we have would not do justice to the complexities of the conflict. The same counts for the history of community safety strategies in Kosovo whose origins dates back as far as to the 15<sup>th</sup> century and the Kanun. The influence of this set of customary rules that resolves conflicts between community members without resorting to the state has been significant over time among Albanians. It remains unclear if and how it influences informal policing structures, particularly in rural areas and villages until today. Although there is no doubt that cultural and historical aspects have a strong

impact on how modern COP strategies are accepted and implemented it would go beyond the scope of this handbook to examine these historical roots in depth.

### **The Kanun Today**

The Kanun is an informal conflict resolution mechanism that exists in different versions (for example, Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini, Kanun of Skanderberg) and was originally solely oral law. Its aim was to regulate every aspect of social life of the honorable Albanians, such as the economic and family life, marriage, hospitality, land, the punishment of crimes and the pursuit of blood feuds. A number of scientific studies have dealt with the Kanun, particularly since the collapse of Yugoslavia. In fact, to a certain extent, a reemergence of the Kanun was observed in Northern Albania as well as in Kosovo when state authority crumbled and the need for an alternative system of rules emerged.<sup>198</sup> It is estimated that between 1999-2005 around 18% of murders in Kosovo were related to blood feuds that can directly be traced back to the Kanun. Nevertheless, a survey by the University of Leuven from 2006 indicated that while most of the people have heard about the Kanun, very few actually know something substantial about it. However, the cultural heritage of the Kanun should not be underestimated today. For example, a number of principles from the Kanun were incorporated in modern mediation laws in Kosovo. International observers have wondered why Kosovo has one of the lowest crime rates in the whole region. One reason could be that often crimes are not registered with the police because they are dealt with by citizens themselves and in accordance with old customary laws.<sup>199</sup>

### *History of COP in Kosovo*

For the purpose of a handbook written for practitioners, we begin a historical introduction with the end of the conflict in 1999. Although there are some indications for the fact that forms of community policing were already existing in the Yugoslavian system, there is a simple reason for this late entry point: after the conflict in 1999, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), as well as the Kosovar security architecture, were built up nearly completely from scratch.<sup>200</sup>

### 1999-2004: UNMIK

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<sup>198</sup> Janssens 2015: Statebuilding in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective, 173.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid, 361.

<sup>200</sup> OECD 2007: Handbook on SSR Reform, 163.

After the cessation of the 1999 war, a UN Security Council resolution handed over governance of Kosovo to the United Nations. This five first years of Kosovo post-war history can be called the 'UNMIK era' and was marked by the fact that the UN was responsible for public security as well as for the establishment of new functioning security structures. While UNMIK was a civilian mission, KFOR (NATO-led Kosovo force) was its military partner mission both having the monopoly on coercive force. This meant that UNMIK had the authority to conduct criminal investigations, arrest suspects and use deadly force if necessary.<sup>201</sup> UNMIK also created from scratch the KPS whose police officers were trained by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) police school and provided with practical experience by the UNMIK International Police Unit.<sup>202</sup>

One of the biggest challenges UNMIK faced was the disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the reintegration of the former fighters into the security sector. Based on an agreement, the KLA was obliged to hand over all their weapons and ammunition to KFOR within 90 days. In reality, this disarmament was far from being completed. Rather than insisting on a least gradual disarmament as it would be the case in Macedonia two years later, the international community allowed them to be ignored. Capussela calls this the original sin of state-building in Kosovo "for it fractured the credibility of the international administration, military and civilian alike."<sup>203</sup> Former KLA members were first integrated in the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civilian emergency service providing disaster response, contributing to the rebuilding and monitoring of communities and other humanitarian tasks. Soon it became clear that the KPC was assuming police functions without being subjected to any oversight. To tackle this problem, the newly established KPS, operating under the umbrella of UNMIK, recruited approximately 7000 recruits of which 25% were former KLA members.

The Kosovo Police Service Schools, in turn, were run by the OSCE. The mandate was to establish and train the police service in a manner consistent with the principles of democratic policing. In 1999, its initial goal was to train 3500 police officers within a time period of 12 months. But soon it became apparent that more officers were needed and by 2002 the number was increased to 5700. Diversity played an important role in this new police force with target figures of 15 % minorities and 20% women in the selection

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<sup>201</sup> Janssens 2015: Statebuilding in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective, 83.

<sup>202</sup> Gippert 2015: Exploring local compliance with peacebuilding reforms: legitimacy, coercion and reward-seeking in police reform in Kosovo, 55.

<sup>203</sup> Capussela 2015: State Building in Kosovo, 36.

process. These goals were not reached fully as we will describe below. Nevertheless, the OSCE was applauded for its success of having created a real multi-ethnic multi-gender institution in Kosovo.<sup>204</sup> The police training was organized by OSCE in cooperation with the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the U.S. Department of Justice. However, little attention was given during this time to the training of COP-strategies as the focus was more on a law and order model. The tasks were to prevent and combat crime and serve all people of Kosovo without distinction. Graduated recruits started by enforcing speed limits and conduct joint patrols with UNMIK police officers to increase contact with citizens and communities. An important aspect of training was to 'depoliticize' the police force. In order to do so, UNMIK implemented two strategies, the first being to make the police more responsive to the needs of citizens. The second was to insulate them from political influence. This was relatively successful, especially the employment of local police officers with a better understanding of the local culture. In sum, the new police force was positively viewed by the citizens and their will to cooperate improved.<sup>205</sup> In consequence, over the following years, responsibility was slowly transferred from UNMIK to KPS.

In retrospective, UNMIK's strategy for stabilizing Kosovo was based on the creation of a democratic system that provided good governance, abided by the rule of law, was founded on the market-based economy and respected human rights. But the UNSC had also learned its lesson from the SFOR Mission in Bosnia and granted UNMIK strong police and military powers.<sup>206</sup> With regards to the police, UNMIK was confronted with a unique situation in Kosovo (only similar to the situation in Timor Leste) as that the police force had to be completely rebuilt from scratch. Although the results were considered of being a success, a number of deficiencies of the KPS surfaced as soon as UNMIK handed over the responsibility to the Kosovars. It appeared that police training had been too short due to the need of UNMIK to deploy a large number of police officers in short time. Moreover, the strategy of leading by example and that new police officers would learn most by being in the field under the supervision of a Police Field Training Officer (PFTO) proved to be only partly effective. In reality, the PFTOs often lacked experience and qualifications to lead by example.<sup>207</sup> Similar to Bosnia, the

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<sup>204</sup> Janssens 2015: Statebuilding in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective, 138.

<sup>205</sup> Janssens 2015: Statebuilding in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective, 146-159.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid, 95.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid, 160.



increase of state-employed police officers led to cutbacks a few years later once the costs of expanded payrolls and associated expenditures became apparent. This, in turn, became a problem to security.<sup>208</sup>

In sum, the international community had opted for a top-down approach to the establishment of a police service. The question which policing scheme would be the best fitting for Kosovo was of minor importance. A strong focus was put on law enforcement and human rights. Despite some efforts, one has to say that local ownership played only a minor role for the UN-mission.

#### 2004-2008

In 2004 Kosovo was shaken by an outburst of violence when about 60 000 Albanians attacked the international presence and ethnic minority communities. KFOR and UNMIK were taken by surprise and failed to counter the violence and to reinstate security. The considerably little trust UNMIK had managed to build up between the multi-ethnic communities over five years was shattered within a day. In fact, the widely shared perception that UNMIK was one reason for the societal stagnancy might have been one trigger for the violence.<sup>209</sup> Consequently, to prevent similar events in the future, a number of measures were taken by the international community. UNMIK expedited its transfer of security to the Kosovars. Riot control capabilities of the police force were enhanced significantly which promoted the militarization of the police. Parallel to these developments, Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs) were introduced, that were later transitioned into MCSCs. The counterparts on a local level were the LPSCs the Local Public Safety Community Councils. In addition, ICITAP had already introduced in 2003 the so-called Community Safety Action Teams Program. Again, a top-down approach was chosen but at least for the first time in the police building process in Kosovo, local communities were viewed as partners in the provision of security.

However, it can be hardly argued that UNMIK adopted a new community policing strategy as its focus remained on fighting crime as well as public order management. UNMIK's approach was based on the establishment of separate UNMIK community policing units at the station level. A community policing coordinator at regional headquarters as well as a unit at the main headquarters supported the units at the station level by coordinating CP-projects. Janssens describes this coordination efforts mainly as a "paper

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<sup>208</sup> OECD 2007: Handbook on SSR Reform, 93.

<sup>209</sup> Janssens 2015: Statebuilding in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective, 221.



pushing process where CP-officers drafted projects and activities that eventually ended up in a drawer at main headquarters.”<sup>210</sup> This was particularly problematic as by 2005 besides OSCE and UNMIK a number of other actors such as NGOs were active on the field of COP. A steering group to coordinate all these activities was established by UNMIK and handed over to KPS that was renamed to Kosovo Police (KP) after the declaration of independence.



#### **Saferworld Project in Gërmovë/Grmovo 2005**

An example of how NGOs approached and started influencing COP in Kosovo is this project implemented by the NGO Saferworld in Gërmovë/Grmovo. The village with a population of around 1,000 inhabitants is located in Kosovo’s south-eastern municipality of Viti/Vitina near the Macedonian border and is mainly inhabited by Kosovo Albanians. Unemployment is high and the infrastructure poor. Saferworld in cooperation with Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ) conducted interviews with locals to identify issues and priorities:

1. bad relations between the police and the community and the absence of police patrols in the village.
2. the danger of traffic accidents on the main road.
3. public health dangers posed by uncollected rubbish and the stray dogs it attracts.

Community representatives in partnership with officials from the municipal authorities, the police, local utility companies, a civilian emergency body, and others formulated three action plans to address these issues:

1. to improve road safety by introducing regular police patrols.
2. to build a pavement along the main road to improve the safety of pedestrians.
3. to introduce a refuse collection system to eliminate dangers to public health and to reduce the presence of stray dogs.

A ‘Community Improvement Council’ was established by residents consisting of 17 members to develop the three plans and to oversee their implementation. Between December 2005 and February 2006, the Council met weekly in the premises of the local school, often joined by representatives of FIQ, to report back, co-ordinate and plan actions. With their support, the council managed to initiate regular communication with the local police command. Traffic patrols were introduced in the

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<sup>210</sup> Ibid, 251-278.

village and the police declared their willingness to communicate more frequently with villagers. The Council, in turn, offered to assist the police with their work in the community and to update them regularly about the community's safety and security concerns. A police officer was delegated to participate regularly in the Council meetings and the implementation of the Community Safety Plans. A pavement was built with the community residents providing labor. A refuse collection service was established paid by the residents through an established system to collect financial contributions from residents.

The achievements of the initiative are described by Saferworld as follows:

- For the first time, the KP introduced daily traffic patrols on the main road, and now take action against reckless drivers. Members of the Council, teachers, and schoolchildren all state that there has been a clear reduction in the speed of the traffic on the road as a result of the police patrols.
- As a result of the dialogue and increased police presence in the village, both police and the community report a significant improvement in relations.
- Residents report feeling safer walking through the village and especially sending their children to school.
- The threat to public health from uncollected and decaying refuse has been reduced, as was the threat of attacks by scavenging stray dogs, especially in the evenings.
- The relationship with the municipality has strengthened after working together towards shared objectives.
- People feel better able to talk publicly about their security and safety concerns and feel empowered to take action to address them. For example, the Council began discussing an action plan to address problems associated with small arms. Being aware of their past achievements, they are now more confident in approaching authorities on other issues.
- A number of community members acquired the capacity to run projects independently.
- The community's willingness to work with outside actors has been restored based on their success in implementing the Community Safety Plans.
- Neighboring communities have expressed interest in adopting the approach.

As positive as these forms of locally owned initiatives are, it remains the question of how sustainable they were.

2008-present:

After the declaration of independence in February 2008 and with the adoption of its own constitution, the UN decided to withdraw its staff from Kosovo drastically. Most parts of the executive powers including the responsibility for policing were transferred to the Kosovo government and European Union Rule of Law mission in Kosovo (EULEX). The police sector of EULEX consists of four main units: one unit in charge of intelligence and investigations, a riot control unit, a witness protection unit as well as an advisory unit with members located in the central and regional headquarters of the police and in every local station.<sup>211</sup>

EULEX's objectives are to assist Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability. The mission strives to develop and strengthen an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and customs service. Moreover, its mission is to ensure that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognized standards and European best practices.<sup>212</sup> Its tasks comprise monitor mentor and advise (MMA) the competent Kosovo institutions on all areas related to the wider rule of law. As an integrated mission, EULEX addresses not only police but also justice and customs. Nevertheless, the police component is by far the largest of these three pillars and particularly consists of co-located MMA-staff in the KP-Departments of Operations, Border, Crime, and Administration.<sup>213</sup> It is worth noticing that there is no official strategy or guidelines for the implementation of COP from EULEX as our research has shown.<sup>214</sup> But a lot of the EULEX police officers are trained in COP and through their mentoring and advising functions they most certainly have an impact on COP strategies of KP. This may turn out to be problematic as COP strategies vary sometimes significantly from country to country and advisory in that matter may lack coherence. One of our interview partners reported of a KP-Member having three advisors at a time (EULEX, OSCE, and ICITAP) and in sum eight different advisors over a time period of just a couple of years.<sup>215</sup>

However, this shows that KPS sits in the “driver seat” and EULEX officers widely emphasize the MMA-function although they have executive powers in

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<sup>211</sup> Capussela 2015: State Building in Kosovo, 114-115.

<sup>212</sup> Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, Art.2.

<sup>213</sup> Derks, Price 2010: The EU and Rule of Law Reform in Kosovo, 11.

<sup>214</sup> Interview EULEX Representative, MMA Mitrovica North.

<sup>215</sup> Interview Representative EULEX, Executive division Mitrovica.

exceptional cases. The metaphor of the driver seat should emphasize the fact that local ownership and a bottom-up approach was the driving principle of EULEX from the beginning. The mistakes made by UNMIK of approaching policing top-down by implementing policing models that poorly fitted Kosovo's society should not be repeated. Nevertheless, the success of EULEX is widely contested today.

Janssens claims that the reluctance of EULEX to act on its executive powers led the mission to become increasingly resented by citizens.<sup>216</sup> Capussela argues similarly when he blames a certain bias of the Mission towards its advisory functions, leaving the executive functions in the shadows that became a main problem of the mission.<sup>217</sup> Particularly the task to tackle high-level corruption and organized crime was neglected resulting in poor outcomes and meager convictions in high profile corruption cases. The dogma of 'local ownership' turned out to become a problem for the mission as they should have been applied to the making of policies but not to its implementation. This is just one of the many flaws of the missions but most of did them not directly relate to the police component. Nevertheless, in 2014 the mission mandate was revised stipulating that by 2016 all rule of law institutions including the police should be controlled by Kosovo institutions.

### Forums for COP in Kosovo

Over the years, different approaches and strategies were introduced by the international community to promote COP in Kosovo. We have already written about various campaigns and projects on a smaller scale initiated and implemented by different civil society organizations and NGOs often in cooperation with the international community as a funding partner. You can find some of the most interesting examples of these grass-roots projects throughout this handbook.

Besides these smaller projects, three large-scale approaches to COP are worth mentioning that were implemented (nearly) Kosovo wide:

1. The Community Safety Action Teams (CSATs) created by International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the U.S. Department of Justice.
2. Local Police and Security Councils (LPSCs)

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<sup>216</sup> Janssens 2015: Statebuilding in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective, 338.

<sup>217</sup> Capussela 2015: State Building in Kosovo, 115.

### 3. Municipal Community and Safety Councils (MCSCs)

A brief look at these forums for COP helps to get a clearer picture of how COP was approached in Kosovo over the past years.

#### *Community Safety Action Teams from ICITAP*

ICITAP is a law enforcement development organization supported by the U.S. Government. Its mission is to work with foreign governments to “develop effective, professional, and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism.”<sup>218</sup> The organization is active in over 30 countries worldwide and one of their strategic approaches is Community Policing through the implementation of CSATs.

CSAT was first introduced in Kosovo in 2003 in four municipalities as a pilot program by ICITAP and OSCE. By 2016, CSATs were established in 34 locations on the municipality level. After the declaration of independence in 2008, CSAT was taken over completely by ICITAP while OSCE focused on building up capacities for LPSCs and MCSCs. In 2010-2011, the program was handed over to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo.<sup>219</sup> UNMIK, however, had never been involved in the program. The aim of the program was to methodologically establish and engage teams of community volunteers, local government officials and local police officials who would work together to identify and prioritize issues of community safety and livability. The idea behind it was based on a community policing philosophy: citizens develop more respect and trust in the law as well as in law enforcement agencies if they have a voice in solving community problems related to human security together.<sup>220</sup> Issues addressed by CSATs are, for example, drug abuse, hooliganism, domestic violence, child begging, traffic safety, stray dogs and environmental cleanups. The concept strongly depended on volunteer work from its beginning with the goals to strengthen communication and cooperation between municipalities and the police.

#### How CSATs Work

The process of identifying municipalities for the implementation of the program comprises different stages. In a first stage, each municipality had to

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<sup>218</sup> US Department of Justice 2009: About ICITAP. Retrieved from <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-icitap/about-icitap>

<sup>219</sup> Interview ICITAP National advisor on community Safety.

<sup>220</sup> United States Department of Justice 2009: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) – Program Management Plan for Kosovo, 10.

meet a number of criteria before they qualified to establish a CSAT, such as a multi-ethnic composition of the local police and the willingness to work with non-Albanian minorities. In a second stage, a CSATs program team meets with the municipal and KP leadership in the community to assess the willingness and support for cooperation. Afterwards, the municipal and KP leaderships identify one municipal representative, one KP representative, one community member and one youth leader from the participating community. These form the Participant Recruitment Committee and at least one of the members should be a woman. About 35 to 40 citizens are recruited afterwards as leaders from the municipality, KP, and communities reflecting diversities in their communities, including those of age, gender, ethnicity and profession. However, the most important criteria to become CSAT representatives is their motivation to work as volunteers.

Only then is an initial community meeting and orientation session organized, providing CSATs representatives with information about the program and the role that they will play. A second meeting is held to assess the concerns of the wider community that relate to crime, safety, and livability. Voting helps to estimate which issues are most pressing in the community and will be brought to the problem-solving training. Here projects are developed by the CSAT members to tackle the most important problems. During a third community meeting, CSAT members share the projects and provide an update on the status of the issues being addressed. The participants at these meetings have an opportunity to ask questions, provide feedback or volunteer their assistance.<sup>221</sup>

A crucial part of CSAT is the training which lasts for seven days and includes various topics, such as partnership development, team building, and bridging the gap between police and community perspectives. The SARA problem-solving model encompassing 'Scanning', 'Analysis' (of the problem and partners), 'Response' and 'Assessment' as well as project action planning are training components as well. In a sixth and last stage following the training, CSATs participants begin to implement their project action plans. During a third community meeting, findings and progress are reported to their community. Sustainability of the program is ensured through continuous support and coaching offered by the CSATs Program Team. Since 2004 a training of the trainers' course was established and by 2007 the training was completely organized by CSAT-members.

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<sup>221</sup> OSCE ICITAP 2011: Assessing the impact – Kosovo's Community Safety Action Teams, 14-15.



### SARA Model

Problem-solving is a key issue of community policing. But before problems can be solved a systematic approach must be taken to find out what exactly the problems are and how they can be tackled in a creative way that is not limited to a standardized process. The SARA-Model provides a standardized approach to problems in communities by defining four stages: Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment. Our research showed that it is widely used in COP and by important stakeholders in Kosovo, such as KP, OSCE, and EULEX.<sup>222</sup>

Scanning – Problems can best be determined through personal experience by individuals affected by a problem and by communication with them. Those individuals can be residents, businesses, other public or private agencies, other officers, or other employees. The scanning process includes:

- identifying recurring problems and consequences to the public and the police;
- confirming and prioritizing problems;
- developing broad problem-solving goals.

Analysis – It is crucial to learn and understand as much as possible about the players involved. A tailored problem-solving strategy is only as good as the underlying analysis which should particularly include the identification of obstacles to the approach:

- identifying relevant data and research how the problem was approached before;
- identifying strengths and weaknesses of other approaches;
- identifying as many resources as possible to approach the problem.

Response – On the basis of the scanning and analysis an adequate response should be developed. A solution must not necessarily be designed to erase the problem entirely. A reduction of the problem, a reduction of the caused harm or a better coping with the problem might be more achievable. A response should include:

- outlining of a response plan;
- identifying what other communities with similar problems have done and how this can/can not be implemented;
- carrying out the planned activities.

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<sup>222</sup> For a good overview of the model see <http://www.iaca.net/Resources/Articles/POPandSARA.pdf>



Assessment – This is an important part of the model as it gives an overview of the effect a response had and if deficiencies occur enables to tailor a better response next time. But even if the response was successful, the assessment gives a clearer idea of how positive change can be sustained. Sustainability is one of the most crucial and most precarious issues of COP. The assessment stage includes the following:

- determining if and how the plan was implemented and which goals were reached;
- identifying strategies to augment or adapt the plan;
- ensuring continued effectiveness through ongoing assessments.

*“The challenge we still face is the sustainability. Because we had the problem of grasping the voluntarism inside the community. We have to understand one thing: the economic situation is quite a big challenge.”<sup>223</sup>*

### Evaluation of CSATs

Generally, the CSAT-program is considered being a success. The concept has been copied by a number of other countries in the region, such as Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, and Macedonia. But a number of issues and challenges remain. The CSAT-concept in its essence is an Anglo-Saxon concept based on the community safety initiative in the US and was exported to Kosovo. Its key feature is volunteering work by citizens. As good as it sounds, volunteering in a post-conflict country with high unemployment rates, poor infrastructure, low wages and the daily struggle for life leaves not much room for volunteering. Therefore, a reimbursement of CSAT members for their daily costs was recommended by the OSCE.<sup>224</sup> Another issue is the fluctuation of people, particularly from rural areas, due to migration or other reasons which is a constant challenge to the fragile sustainability of CSATs. There is still some confusion with regard to the role of CSATs. Some believe their role consists of being secretive informants of the police which has a contradictive effect on the trust-relations between CSAT, the police, and the community.

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One constant issue to keep CSATs operational is the question of funding for projects as neither OSCE nor ICITAP provides any monetary support. The

<sup>223</sup> Interview ICITAP National advisor on community Safety.

<sup>224</sup> OSCE ICITAP 2011: Assessing the impact – Kosovo's Community Safety Action Teams, 64.

<sup>225</sup> Janssens 2015: Statebuilding in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective, 247-248.



absence of funds has led to a situation where projects could not be implemented which in turn had de-motivational effects on CSAT members. But from its beginning the program was aimed at empowering citizens to acquire own funding for projects meaning that especially the municipalities were expected to allocate money from their budgets. But not just the lack of funding can have a negative impact on motivation. Also, projects conceptualized by citizens that are too ambitious for their capabilities can very quickly be overwhelming resulting in frustration. The CSATs program is not about “changing the world” as one of our interview partners put it but rather about small changes on the local level that are visible to the people. Another more practical issue is the fact that local and municipal governments often change their leading personnel after every election which takes place every four years. New majors have to be briefed and often convinced of the program of co-producing safety in communities and not leaving it to the police alone. Local election in Kosovo in 2013 resulted in 70% new majors in the municipality and a substantial number had to be filled in on the role and functioning of CSATs. But the same counts for international staff members involved in COP that are constantly changing and being deployed in different locations.

*“Our question is: can the government, the police, and the ministry take the bill? Basically in continuing what we have invested in the last 13-14 years by OSCE and ICITAP jointly?”<sup>226</sup>*

### *LPSC and MCSCs*

The community safety architecture in Kosovo is based on multiple levels. On the top level, the Kosovo Steering Group of Community Safety Strategy Implementation monitors the status of community safety and community policing and reviews related legislation. On the grass-roots

level, one can find the LPSCs whereas in the middle there are the MCSCs on a municipal level. The leaders of the LPSCs are automatically members of the MCSCs.

The LPSCs were established by OSCE in the aftermath of the 2004 riots in Kosovo. To prevent similar events from happening again, a stronger decentralization of security issues was emphasized. The first LPSCs were established at the village level targeting ethnic minority areas. Up to date, 47

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<sup>226</sup> Interview ICITAP National advisor on community Safety.

LPSCs have been established in most parts of Kosovo. They are all based on a grass-roots approach to creating consultative bodies to address the security needs of local communities and give them a voice in the policing of their community. The establishment and functioning of LPSCs are mainly donor-driven. LPSCs are established by the initiatives of a community or on the request of a police station commander. The role of the OSCE in that matter is to help identify locations where LPSCs could be established and to function as a contact point between the LPSCs and potential provider of funding.<sup>227</sup> The final decision whether a LPSC should be established lies within the discretion of the General Director of Kosovo Police. Members of the LPSCs are nominated by the village leaders and two police officers, usually, one male and one female, are members of it.

Training of LPSC members were jointly organized by ICITAP and the OSCE and is the same as for the CSATs (SARA-Model). Training is divided into different phases. To ensure sustainability, a training-the-trainers program was initiated in which two members of each LPSC (male and female) are chosen to take part in a five days training.<sup>228</sup> LPSC meetings are to be initiated not only by the community members but also by the police officers to address certain problems identified by the police. This two-way approach is often misunderstood by the police officers who believe that the forums are a way for communities to contact them and that no proactivity is required by the police.<sup>229</sup> During these meetings, the most pressing problems are discussed and projects are planned. These projects range from street lighting, shelters for stray dogs, youth camps and street safety initiatives. A considerable part of the training evolve on how these projects are planned and applications for funding are drafted. The minimum amount of funding is € 3.000.

### *Municipal Community and Safety Councils*

The counterparts to the LPSCs on the municipal level are the MCSCs. They are consultative bodies for safety that bring together representatives of the municipal institutions, police, media, ethnic and religious communities as well as civil society organizations and LPSCs chairpersons. They also raise issues that LPSCs are unable to bring to the attention of the municipality. MCSCs are chaired by the mayors of the municipalities and the leaders of the LPSCs are the members of the MCSCs. The municipal forums were

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<sup>227</sup> Interview Representative OSCE, Senior Community Policing Officer.

<sup>228</sup> Interview OSCE LPSC Trainer.

<sup>229</sup> Interview Representative OSCE, National Programme Officer Community Safety Development Section.

established by UNMIK by decree but without offering any capacity building which resulted in a certain reluctance in some municipalities.<sup>230</sup> Officially every municipality is obliged to have an MCSC. The funding of MCSC is covered by the municipal budget.

The performance of these forums varied significantly depending on the municipality. They work better or worse, often depending on how valuable they are considered by each mayor. Also, the public perception of MCSCs was rather limited in the past due to a lack of outreach and the constant struggle for funding made a sustainable strategy difficult. The underlying cause of these problems was probably the more or less coercive or top-down manner in which UNMIK introduced them, regardless of the needs and abilities of the municipalities and without even consulting them. In consequence, some municipalities refused to comply but they were established anyhow. The troubles continued as the development of this complex architecture of MCSCs, LPSCs and CASATs were at times uncoordinated, with different actors national and international and even the forum occasionally seem to compete with each other rather than to cooperate.<sup>231</sup> Safer world concludes that this has resulted in parallel sets of structures, unclear relationships and poor communication between the different levels of the infrastructure.

*“CP is a process and this process has to be a living process. It is not about making a meeting once a month and you start thinking ‘what did we talk about last month?’ It means that during one month you did not work on anything, which is not good. [...] Just be proactive, be participating, you need to convince people.”<sup>232</sup>*

## Evaluation

After more than ten years of existence, it is still early to fully evaluate the community safety structure. Nevertheless, it is probably safe to say that the LPSCs have been more successful so far than the counterparts on the municipal level. The LPSCs are for that matter very similar to CSATs as both programs aim for the grass root level. Based on this resemblance, Janssens calls the LPSCs a “finely tuned” version of CSAT as it directly invites potential

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<sup>230</sup> Janssens 2015: State building in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective, 247-248.

<sup>231</sup> Saferworld 2013: Community based approaches to safety and security – Lessons from Nepal, Bangladesh and Kosovo, 9.

<sup>232</sup> Interview Representative EULEX, Chief regional advisor North Regional Directorate Mitrovica.

partners and stakeholders to the final community meeting. ICITAP functions more as an informal middleman between these stakeholders.<sup>233</sup>

However, once again and similar to CSAT, one of the major challenges for the future is the sustainability of the program. Here, as well the challenge LPSCs are facing is funding. Our research has shown that here lies one of the biggest problems as numerous LPSCs simply died slowly not because due to a lack of ideas but because they did not acquire any funds. Sometimes the suggested projects were not feasible (for example a chicken farm) and often a project does not cross the threshold of € 3.000. Nevertheless, these forced pauses have a devastating effect on the motivation and engagement of members.<sup>234</sup> The OSCE has taken a big effort in establishing and supporting the program. As it is now slowly being transferred into the hands of KP it will be seen if enough resources and efforts are available to keep the program alive.<sup>235</sup> The question remains how a certain degree of self-sustainability of forums like these can be stimulated.

*"You cannot just copy-paste different things from different countries. Of course, we have to take into account the mentality and the cultural background of the society that we live in and where we want to implement a project. [...] But generally, it is the same concept, it is the same philosophy: Trying to build a communication and trust between community, police, and others."*<sup>236</sup>

#### *Sustainability and Voluntarism in Kosovo*

The LPSCs as much as the CSAT program were from their beginning designed to be handed over at one point in time to the local authorities. The question remains when it is the right time to put a mechanism of local community safety in the hand of the locals. Ideally, the forums would be handed over when they are self-sustainable, meaning that no engagement from outside of the community is required to keep the forum functioning. This, however, is depending on a number of factors that cannot be controlled easily. It seems that two of the most important factors to ensure sustainability are individual engagement and a certain degree of interest of the community. Put differently: a motivated citizen or police officer with the best ideas can't achieve a lot if he or she lacks the support of the community. In turn, a

<sup>233</sup> Janssens 2015: State building in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective, 281-282.

<sup>234</sup> Interview Representative LPSC Prizren Region.

<sup>235</sup> Interview Representative OSCE, Senior Community Policing Officer.

<sup>236</sup> Interview ICITAP National advisor on community safety.

community eager and willing to solve perceived problems will not be successful if no individuals are found to take action into their own hands. Other factors like persistence, patience and the ability to deal with setbacks play a role as soon as a forum is established. But these are universal problems that every community has to deal with and eventually overcome.

We still know very little of what drives local behavioral choices. The question remains why this works in some parts of the world, a country or a community better than in others? Or more generally: Why do some local actors choose to comply with peacebuilding reforms and why do others evade or even resist the same efforts? Gippert correctly points to the fact, that local behavioral choices in peacebuilding encompass a wide spectrum and cannot be limited to a binary distinction between compliance and resistance.<sup>237</sup>

For the case of Kosovo, there seems to be a certain culture of mistrust towards state institutions based on historic and societal circumstances which are likely to influence the effectiveness of COP in the country. COP requires, on the police side, a high degree of proactivity as well as the understanding that citizens are not just subject to policing but rather a cooperative asset in the creation of security. On the citizen side, this is reflected in the understanding that security is not just a service but a collective good that requires collective action. A precondition for the cooperation of both, police officers and citizens is a relationship based on mutual trust.

What sounds simple is in reality much more complex. In Kosovo for example, the CSATs and LPSCs are based on a US model of community engagement where voluntarism of community members are an integral part. But the volunteering culture in the US is not based on pure altruism but rather has a strong basis in everyday life. Schools have institutionalized forms of voluntarism incorporated into their curriculums. College applications require social activities as a form of qualification. The same counts for job applications where the proof of volunteering work is a valuable asset. Our research has shown that volunteering work plays a much lesser role in Kosovo. Teachers engaged in LPSCs struggle to get leave from their principals to attend training. Often no certificates or verifications are issued for volunteering work so that applicants have no chance of proving their engagement in community issues. An LPSC-leader we talked to told us about his lasting struggle to acquire a stamp to being able of issuing certificates to

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<sup>237</sup> Gippert 2015: Exploring local compliance with peacebuilding reforms: legitimacy, coercion and reward-seeking, in police reform in Kosovo, 53.

the younger members of the LPSC saying that they have been volunteering successfully.

Moreover, the devastating economic situation and the high rates of unemployment have not the effect that people have more spare time to volunteer. In fact, the daily struggle for work is time-consuming and long periods of unemployment can have a demotivational effect. But within this lies a chance as well. To boost the willingness to volunteer, small amounts of money can have a positive effect. An LPSC-leader from a small village reported, that he had struggled for a long time to motivate youngsters in the community for cleaning activities of the environment. From the 120 youths in the village, only 3 showed up for cleaning campaigns although widely advertised in the local school. When offered € 5 each per day over 80 engaged in the campaign.<sup>238</sup> Small incentives might have a considerable impact although they can undermine the whole concept of voluntarism. This, in fact, is supported by studies dealing with the question how local actors can be motivated to comply with peacebuilding reforms. Local compliance has been identified as a crucial factor for the success of international peacebuilding and police reform efforts. It is increasingly recognized that among other pathways a 'buy-in' of locals into reform processes are important in shaping the success of international peacebuilding outcomes.<sup>239</sup>

Incentives, especially for young people, do not necessarily have to be financial. The OSCE, for example, used the LPSCs training to introduce English language training as well as a Job-interview-training for students that were engaged in the LPSCs. Some even managed to successfully apply for jobs at international organizations. After all, one should not confuse altruism and voluntarism. Community safety programs based on voluntarism have to make use of all different means to engage people.

### *COP in the North of Kosovo*

A lot has been written on the issue of Mitrovica being divided between Albanians in the south and Serbs in the north. The city has been a focal point for Kosovo's fragile security since 1999. This handbook does not strive to add to this complex topic and ongoing debate. But it would be incomplete if not

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<sup>238</sup> Interview Representative LPSC Prizren Area.

<sup>239</sup> Gippert 2015: Exploring local compliance with peacebuilding reforms: legitimacy, coercion and reward-seeking, in police reform in Kosovo, 71.

at least some aspects of community policing in the northern region would not be mentioned in here.

Mitrovica north and south have their own regional police station as well as substations. With the introduction of the new community policing concept in 2010, KP dismantled the small Community Policing Units, located at main police stations and which were responsible for entire municipalities. The aim was to have several sector officers in each sector, corresponding to the number of inhabitants, as well as a chief sector officer, in order to increase the police presence in the communities and to improve communication and co-operation between the police and the public.

Today the Serb minority is represented in KP with about 13% of the total staff. This number is even higher in the north of Kosovo where Serbs have been systematically included in the KP over the past years. Nevertheless, when it comes to trust in the KP, some differences between Serbs and Albanians can be observed. While 80% of the Albanians and 79% of other ethnic minorities trust or somehow trust the KP, the percentage for Serbs is with 68% a bit lower. The lowest is the trust in the north towards the Kosovo security force with over 75% of citizens not trusting it. However, this relative lower trust is reflected in the fact, that in the north unofficial or informal security networks are more present than in the south.<sup>240</sup>

Besides these informal networks whose impact on human security is very hard to estimate, a number of others stakeholder play a role for COP in the region. Besides OSCE and EULEX it is KFOR, the Kosovo force of NATO, played an important role as a provider of security in the north over the past decade. The soldiers patrol regularly the streets in so-called Liaison Monitoring Teams (LMT) of which six exists in northern Kosovo. Their mission includes to interact with the population, to gather information from the communities, and to liaise with KP and other law enforcement agencies. To improve trust between the international personnel and the local population some of these LMT-teams are stationed in so-called fieldhouses one of them in Mitrovica. The LMT-officers live among the locals, shops groceries in the same supermarkets and frequent the same restaurants and bars.<sup>241</sup> As a result of this engagement, 90% of the people in north Kosovo reported having had

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<sup>240</sup> Kosovo Center for Security Studies 2016: Kosovo Security Barometer – Citizens perception on police integrity in Kosovo, 14-15.

<sup>241</sup> Interview KFOR Soldier Liaison and Monitoring Team



contact with KFOR.<sup>242</sup> Although in official documents often referred to as being a key player in COP as well as being an important part of the Kosovo security architecture, it remains unclear which role the force really plays in COP. It is important to keep in mind that not every security provider engaging with communities for the purpose of collecting intelligence is also engaging in community policing.

EULEX was from the beginning encountering difficulties during its engagement in northern Kosovo. This reached a sad highpoint when an EULEX-officer was killed during an attack in Mitrovica North in 2013. The virtual boycott of EULEX presence in this part of Kosovo resulted in the fact that the mission was not able to execute its MMA tasks properly as it was continuously hindered on entering the north.<sup>243</sup> However, over time the situation eased and our research showed that besides some 'Gaul villages' that refuse any interference from EULEX, the north can be considered as safe for officers of the mission.<sup>244</sup> At times EULEX deployed around 15 regional and station advisors in the north dealing with COP but reduced that number in 2016 to only four.<sup>245</sup>

Besides the continuous patrolling of the north EULEX's main focus on community policing was to establish the LPSC's and to gain back the trust of citizens. In the past two years with the help of OSCE in 11 communities in the north of Mitrovica LPSCs were established.<sup>246</sup> Temporarily, the EULEX officers even joined their KP colleagues in LPSC meetings. But our research showed that the efforts in terms of money and manpower were considerably high to establish LPSC against the resistance of local politicians and citizens and only succeeded by stressing the fact that politics were not involved in the process.<sup>247</sup> Northern Kosovo is a relatively small place and often the police did not see the need of LPSCs as they have informal intelligence networks already in place. It seems that even today the concept of creating forums to include citizens in the provision of security is still widely rejected by police officers as much as by citizens.<sup>248</sup> In consequence, the results so far were

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<sup>242</sup> Kosovo Center for Security Studies 2016: Kosovo Security Barometer – Citizens perception on police integrity in Kosovo, 18.

<sup>243</sup> Janssens 2015: Statebuilding in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective, 329.

<sup>244</sup> Interview Representative EULEX, Executive division Mitrovica.

<sup>245</sup> Interview Police Officer Netherlands EULEX, MMA Mitrovica North.

<sup>246</sup> As of May 2017.

<sup>247</sup> Interview Representative OSCE, Senior Community Policing Officer.

<sup>248</sup> Interview Representative EULEX, Chief regional advisor North Regional Directorate Mitrovica.



mixed, strongly depending on the willingness of station commanders and majors.

It is also important to take into account the fact that the mere existence of an LPSC on paper does not mean that it is actually functioning. LPSCs are strongly depending on voluntary work by citizens. That means that interest in the work has to be constantly created and is not a fast-selling item. Moreover, the more pressure is applied to communities, the more likely it is to create an atmosphere for citizens of not having a choice than to participate in LPSC. In short term, this might be functioning to a certain extent but in a long-term and especially when stakeholders like OSCE pull out the sustainability of these forums becomes questionable.

Another unresolved issue in the north of Kosovo are the so-called Civilian Protection Units. These operate in North Kosovo outside of the official legal framework. The majority of the Serbian communities view them as a civilian structure with the sole purpose of providing assistance to civilians in emergency situations. In addition, these units frequently perform other tasks, such as road maintenance, bridge repairs or securing buildings. According to a recent study, there are some indications and suspicion that individual members of CP units have been involved in political violence and organized crime.<sup>249</sup> This is one of the reasons that the Kosovo government in accordance with the international institutions, consider the units as mainly illegal paramilitary structures that must be dissolved. Under an EU-brokered agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, almost 500 former members of the Civil Protection Units were to be integrated into relevant Kosovo institutions. Numerous problems complicated this process and delayed it significantly. A large part of former CP personnel was excluded from the integration plan from the beginning and will remain jobless after its implementation. Kosovo's institutions are hardly able to absorb entire CP units but also the unwillingness of CP personnel to become part of Kosovo's structures posed serious challenges as well.

### **COP in Kosovo Today: People are the Police, Police are the People**

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<sup>249</sup> Belgrade Center for Security Policy 2015: The future of Civil Protection in North Kosovo, 6.

*“Community Policing what it basically is in Kosovo: People are the police, police are the people. Simple as that. So it is a motto, I say a quite ambitious motto. I think it is very ambitious.”<sup>250</sup>*

In 2012, the KP adopted the Kosovo Community Policing Strategy 2012-2016 under the motto “People are the Police, Police are the people”. The short-term goal was to establish an effective relationship between police and citizens and thereby to learn to understand their problems. In the long run, it sets out to improve the ability of police officers to liaise with the communities and work in a cooperative manner.<sup>251</sup> According to OSCE, the strategy promotes partnership between the public and the police by encouraging their joint responsibility for community security issues. An important role was granted to the community safety forums to identify and communicate safety needs of communities and to ensure that the police are reactive to them.<sup>252</sup>

Already in 2011, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had adopted the “Community Safety Strategy and Action Plan 2011-2016”, determining strategic priorities and objectives of institutions involved in community safety. The strategy declares LPSCs and MCSCs as an integral part of a broader approach to community safety.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> Interview Representative EULEX, Chief regional advisor North Regional Directorate Mitrovica.

<sup>251</sup> KP 2011: Kosovo Community Policing Strategy 2012-2016, 12.

<sup>252</sup> OSCE 2010: Safety in our Community – Informative brochure of community policing in northern Kosovo, 8.

<sup>253</sup> Janssens 2015: Statebuilding in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective, 280.



### Contacts in Kosovo

A good indicator to evaluate the effectiveness of community policing are police contacts with citizens. Personal experience with police, especially outside law enforcement situations, can contribute to a positive perception of the police which in turn is a prerequisite for trust-building.

Kosovo Security Barometer conducted by the Kosovo Center for Security Studies found that Traffic Police and the Border Police have had the most interaction or communication with citizens. At first sight, this seems surprising taking into account that it is the specific task of community police officers to proactively get in contact with citizens. Only 16 percent of the respondents claimed to have had contact with CP officers.<sup>254</sup> However, COP is not about the quantity of police-citizen contacts but rather about the quality of these contacts. Building trust takes time and repeated contacts with community leaders, school principals, and teachers or other individuals that are involved in community affairs. Efficiency in COP means building strong relations with the community and not as many relationships as possible. Ideally, every citizen in a community should at least know that a COP officer exists and how to contact him or her. One of the interview partners compared COP officers to politicians: they should be known by face and name in their communities. Instead of asking for votes they ask the people for their cooperation.<sup>255</sup> This is supported by the above-cited survey: when asked how public safety can be improved, 95% perceived it as an utmost necessity to increase cooperation between citizens and the KP.<sup>256</sup>

Regardless of how realistic this is in reality in Kosovo, there is still a long way to go. It has to be taken into consideration that COP is still a relatively new approach for KP. The first 150 COP officers were trained by the OSCE from 2006 to 2008. With the adoption of a new community policing strategy, the separate CP-units were closed down and instead all 8.000 Kosovar police officers were trained in CP where they learned about partnership building, communicational skills, and the COP strategy.<sup>257</sup>

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<sup>254</sup> Kosovo Center for Security Studies 2016: Kosovo Security Barometer – Citizens perception on police integrity in Kosovo, 18.

<sup>255</sup> Interview Social Scientist UNDP.

<sup>256</sup> Kosovo Center for Security Studies 2016: Kosovo Security Barometer – Citizens perception on police integrity in Kosovo, 25. Nearly 80% believed that more security can be achieved by more frequent police present in traffic.

<sup>257</sup> Interview KP Officer.

*“From a mission member’s perspective, you have a big problem when you join a mission believing you could see everything through your German glasses. Even on an international level, you have different approaches [...] to COP, even in Europe.”<sup>258</sup>*

### *The Kosovo Police Service*

As already mentioned KP was developed with the help of UNMIK basically from scratch and trained by OSCE whereas practical experience was provided by UNMIK. Today the KP force is the most trusted and contacted law enforcement institution in Kosovo. The International Crisis Group states in a study from 2010 that police have earned a reputation for honesty and are largely free from the petty bribery that tarnishes many services in the Western Balkans.<sup>259</sup> Transparency International in a comprehensive study from 2015 concludes that it has “enough financial and human resources, and is fairly well-regulated by law in terms of requiring that police officers are independent, transparent and accountable in the course of their duties. Aside from that, the police force is considered the most active law enforcement institution in terms of investigating and reporting corruption.”<sup>260</sup>

Indeed, general trust in the police is high with 79% of citizens trusting or somehow trusting the police in 2015. Interestingly, this figure is relatively stable over the regions as well as over ethnic backgrounds that have, in general, positive views towards KP.<sup>261</sup> These statistical data concerning trust in the police are particularly relevant for COP as there is a strong relationship between trust in police and the citizens’ perception of safety.<sup>262</sup>

In practice, however, the perception of law enforcement agencies by the citizens does not say much about the institution’s actual state. This counts for KP as well that is far from being a perfect police organization. Transparency International respectively identifies the heavy influence of the government on internal management issues as well as a high grade of centralization and

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<sup>258</sup> Interview Representative EULEX, Executive division Mitrovica.

<sup>259</sup> International Crisis Group 2010: The rule of Law in independent Kosovo, 5.

<sup>260</sup> Transparency International 2015: National Integrity System Assessment Kosovo, 91.

<sup>261</sup> Kosovo Center for Security Studies 2016: Kosovo Security Barometer – Citizens perception on police integrity in Kosovo, 13-14.

<sup>262</sup> Gray, Strasheim 2016: Security Sector Reform, ethnic representation and perceptions of safety: evidence from Kosovo, 348.

not enough officers in the field that resulted in problems of meeting community demands.<sup>263</sup>

Some of these organizational problems date back to a Yugoslavian police culture where officers were well respected and even feared. With the incorporation of numerous former KLA fighters a military command culture was imported which is expressed in a certain rigidity and a strict obedience of lower ranks. The “Fehlerkultur” or mistake management is weakly developed resulting in a lack of proactivity of lower ranks and a shifting of responsibilities. A certain resistance to change exists, resulting in frustration among young officers eager to apply new policing techniques.<sup>264</sup> This is specifically relevant for COP which still must be considered a relatively new or even innovative form of policing in the Western Balkans. But then again, many of these deficits can be found in police organizations around the world including those in Western Europe and are certainly not unique characteristics of KP.

Currently, KP is going through some major changes particularly with a view to the age structure of the force. Due to an early retirement scheme, the oldest police force in the region recruited hundreds of young men and women since 2016. This can be viewed as a good chance for COP in the future.

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<sup>263</sup>Transparency International 2015: National Integrity System Assessment Kosovo, 91.

<sup>264</sup> International Crisis Group 2010: The rule of Law in independent Kosovo, 6.



### Female Police Officers in Kosovo

Of the approx. 8000 KP officers in Uniform today, only around 14% are female. The numbers of female police officers haven't significantly changed since 2011 when 12.5% of the police force were women.<sup>265</sup> However, in 2015 nearly 20% of the 289 cadets that graduated from the police academy were female. But the problem is not so much the graduates but rather the high drop out rates female police officers. In 2011, a government report states that over 33% of the women dropped out of the police force compared to only 14% of men. Back then, less than 10% of women were in leading positions of the police. The report states various reasons for these discrepancies. It starts with the initial problem that a majority of women had problems persuading their families and peers to become a member of the police force as this job is not viewed as suitable for women. This problem of acceptance persists during their work as female police officers leading to difficulties in performing their duties.

However, the respondents named as reasons for the high dropout rates next to personal reasons, such as marriage or motherhood, the working conditions as well as insufficient income. With a view to the latter one has to concede that today salaries of police officers are satisfactory in Kosovo. Since 2011, the salaries for public administration have increased by 23%, resulting in an average salary for a police officer of around € 450 per month compared to Kosovo's average income of € 291.<sup>266</sup> For COP, the recruitment of female police officers is a priority for the simple reason that half of the communities are constituted of women.

A related issue is the representation of ethnical minorities within KP. According to the OSCE, in 2015 of a total of 7.635 police officers, 16% were non-Albanian officers: 967 Kosovo Serbs, 65 Kosovo Turks, 181 Kosovo Bosnians, 13 Kosovo Roma, 17 Kosovo Ashkali, 37 Kosovo Gorani and 9 Kosovo Egyptians.<sup>267</sup>

*"The international community played their part as well by, to a certain degree imposing community policing on the police without taking into consideration the customs and traditions in Kosovo and the fact that community policing was implemented over a very long period of time in western countries."<sup>268</sup>*

<sup>265</sup> Kosovo Government 2011: Report on the position of women in Kosovo Police, 2.

<sup>266</sup> Transparency International 2015: National Integrity System Assessment Kosovo, October 2015, 94.

<sup>267</sup> OSCE 2015: Community rights assessment report - Fourth edition, 11.

<sup>268</sup> Interview Social Scientist UNDP.

## Concluding Remarks

Police reform has become an integral part of peacebuilding by the international community. In recent years, these efforts have increasingly incorporated COP strategies. The reasons for that have been laid out in the previous chapter. However, these efforts are shaped by different assumptions about state power, the role of police in a democracy and how conflicts can be prevented. Kosovo, however, has been a case – or an experiment – where these assumptions were put to test. Some of the strategies worked, some didn't and for some, it is still too early for an assessment.

The implementation of the above-named security mechanisms, such as MCSCs, LPSCs, and CSATs, was a step in the right direction. However, it is worth mentioning that a Saferworld study from 2011 came to the conclusion that the visibility of all three was very low. Although all actors had been present for a number of years at the time the study was conducted most respondents were not aware of these structures. One possible explanation offered is that people are confused by the myriad of different structures, their mandates and last but not least, their names.<sup>269</sup> More recent data if the visibility has improved is not available.

Sustainability is key to community safety structures. Implementation is a long lasting process that requires considerable efforts, funds, and manpower. And the experience from UNMIK showed that top-down approaches are less effective when it comes to police reform. This is particularly true for COP which is based on cooperation rather than authoritative policing. Within this lies the major flaw of the COP strategies by the international community: Can an approach to policing that is cooperative in its essence be implemented in a coercive manner? We have no clear answer to that but based on the UNMIK experience it seems that top-down approaches are more likely to fail. Local ownership is a key issue in contemporary approaches such as chosen by EULEX or OSCE. But the case of EULEX and its fading acceptance over the past years showed that it is not a recipe for success as the rule of law mission came under harsh critique for its reluctance of using its executive powers. Raising expectations that cannot be met due to financial or political constraints is a key problem of all security sector reforms. The same counts for COP which is far from being a panacea for security risks. This is the reason why especially for COP public or local ownership is important. Fortunately, cooperative implementation strategies have become more popular. Leading

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<sup>269</sup> Saferworld 2011: Public perceptions of safety and security in Kosovo: Time to act, 10

by example, convincing citizens and police officers as well as giving incentives to adopt and engage in COP forums have dominated COP implementation strategies of the international community in Kosovo in recent years. Not to forget the educating efforts through training and training the trainers.

But a factor that has to be taken into consideration when assessing all these is effort is the so-called mission dependency. In particular, after long-term deployments 'local actors tend to lean on support rather than taking over responsibilities and committing to the values and standards they have learned.'<sup>270</sup> The reasons for that may relate to culture and tradition as certain values may simply immune to external transformation.

However, an honest assessment of COP in Kosovo must ask the inconvenient question: Will COP be an integral part of the security architecture of Kosovo in ten or twenty years from now? Our research showed that there are some good reasons to doubt that. "Things are done differently in Kosovo" was a phrase we came across numerous times during our research. This can probably be extended to the entire Western Balkans.

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<sup>270</sup> Clingendael 2016: The future of police missions, 28.



**Recommended Readings**

Two recently published books dealing with the challenge of state-building in Kosovo are Jelle Janssens: *Statebuilding in Kosovo: A plural Policing Perspective*. Capussela: *State Building in Kosovo*.

The OECD Handbook on Security Sector Reform from 2007 is still today an important reference book.

This OSCE document gives insights into the activities of CSATs in Kosovo: OSCE ICITAP: *Assessing the impact – Kosovo's Community Safety Action Teams*.

The Saferworld publication 'Community-based approaches to safety and security – Lessons from Nepal, Bangladesh, and Kosovo' presents some the NGOs projects in the regions.

The Kosovo Center for Security Studies has recently published a study on the security perception of Kosovars: *Kosovo Security Barometer – Citizens perception on police integrity in Kosovo*.

The Kosovo Police published a strategy paper on its Community policing strategy in 2012. *Kosovo Community Policing Strategy 2012-2016*

An insightful document was published by International Crisis Group: *The rule of Law in independent Kosovo*.

## 6. Youth, COP, and ICT

### Summary

*Youths play a very important role for COP, respectively in developing countries where they are a rapidly growing segment of society. Young people are not only the part of the population that most often engage in criminal behaviors but also are at the highest risk of becoming victims of crimes. Youth-police relations are often problematic and characterized by mutual mistrust. This chapter identifies three main areas pertaining specifically to the safety of youth: cyberbullying, school violence and sexual harassment. COP engagement in each of these fields faces particular challenges. Schools can play an important role in the implementation of COP strategies. With regards to ICT young people are often tech-savvy offering new opportunities for outreach but also a number of new risks of being victimized.*

### Introduction

Young people play an important role when it comes to safety and security in communities. Particularly in post-conflict countries and their demographic structure where young people make up for a large part of the population societal change cannot be achieved without including the youth. For example, in Kosovo in 2012 nearly 50% of the general population were under the age of 30.

#### **Definition: Youth**

To define “youth” or “young people” is not an easy task. Youth is best understood as a period of transition from the dependence of childhood to adulthood’s independence and awareness of our interdependence as members of a community. Youth is a more fluid category than a fixed age-group. Therefore, youth is often indicated as a person between the age where he/she may leave compulsory education, and the age at which he/she finds his/her first employment. This latter age limit has been increasing, as higher levels of unemployment and the cost of setting up an independent household put many young people into a prolonged period of dependency. The UN, for statistical consistency across regions, defines ‘youth’, as persons between the ages of 15 and 24. For activities at the national level (e.g. when implementing a local community youth program) “youth” may be understood in a more flexible manner. The UN-Habitat (youth fund) defines all people between 15 and 32 as youths.

The role youth play in a community varies considerably. It is not possible to consider young people as a homogenous group within a community. Typically, they encompass different roles depending on possibilities, expectations, education and other social factors. A number of different factors play a role:

- Young people are the group in society typically most often engaging in criminal activities
- Young people are the group most often victimized by criminal behaviors of both, peers and adults.
- Young people more often frequent public spaces in crowds where encounters with other people and the police are more likely.
- Young people engage in behavior considered illegal specifically for their age group, such as alcohol consumption, truancy from school and driving cars unlicensed.
- Young people's transition to adulthood is often characterized by risk-taking behaviors, rebellion and an outlaw mentality.

These factors are responsible that young people are often considered as troublemakers especially in the eyes of police officers. However, it goes without saying that the positive aspects of youths mostly outweigh the negatives and include the ability to think outside the box, strong motivation to make a difference as well being open to new technologies.



### Young People as “Agents of Change”<sup>271</sup>

Nelson Mandela once stated that “Youth is a valued possession of the nation. Without them, there can be no future. Their needs are immense and urgent.” The role of youth in developing countries and their impact on democratic and economic development is part of a current debate in academic research. Some see a huge potential in youth for the development of entire nations, others are more pessimistic and correlate, for example, the numbers of young people (mainly of young men) with the likelihood of violent conflicts. Since the 1990s the perception of youth has changed, especially in the international development collaboration. Young people are increasingly seen as “agents of change”, as experts for the solution of their own problems and the improvement of their lives. By now, international and national organizations like the World Bank and UNICEF recognize young people as an autonomous target group. The high number of youngsters represents an all-time high, posing a major challenge for their countries, which are faced with the necessity of providing education and employment to large cohorts of young people.

The role of youth played in developing countries is getting more and more important. While many see the rising number of young people as a motor for the development of nations, others are more skeptical. The British Council, for example, warns of a “demographic disaster” if not more attention is paid to the concerns of young people. The World Bank’s 2007 World Development Report drew attention on the problem of youth participation and called for young people to be provided with greater opportunities to take part in the life of society. If this cannot be achieved, the World Bank warns that the resulting frustration could lead to a turning away from society and an increasing propensity for violence. The economic and social costs of the resulting violence must be considered a significant barrier to further development and may even lead to the destabilization of countries in the middle or long term. Furthermore, a high level of youth violence hampers social and economic development and leads to the political instability of states.

In the case of Kosovo, it is becoming clear that democratization processes are often a prerequisite for the functioning of the economy and the achievement of stability, yet the international community and the government have been late in recognizing this. Such processes must take on board younger generations, as they are the future of any country.

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<sup>271</sup> Source Feltes, 2013: The Promotion of Youth Participation Structures – Lessons Learned.

### *Youths with Minority Backgrounds*

If young people, in general, are more likely to either commit crimes or become victims of crimes than adults, then this is even more true for young people from ethnic minorities. Young people from ethnic minorities are more likely to have contact with the police, they are arrested more often and are overrepresented in juvenile prisons around the world. Reasons for that are manifold and range from higher police control activities in minority neighborhoods, widespread racial profiling among police officers (i.e. 'stop&frisk') and the tendency of ethnical minorities to commit typical crimes (i.e. street crimes, drug-related crimes) that are 1. relatively easy to detect and 2. prioritized by law enforcement systems. But also social and educational reasons have to be taken into account when dealing with young offenders from ethnic minorities.

Contacts between young people from minorities and the police are more likely to be viewed negatively by both parties. Particularly cultural differences, downward spirals of conflict, gang membership or low social and educational statuses constitute this difficult relationship. Research on trust in and attitudes towards the police suggests that procedural fairness and the quality of interpersonal treatment (politeness, dignity, respect human rights) is of particular importance for young people from minority groups during encounters with legal authorities. Authorities acting in ways that are perceived to be procedurally unfair undermine their own legitimacy and by that makes it less likely that those who have been treated unfairly will obey the law in the future. Interestingly, when it comes to young people from minorities, findings suggest that although ethnic groups differ regarding whether they are treated fairly, they agree on what constitutes fair treatment by the police (i.e. neutrality, benevolence, respect). Regardless of the ethnic background, these process measures are considered more important than a favorable outcome for the young people during encounters with the police.

### *Youth and Gender*

Girls and young women have to be considered as one of the most vulnerable groups in post-conflict and developing countries. Although their delinquency rates are relatively low compared to males of the same age, the likelihood of becoming a victim of crime is relatively high. Gender-based violence, domestic violence and various forms of exploitation of girls and young women are widespread around the world. Accordingly, the police, among other institutions, play a crucial role as a provider of protection against those crimes. Nevertheless, the willingness of young females to report victimization

to the police is considerably low. With regards to the relationship between young females and the police, data from U.S. middle schools suggest that males report on average 3 times as many incidents of delinquency than females, even though their perception of safety appears to be similar. Reasons for this low reporting rates are among others that victimization, gang membership or membership in violent peer groups, violent conflicts and the number of arrests appear to be more frequent among males than among females.<sup>272</sup> Another reason, especially in case of sexually motivated crimes, is a lack of trust in the police who, in some world regions, is still dominated by male officers.

In the literature, there is no consensus about the effects of gender on the perceptions of and attitudes towards the police. Whereas some studies find more positive attitudes towards the police among young females, other studies conclude that gender is a relative nonfactor. However, overall the findings suggest that females tend to have more positive attitudes towards the police than males. One reason might be that young females have a lower likelihood of experiencing police contacts and if they do, the contacts tend to be perceived less negative. In fact, the type of contact that produces negative sentiments among juveniles, as well as adults, is arrest and since males make up over two-thirds of juvenile arrests, the difference in male and female attitudes found here is not too surprising.<sup>273</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> Stewart et. al. 2013: Youth Perceptions of the Police: Identifying Trajectories, 26.

<sup>273</sup> Stewart et. al. 2013: Youth Perceptions of the Police: Identifying Trajectories, 31.



### **Elderly Cinema in the city of Essen**

Although this Handbook puts a focus on young people as clients and partners for COP there exist another important group in society: the elderly. They are a fast growing vulnerable group, especially in western societies. With progressing age the danger of falling victim to deception or fraud by criminals increases. A wide range of scams is used to defraud the elderly for money exploiting typical insecurities that come with the higher age (e.g. loss of eyesight and hearing). A popular method of fraudsters is to force entry into homes under false pretenses such as an emergency and stealing valuables. Another more sophisticated method is the impersonation of a relative, a serviceman or even a police officer requiring money. Most of these crimes can be prevented by raising awareness amongst the elderly and sensitize for the methods used by the fraudsters. But the scams are fast changing and adapted so that a constant and quick update of vulnerable individuals and groups is required. Social media would make an effective tool for the police to do so. Elderly people are much more reluctant to use social media, smartphones or even mobile phones than younger people. More traditional ICT such as radio or TV might be a solution to that problem. The police in the city of Essen has gone a slightly different way and organizes in collaboration with the cities elderly department so-called "Elderly Cinema" events. Local cinemas are rented to show educational films on topics like "False Policemen at the telephone or the front door." The advantage of this approach is that the format of cinema is well known amongst the elderly. Moreover the social character made the events to a popular format in the city with thousands of citizens each year. The problem, however is that the most vulnerable group namely those individuals that are isolated or too old to leave their homes can hardly be reached with this method.

### *Youth and Police*

The relationship between police and youth is more complex than between police and adults. Important factors to map out this relationship is the perception of police and the attitudes towards the police (ATP) by youths. Both are affected by different factors, such as:

- race
- minority status
- family background
- gender
- education
- delinquency
- prior victimization

- exposure to police practices through communication with others
- perceptions of quality of life
- involvement in delinquent subcultures
- neighborhood and community ties<sup>274</sup>

The importance for COP of taking perceptions of and attitudes towards the police into account has its reasons in the link to several key outcomes, such as:

- individuals' law-abiding behaviors
- public support for the allocation of resources to police agencies
- evaluations of police performance
- citizens' willingness to cooperate with the police as co-producers of public safety<sup>275</sup>

Research has shown that overall juvenile attitudes towards the police are less favorable than those of their adult counterparts. Police agencies generally face significant challenges in generating voluntary cooperation with youth and have found it particularly difficult to engage youth in collaborative crime control efforts.<sup>276</sup> Successful law enforcement is heavily dependent on people's willingness to report crimes, to call for help, to report suspicious activities and to serve as a witness or informant. The police need to be able to elicit such types of cooperation from citizens in order to effectively and efficiently control crime and secure people's safety. Legal authorities can specifically benefit strongly from the cooperation of adolescents as they are the group who, relatively speaking, commits the largest number of offenses, are often bystanders and most often becomes the victim of crimes.<sup>277</sup> Adolescent behavior patterns, such as traveling in crowds, congregating on streets and public places, and cruising in cars, raise suspicion and increase the likelihood that youth will be stopped and questioned by officers.

Hence, the wider societal culture that deems that young people are a threat tends to provide justification for police to attend to youth in order to avoid potential trouble. Removing youth from visible street locations often when they are not involved in any illegal or deviant behavior can result in negative opinion towards police.<sup>278</sup>

The extra police attention for not doing anything wrong creates a sense that youth are being treated as trouble-makers. This promotes tense and hostile

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<sup>274</sup> For a detailed overview of existing studies see Brick et al. 2009: Juvenile attitudes towards the police, 488.

<sup>275</sup> Schuck 2013: A life-course Perspective on Adolescents' Attitudes to Police, 2

<sup>276</sup> Murphy 2013: Does procedural Justice matter to youth?, 53.

<sup>277</sup> Dirikx, Van den Bulck 2014: Media use a the Process-based Model for Police cooperation, 344.

<sup>278</sup> Murphy 2013: Does procedural Justice matter to youth?, 54.



police-youth encounters and leads many youths to have a pessimistic view of police enacting their authority unfairly. Moreover, these situations allow officers to exercise a substantial amount of discretion, where the demeanor of the youth plays a large role in determining the final outcome of the encounter. These encounters with officers are believed to be qualitatively different for youth than adults. Compared to adults, adolescents, particularly minority adolescents, are subjected to more surveillance, harassment, and degradation by the police.<sup>279</sup>

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<sup>279</sup> Schuck 2013: A life-course Perspective on Adolescents' Attitudes to Police, 3.



### Attitudes Towards the Police

The ATP of citizens is shaped by different factors, such as individual experiences, social background, the media, and peers. In an attempt to reduce this complexity, social research dealing with how ATP are shaped identified three main perspectives on policing attributes which matter the most for a person's attitude towards police:

- the performance-based perspective
- the distributive justice perspective
- the procedural justice perspective.

According to the performance-based perspective, people's ATP are mainly determined by their views on how effectively the police control crime. If people feel that the police are effectively controlling crime, that they are keeping the neighborhood safe and that crime rates are low, their ATP can be expected to be positive.

The distributive justice perspective argues that people's ATP are primarily rooted in their views about the fairness of the distribution of police services across people and communities. If citizens feel that people receive the outcomes from the police that they deserve, and if they are convinced that different groups of people (different race, gender, age, etc.) receive the same quality of service, they will probably support the police.

Finally, the procedural justice perspective states that what matters most are people's views on how fair the processes are through which the police make their decisions and exercise their authority. Four elements have consistently been found to be related to people's judgments about procedural fairness: the opportunities for participation that police officers provide in making their decisions; their friendliness and politeness; their neutrality; and, finally, their trustworthiness. If people rate the police in a positive way on each of these dimensions, their ATP can be expected to be positive.

### *Trust in Police*

The most important factor for a cooperative relationship between youth and police is the level of trust between them. This does not only include the level youth trusts the police but also vice versa, which attitudes the police have towards the youth in a community. Trust can be divided into different

dimensions, such as trust in police effectiveness, on the one hand, and trust in police fairness and engagement, on the other hand.<sup>280</sup> Research suggests that adolescents tend to find police effectiveness less important than police officers showing concern for citizens' needs. In addition, the youths perceived the fair exercise of power and respectful treatment of citizens to be very important aspects when thinking about policing in general.<sup>281</sup> Youths have high expectations of the police but remain realistic. An experience with a police officer mildly crossing the line does not always lead young people to believe that most cops are unfair. However, potentially a single experience of a 'bad' cop can greatly alter how youths think about the police. Sometimes negative perceptions of the police can mainly be an expression of a rebellious attitude. For others, they are a reflection of truly negative beliefs about the police that may continue to influence them in their ATP throughout adulthood.



#### **The US National Police Athletics/Activities Leagues<sup>282</sup>**

Community policing can facilitate interaction between the police and youth, such as police-youth sports activities, mentoring and job skills training. The National Police Athletics/Activities Leagues was according to their mission statement set up to work in the USA promoting the prevention of juvenile crime and violence by building relationships among kids, cops, and community through positive engagement. PAL provides its members with funding to develop programs, such as sports and arts-related activities, and adventure trips. Police officers supervise and engage in the activities with the youth. The activities are also used to enhance relations with the community, build awareness about the role of the police, and promote positive youth attitudes. Similar Initiatives have been implemented in Kosovo by KP and the OSCE. For more information, see the National PAL website: <http://www.nationalpal.org/>.

### **Communities, Police and Youth**

An issue of great concern in police research is the impact of aggressive police strategies on communities. Particularly problematic are the effects that these interactions have on the relationship between the police and the younger

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<sup>280</sup> Dirikx et al. 2012: Police-youth relationships, 192.


<sup>281</sup> Ibid, 202.

<sup>282</sup> Case Example taken from UNODC 2013: Training Manual on Policing Urban Space, 18.

residents, especially of minority communities. This can lead to a vicious circle of mutual animosity. Young people are often treated harshly by police as a result of individual officers' perception of young people as troublemakers, or as a result of structural mistrust against juveniles within the police organization.

As for juveniles, the opinion of their peers is more important than legal norms or administrative regulations, harsh treatment of younger people by officers may produce an even lawless youth subcultures. This may result in communities or neighborhoods in which residents are alienated from the police and are therefore unwilling to cooperate with the police to address crime. In addition, because today's youth become tomorrow's adults, these controversial police strategies may generate a cycle of destructive community-police relations. Keeping the fact in mind, that social cohesion and social control is the most important aspect for crime prevention in neighborhoods, destructive community – police relations may result in higher crime rates and create generate a cycle of destructive community-police relations.<sup>283</sup>

### Vicious Circle of Police Youth Perceptions



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<sup>283</sup> Schuck 2013: A life-course Perspective on Adolescents' Attitudes to Police, 2. With further references.

### *Police Contacts*

We know that police contacts have a significant impact on attitudes towards the police held by juveniles as well as adults. However, there is no consensus on how these contacts affect the attitude towards the police. The nature of these contacts plays an important role.

Perhaps not surprisingly, it seems that particularly youths who had been arrested had significantly less favorable attitudes towards the police than youths who had no contact or other types of contact with police officers such as only being stopped and questioned in a proper manner. A negative outcome of a police encounter, such as an arrest or just the experience of being treated rudely casts a shadow over perceptions of police.<sup>284</sup>



#### **Dutch Ask the Police Website<sup>285</sup>**

The Dutch police has created a website specifically targeting young people. Questions related to issues of particular interest for young people can be asked via the website. These issues encompass, for example, weapons, drinking, and drugs, fireworks, looting or sexual abuse. The webpage states that questions will be answered in three days and that user data are protected. A number of topics are linked to a Youtube channel where short video clips deal with different topics. Also interesting is the fact, that vloggers, video bloggers with a certain standing among youngsters are featured that inform on certain issues as, for example, that the spreading of nude pictures is forbidden.

Another important factor shaping the attitudes towards the police is the ethnical minority background. Numerous studies suggest that young people with minority backgrounds have a significantly higher dissatisfaction with the police. Interestingly, this seems to be independent of class and socioeconomic status.

The research illustrates that strain, community ties, and fear of crime are significantly related to youths' attitudes. Reducing levels of individual strain and improving perceptions of community ties would improve youths' attitudes towards the police. By convincing people to get involved in the community and making such efforts known, police may be viewed in a more

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<sup>284</sup> Brick et al. 2009: Juvenile attitudes towards the police, 493.

<sup>285</sup> <https://www.vraaghetdepolitie.nl>

favorable light - with the result, that this makes their work easier, communication with citizens more productive and police work overall more successful.



### **Gauteng Youth Crime Prevention Desks<sup>286</sup>**

Due to the fact, that young people in South Africa are a key target group as both victims and perpetrators of crime, the Youth Crime Prevention Desks (YCPDs) in Gauteng mobilize and involve young people in violence and crime prevention interventions. Desks are volunteer-based structures based at police stations within the province to encourage and enable young people to participate actively in identifying the causes of youth violence and crime and to collaborate in creating social crime prevention strategies for their communities. The YCPDs are a joint initiative between the Department of Community Safety (DoCS), the South African Police Service (SAPS), and Community Police Forums (CPFs). Initially designed to promote coordination between these entities to create safer environments for young people, the YCPD program has become a platform for youth to share their vision for a safer future.

This program seeks to address various aspects of crime and its impact on youth. This includes:

- Developing cooperative relations between the police and youth
- Assisting in identifying safety needs of youth
- Developing and implementing programs to address identified safety needs
- Enabling youth to act as good citizens and role models
- Empowering youth in crime prevention, as well as communication, conflict-resolution, and interpersonal skills

The YCPD members coordinate youth safety activities and projects at police station level. The main pillars are school safety, substance abuse prevention, and the prevention of violence against women and children. The idea is to work with other youth and youth groups to develop projects that are attractive, sustainable and implementable, and to respond to the specific safety needs of their communities. Initiatives include:

- Sports against crime
- Prison talks
- School talks and debates

<sup>286</sup> <http://www.saferspaces.org.za/be-inspired/entry/gauteng-youth-crime-prevention-desks>

- School safety desks
- Substance abuse campaigns and projects
- Roadshows on safety
- Child protection
- Crime awareness through public meetings

In April 2014 92 out of 141 police stations had functional youth desks. Every police station has a SAPS coordinator responsible for the YCPD. The YCPDs also address the underlying problem of youth unemployment as a major driver of crime by offering training for hard and soft skills.

#### Bullying and Cyberbullying

Information and communication technologies play an immensely important role in the lives of young people. Mobile phones (Smartphones) social media sites, messenger applications and so on are part of daily life of youths. ICT has changed the lives of young people around the world. But it also exposes some risks to human security. Data protection issues are one of them but also different forms of harassment or even violence are related to the use of ICT.

#### Definition: Cyberbullying

'Bullying' is usually defined as being an aggressive, intentional act or behavior that is carried out by a group or an individual repeatedly and over time against a victim who can not easily defend him or herself. In recent years, bullying through electronic means, specifically, mobile phones or the internet has emerged, often collectively labeled 'cyberbullying'. It is defined as 'an aggressive, intentional act carried out by a group or individual, *using electronic forms of contact*, repeatedly and over time against a victim who cannot easily defend him or herself'.

On a side note: there is no term or concept in most Balkan cultures which specifically describe bullying or cyberbullying. The problem with that is that phenomena that cannot be named have a low chance of being discussed

### *Use of ICT by Youths*

Recent studies have shown that children and young people use the internet and digital devices frequently and that this utilization increases the older they grow. A UNICEF study from 2013 in Serbia<sup>287</sup> states that in the 4<sup>th</sup> form of primary school 84% of the students use mobile phones and 94% of senior primary school students. In the study over 90% of students and far over 90%

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<sup>287</sup> UNICEF 2013: Utilisation of digital technologies, risks, and incidence of digital violence among students in Serbia.  
[https://www.unicef.org/serbia/Digital\\_Violence\\_Summary\\_2013.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/serbia/Digital_Violence_Summary_2013.pdf)

of the senior primary school students (4<sup>th</sup> form) and secondary school students used computers. Interestingly, there are no significant differences between the use of the internet by boys and girls nor are there differences among older aged children from smaller and larger places. The internet activities of youths can be divided into three groups: Communication, fun and finding information. The first two make up for the larger part of internet activities young people engage in. This also suggests, that young people barely consume traditional forms of media, such as newspapers or print magazines.

One important way for COP to relate to and build a relationship with youth is by reacting to the special issues young people deal with in daily life and which are perceived as problematic or risky either by themselves or the community. One of these issues that is a growing problem amongst young people but to a much lesser extent to adults is cyberbullying. Recent studies from several countries suggest that 20% to 40% of young people were at some point in their lives victims of cyberbullying.<sup>288</sup> Although not as widespread as traditionally, bullying has become more of a problem with the proliferation and use of ICT by children and youth. The forms in which cyberbullying can occur are manifold.

- **Harassment** – sending offensive, rude, and insulting messages and being abusive.
- **Denigration** – sending fake, ridicule and damaging information and photos about another person.
- **Flaming** – using purposely extreme and offensive language.
- **Impersonation** – hacking into someone's or creating a fake email or social networking account and use the person's online identity to send or post vicious or embarrassing material to/about others.
- **Cyber Stalking** – repeatedly sending messages that include threats of harm, harassment, intimidating messages that make a person afraid for his or her safety.
- **Threatening behavior** – often threats against the personal well being and even life are made on the internet.
- **Cyber grooming** – befriending and establishing an emotional connection with a child through the internet to lower the child's inhibitions for sexual contact.

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<sup>288</sup> Broll, Huey 2014: "Just Being Mean to Somebody Isn't a Police Matter", 157.



While some of these offenses are not illegal per se, they can very easily turn into illegal behavior and may have negative effects for the present and future life of youngsters. Often the way one has been treated becomes a model for one's own behavior especially when no consequences are observed. Moreover, the line between verbal and non-verbal aggression is increasingly fading Cyberstalking very often develops into stalking in the real world. Cyber grooming easily develops into child molesting or sexual exploitation. Facing these various forms of cyberbullying and the distinction between legal, although deviant, and illegal behavior shows how many different forms of behavior the notion includes.

### *The Role of Adults*

Awareness amongst parents, schools, communities and the police about these forms of deviant or criminal behaviors are still relatively low. The reasons for that vary but one might be that many of the older generations are not completely aware of the ICT use of youths and the possibilities these new technologies offer. Two third of the children in the aforementioned UNICEF study from Serbia<sup>289</sup> assessed the computer and internet skills of their parents as poorly. Children from other European countries assess the skills of their parents much better. Nevertheless, nearly half of the children in the UNICEF study reported that their parents imposed some rules of internet use on them while the other half has no limitations at all. With a view to the growing issue of cyberbullying the parental oversight is of significant relevance.

Whereas traditionally bullying was often concentrated in schools and with that best addressed by teachers, cyberbullying is not limited to schoolyards or classrooms. Victims can be bombarded with hurtful messages and content at any time and anywhere. The effects on the victims can be devastating and range from depression, social anxiety, low self-esteem and a doubled likelihood of attempting suicide.<sup>290</sup> Whereas historically bullying has been being excused as a normal part of growing up ("kids being kids"), there are a growing number of cases where cyberbullying should be taken more seriously. Three factors make cyberbullying considerably more serious:

1. It is not restricted to time and places.
2. It can be conducted anonymously.

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<sup>289</sup> UNICEF 2013: Utilisation of digital technologies, risks, and incidence of digital violence among students in Serbia. [https://www.unicef.org/serbia/Digital\\_Violence\\_Summary\\_2013.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/serbia/Digital_Violence_Summary_2013.pdf)

<sup>290</sup> Broll, Huey 2014: "Just Being Mean to Somebody Isn't a Police Matter", 158.


### 3. It has a potential worldwide audience.<sup>291</sup>

These limits of cyberbullying, the high risk of becoming illegal or even criminal behavior indicates, that this is a topic best dealt with by preventive measures initiated by all relevant stakeholders.

Cyberbullying is best addressed in schools but not limited to students and teachers. Cyberbullying should be explicitly included in school anti-bullying policies and anti-bullying materials, and in teacher training materials for anti-bullying work. In addition, parents, children, and young people should be educated in that matter. Involving the police as well as mobile phone companies and internet providers at an early stage, meaning a preventive stage before crimes are committed, might be useful.

Although research is scarce, it might be worthwhile to take the inter-ethnic perspective into account when dealing with bullying and violence among youths. Findings show that particularly young people with ethnic minority backgrounds have a high risk of being victimized by peers. Measures to tackle the issue might, therefore, include awareness raising, understanding of non-discrimination understanding of diversity and tolerance.

### *Where Does Bullying Happen?*<sup>292</sup>



<sup>291</sup> Vandenbosch et. al. 2012: Police actions with regard to cyberbullying: The Belgian Case, 646.

<sup>292</sup> Source UN Women 2016: Global guidance school-related gender-based violence.

Involving the police in the reporting stage of an incident is important. It is likewise important to keep in mind, that it cannot be the task of the police to convert a bad person into a good one. The majority of cyberbullying cases cannot and should not be handled by the police. Nevertheless, the police should take preventive measures to send the message that the unlimited opportunities of the internet do not mean that it is a space where laws are not enforced. This does not necessarily mean that criminal courts have to be involved. Other means such as justice circles involving teachers and parents or other conflict resolutions have often proven to be much more efficient. Particularly for the victims, it is of great value making others understand, how bullying affected them.



### Police and Cyberbullying

When it comes to cyberbullying there are three areas in which the police can play a role:

- prevention by informing students, parents, and schools
- detection of cyberbullying, for example, by creating online reporting systems
- stopping the crime by identifying victims and perpetrators and handling cases of cyberbullying.

Police input can consist of giving specific examples, suggestions of how to behave safely, and tips of what to do and whom to contact in case of victimization. Safety advice can also be broadcasted over the radio and brochures can be created. It might also be useful to show police presence on the internet. A Facebook page of the police or individual police officers where youths can directly ask questions related to cyberbullying might be helpful.

In addition, the police should cooperate with different internet service providers for the purpose of investigating certain cases. Local data protection and privacy laws play an important role in that matter and may vary from country to country.

Preventive approaches are superior to reactive approaches as the former address the root causes of harmful behavior without criminalizing young people. Internet safety should be, just like traffic safety or drug prevention, be addressed by COP Officers during talks in schools. The goal of that should not be to scare students into behaving properly (as it is often the case in drug

prevention education) but rather teaching awareness of risks online and to encourage taking safety in their own hands. But not only should children and youth be educated. Parents are often either unaware or unable to continue parenting their children online and monitor their activities just as they would do in the real world. CP officers might play a role to educate parents as well as school administrators about how to talk about internet safety to the children.<sup>293</sup>

### *ICT and Bullying in Schools*

A number of mobile applications that address the issue cyberbullying have been developed over the past year. They can either be used by students and/or teacher. The focus of these apps is the anonymous recording and reporting of incidents as one major concern for victims is the fear of embarrassment or even retaliation for outing bullies. The reporting goes mostly to school officials but can be in some cases be extended to law enforcement as well. Some of these apps include an educational dimension as well where games or simulations should teach children about what is (cyber-)bullying and what can be done against it. However, effective systems require an overall strategy implemented by school officials. The efforts are considerably high as mobile applications do not replace trustful teacher-student relationships but ideally complement them. If implemented properly the most valuable effect of these apps lies within the deterrent potential for the reason that bullies are at higher risk of being detected and punished. Moreover, a number of other issues can be addressed through reporting apps, such as drug abuse or illegal weapons in schools.

## **School Violence and COP**

*“Usually the most severe cases go to the police. But until it goes to the police you can imagine how much violence happens, hidden violence, not reported violence and so on. But understanding that the violence is not acceptable is the first thing.”<sup>294</sup>*

Peer-to-peer violence in schools has become a pressing issue not only in the Western Balkans but all over Europe. Schools remain one of the most

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<sup>293</sup> Broll, Huey 2014: “Just Being Mean to Somebody Isn’t a Police Matter”, 169.

<sup>294</sup> UNICEF Representative

important places where children and young people spend a great deal of their time and socialize with peers. It is not surprising that most of the conflicts related to traditional bullying and violence occur in schools. Serious incidences of school violence occur regularly in Kosovo, sometimes cold weapons or even firearms are involved. For example, in 2009/2010 incidents of school violence occurred in Kline/Klina, where one student died, and in the municipality of Ferizaj/Uroševac, where a student wounded three others.<sup>295</sup> In recent years in Kosovo cases of violence of teachers against children and the question of corporal punishment in schools gained increased media attention. For example, a Youtube clip circulated showing a teacher beating a student. A recent study from Pristina found out that 21% of students do not feel entirely safe in schools, and 47% of parents share the same opinion when their children are in school. Moreover, 45% of students declared that during the last semester a teacher has hit or beaten a student. These results are accompanied by the fact that over 51% of students, 41% of parents and 24% teachers are of the view that physical punishment in school can be tolerated in specific cases.<sup>296</sup> However, it is important to add, that the by far highest perceived risk to the security of students is traffic on the way to and from schools followed by stray dogs and not falling victim to violence. While student fights are the most commonly reported issues in Pristina schools, respondents reported a high number of pupil-teacher fights as well.<sup>297</sup> A recent study from Serbia found out that a fifth of the students reported physical violence from peers. A study conducted in 9 high-schools in Vojvodina Serbia reported that at least 42% have had experiences of violence once, several times or regularly during primary education.


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<sup>295</sup> Saferworld 2011: Public perceptions of safety and security in Kosovo: Time to act, 27.

<sup>296</sup> UNDP 2015: Action Paper on violence and security in public schools of the Municipality of Pristina, 12.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid, 5.

## What is School Related Violence? <sup>298</sup>



### *Teacher Student Violence and Corporal Punishment*

*"...it appeared that in that after the Conflict in Kosovo, and it still prevails, violence is somehow being accepted as a normal form of discipline, especially in schools, and by the community and Families in particular"<sup>299</sup>*

Corporal punishment both in schools and homes is still an accepted practice in Kosovo as a UNICEF survey found out in 2005. Back then, even children expressed the belief that they deserve physical punishment for misbehavior or academic failure. Teachers and parents characterized violence as a necessary means to teach children how to behave appropriately. The collected data revealed that one in ten older children said that teachers rarely physically abused them. 61% of these children said they never witnessed teachers slapping, pushing or otherwise physically abusing other children while just under one quarter stated that situations like these were rare.<sup>300</sup> The numbers of verbal abuse by teachers were higher with 17% stating they

<sup>298</sup> Source UN Women 2016: Global guidance school-related gender-based violence.

<sup>299</sup> UNICEF representative in Kosovo

<sup>300</sup> UNICEF 2005: Research into Violence against children in schools in Kosovo, 49.

have been verbally abused rarely. Available newer cases suggest that this has not changed significantly in the past ten years.

*"So this was a quite a good way to make stakeholders responsible, be aware that actually there are ways to respond to violence. It is no longer left to the teacher..."<sup>301</sup>*

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<sup>301</sup> UNICEF Representative



### **Education Information Management System (EIMS) in Kosovo**

Besides raising awareness the question of handling cases of school violence is an important issue. An EIMS can support school administrations to approach violence between students on school premises in a systematic way. In Kosovo, UNICEF has taken a leading role when it comes to policies, prevention, and referrals among key institutions through an EIMS. Before establishing it a protocol was developed dealing with various issues, such as identifying duties, clarifying roles and procedures of institutions for prevention, data collection, and reporting of violence in schools. After a phase of awareness raising and small-scale information campaigns in 400 primary schools in Kosovo, an EIMS was put in place. This includes a module specifically for reporting, recording and managing the cases of violence in schools by linking municipal security councils, social welfare and family centers and the police.

The EIMS serves the purpose of identifying, reporting and referring cases of school violence to responsible institutions. Only the most severe cases of school violence that reach the stage of being a criminal offense are reported directly to the police. The majority of cases, however, is not reported but it remains equally important to provide a platform to treat these minor incidents as well. When a case of violence occurs the director is supposed to summon the involved parties and conduct an assessment of how severe the case is. If below a criminal offense an inner school mediation should be initiated, for example, in so-called peer mediation clubs. A reporting is filed as the documentation of the data is an obligation of the school to do so. It can be of great importance for the school to keep an overview of incidents, evaluate which steps have been taken and where it has been referred to. This information is shared with other stakeholders as well. In return, the schools can track how the cases are handled and follow up on the status. When a case is closed or solved, the information will be available in the system.

However, in some rural areas, the access to computers and internet to establish the EIMS is very low. The Ministry of Education assessed that in 2014 only 44% of schools in Kosovo were adequately equipped with ICT. Even if equipped this did not mean that the devices were also used due to the lack of proper knowledge and training. Also, data protection issues play an important role when it comes to the referral from data of school children to different stakeholders.

A problem that soon occurred in the daily school practice was the modest use of the EIMS by teachers and school directors. This was due to the fear, that reported case might have a negative impact on the image of the schools. Indeed the downside of the increased transparency is the risk being identified and stigmatized as a 'hot spot' school leading to a number of negative implications.



### Further Developments of EIMS

EIMSs are a promising development from a COP perspective. UNICEF is currently working on mobile applications that can be used by teachers to identify certain risk factors to predict school drop outs like low attendance, low achieving results and socioeconomic factors. But there are also some more problematic aspects to EIMSs, one being that students are treated less as partners but rather as objects in the reporting process. This is due to the fact, that young people have a certain reluctance interacting on ICT platforms with adults, representatives of the school or the police. They tend to be skeptical when it comes to this interaction for the fear of losing control and being subjected to a system run by people or institutions that follow their own agenda.

Within the EIMSs all cases reported are filtered through the teachers who operate the system. This makes sense as a system where pupils can directly report to might run the risk of being misused or not being used at all because of the lack of trust. However, it seems obvious that therein lies a weak point of the system. Students would be reluctant reporting a case of corporal punishment to a principal that is himself known for being in favor of using this form of disciplining. Stated differently: The EIMS treat young people as passive subjects instead of active users.

An EIMS should therefore be accompanied by the introduction of some measures to reduce this loss of friction. One measure could be the assignment of a focal teacher. Focal teachers are special representatives of the pupils and as such have to comply with a strict data protection regime. Another measure is the installation of anonymous reporting boxes where complaints and reports from students can be collected or an online reporting tool. Particularly in the case of cyberbullying, for instance, a Facebook page operated by a focal teacher might be a way to tackle the issue and collect complaints. But all these measures have to overcome the same problems: to be used they have to be trusted by the users and this trust is best achieved by transparency. There have to be provided some mechanisms in place where the (alleged) victims can follow up on the status of their complaint.



### Police and the EIMS

The advantage of an EIMS that directly involves the police as a stakeholder is, that the police can much more easily monitor schools that otherwise are more or less closed entities. In schools where there is a cumulation of violence even without qualifying as criminal conduct or being notified by the school principal, the police can engage focused and proactively in certain cases. The aim can be to establish cooperative partnerships with hotspot schools and initiate activities to raise awareness of the problem of violence. In some instances, patrolling certain schools more frequently than others might have a positive effect as well.

*"In every incident or problem the school has they don't know how to react and they call the police. [...] And that is not the role of police in the school...or it shouldn't be. Especially the children in those schools view the police as their enemies that come and chase them. This is why we have to start to change of how the police is being seen in the schools."*<sup>302</sup>

### COP and School Violence

Schools are often a reflection of the community they are located in. Effective COP, therefore, needs to include the community outside the school in its scope.<sup>303</sup> The advantage of COP engagement in schools is the fact that usually the different stakeholders are very clearly defined comprising the school administration, teachers, parents, neighbors of the school and most importantly the students. This well-defined set of interest groups creates a favorable basis for police engagement with schools in various ways.<sup>304</sup> Particularly the direct neighborhoods of schools play an important role in policing as students and teachers regularly identify the way to and back home from schools as one of the least safe times of the school day.

In recent years, the Kosovo Police has increasingly turned to address the issue of school violence by implementing various measures. According to Saferworld, the municipality of Prizren is known for being successful in the preventions of school violence by implementing measures, such as the development of internal school regulations in participation with parent and

<sup>302</sup> Interview Social Scientist UNDP.

<sup>303</sup> Police Foundation 2011: Safer School Partnerships, 6.

<sup>304</sup> UNODC 2011: Handbook Policing urban spaces, 54.

student councils and the installation of cameras in the school.<sup>305</sup> So far security cameras seem to be the number one protective measure against school violence in Kosovo as reported by 56% of the teachers followed by school Uniforms (48%) and the use of school guards (39%). The mentioned Safety Councils comprised of parents, teachers, school directors and students have been established in most schools in Kosovo but apparently approximately only half of them are functional.<sup>306</sup>

The role of COP in schools is, however, more diffuse up to date although the aforementioned study showed that police engagement is desired by all stakeholders involved. The study from Pristina found out that 62% of the teachers, 56% of parents and 46% of the students prefer the presence of a civilian police officer in schools over educational lecturer or police visits and patrols.<sup>307</sup> Police officers in schools are a recent trend in a number of countries and widely viewed as an effective way to address crime and antisocial behavior. But there are a number of affiliated risks and preconditions for effective police involvement in schools that should be taken into account.



### **Safer School Partnerships in England and Wales<sup>308</sup>**

Safer School Partnerships (SSP) have been implemented in England and Wales since the early 2000s. These constitute of a formal agreement between the police, a school (or group of schools) and other agencies to work together reducing crime and the fear of crime and improve behavior in and around schools. The first pilots were launched in 2002, with the deployment of up to 100 police officers in schools in 34 Local Education Authorities deemed to be facing the 'toughest challenges'. There are today some 450 SSPs operating throughout England and Wales, mostly as an integral part of Neighborhood Policing. Before SSPs were introduced, police presence in most schools was reduced to occasional lessons and responding to calls about incidents.

The underlying assumption of the strategy is, that by reducing bullying, truancy and exclusions from school, this will impact indirectly on offending and antisocial behavior. By involving police officers working in schools the aim is also to intervene early with children and young people at risk of offending and to improve relations between

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<sup>305</sup> Saferworld 2011: Public perceptions of safety and security in Kosovo: Time to act, 27.

<sup>306</sup> UNDP 2015: Action Paper on violence and security in public schools of the Municipality of Pristina, 17.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>308</sup> This Case example is from the Police Foundation 2011: Safer School Partnerships: The Briefing, Series 2, Edition 2.

pupils, the police, and the wider community. While the teachers retain responsibility for school discipline and most behavior, the police provide advice and support as well as a physical presence. Individual officers retain considerable discretion as to how and when to intervene to enforce the law, but are usually reluctant to do so unless a serious offense has been committed.

They are more commonly involved in activities, such as helping to improve security, developing effective channels for reporting bullying and other forms of victimization, reviewing the safety of pupils' journeys to and from school, and patrolling the school corridors and grounds. Other activities include running breakfast clubs, undertaking classroom checks and truancy sweeps and helping out during breaks and after school.

Overall the results of SSPs are deemed mildly successful. They might improve feelings of safety reduce truancy and victimization rates. The success of SSPs depends heavily on the expertise of the police officers and their ability to work with other professionals to deliver a joined-up service. Officers need to be self-aware, understood and valued and sustain their desire and enthusiasm to be involved in schools. They need to have the interpersonal skills required for effectively engaging with pupils. In addition, they need to be aware of the background factors that shape pupils' lives that are often characterized by acute disadvantage and marginalization, whether as victims, offenders or both.

Actively encouraging discussions between pupils from different backgrounds on issues, such as personal safety, appropriate behavior, and victim awareness, can contribute towards this.

More controversial is the view on recent developments of widening the role of police officers to encompass identification of risk factors pointing towards future bad behavior or violent extremism. Moreover, there runs a high risk that certain disruptions are quickly interpreted signs of future criminality rather than being viewed as normal childish behavior.

## Sexual Harassment

Although sexual harassment is not particularly a youth topic, it has strong relevance for the daily life of young people. For a more general overview, please see the section on Sexual Harassment and COP. Sexual Harassment and sexual abuse can have a devastating impact on the development of young people, specifically on children. Traumatization, depression, eating disorders, anxieties and relationship problems, to name only some of the effects sexual abuse can have especially when occurring over a longer childhood or adolescent period. Although very often considered as a taboo in communities, sexual harassment is a topic COP has to deal with. According to a UNICEF survey from 2007, 10% of the students in Serbia reported

exposure to sexual harassment in schools.<sup>309</sup> A UNICEF study in Kosovo from 2005 found out that 6% of students mentioned having experienced sexual harassment by teachers. 12% of children between 11 and 18 reported they knew children who had been sexually abused by their parents although it occurred rarely.<sup>310</sup>

A study conducted in Kosovo in 2016 in Kosovo adds to these reasons why specifically youth is affected by sexual harassment. First of all, compared to older people younger people were not able to identify sexual harassment. Second of all, the study found out that there is a fairly widespread belief (40,5%) among both young men and women that “young women like being harassed”.<sup>311</sup>

**Definition: Sexual Harassment**

EU Directives define sexual harassment as instances when any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of sexual nature occurs, with the purpose of effect of violating the dignity of a person, in particular when creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.

As most people think of sexual harassment as rape or unwelcomed touching a wide variety of acts qualify as sexual harassment under this definition. Here are some

- sexual jokes against a person's will
- whistling in the street
- referring to a person with pejorative or sexually charged names such as 'sweetheart' or 'baby'
- pressuring a person to go out (for example for coffee)
- looking and making sexual gestures against the person's will
- pressure for sexual favors
- sending letters, making phone calls without a person's permission

This is not the place for discussing if this includes behavior that has to be considered as socially adequate. There is no doubt as well that some of the named behaviors are not illegal or even deviant. And it also becomes clear that qualifying an act as sexual harassment is in some parts strongly

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<sup>309</sup> Claim 2013: Human Security Chronicle 6, 2

<sup>310</sup> UNICEF 2005: Research into Violence against children in schools in Kosovo, 49.

<sup>311</sup> Kosovo Women's Network 2016: Sexual Harassment in Kosovo, 4.

depending on the will or permission of the alleged victims which raises the complexity of differentiating between acceptable and unacceptable behavior.



### **Sexual Harassment Reporting Mobile App**

In Kosovo, a project initiated by an NGO named 'Girls Coding Kosova' addresses the issue of daily sexual harassment of women. The NGO developed a mobile app called "walk freely" available Kosovo wide, enabling the users to report victimisation of sexual harassment. The app is simply designed in 4 steps to report different kind of harassments (i.e. whistling, shouting, touching etc.) in different locations (i.e. public place, work, school etc.). The interface also allows giving information on the perpetrator (i.e. co-worker, family member, stranger). The reported incidents are collected and aggregated by Open Data Kosovo, another NGO providing the information open to the public on their homepage. Here a map can be viewed showing hot spots of the city locations where sexual harassments occur more frequently. This can help users to avoid certain locations identified as hot spots. It is a potential source of information for community leaders to take specific measures in the hot spots, such as enhanced street lighting. But it might also be a potential resource for police to take up preventive measures i.e. to enhance patrolling in certain locations.

This app is a good example of how 1. a specific problem was identified, 2. tackled by civil society, specifically young people, 3. with the help of ICT.

For the development of similar projects, a few things should be kept in mind. During our research, we found out that young people are often motivated not only by the urge to improve community safety but also to enhance their own qualifications. Young people are often willing to volunteer for their communities but expect a recognition for their activities. This can be a certificate, the achievement of certain skills or something similar. Some older might consider this as the end of altruism and voluntarism but the reality of today's youth is different as it was years ago. Competition with peers over study places and jobs is much higher today and voluntarism is a valuable asset on the CV as long as it can be proven.

For example, Girls Coding Kosova's original mission is to increase the number of girls in programming/IT and encourage young girls to programme. By developing the sexual harassment app the purpose of enhancing security in the communities as well as the additional IT qualifications for young girls were provided. Another example is the OSCE that encourages young people to engage in their Local Police and Security councils by offering application as well as English training.

### *Schools and Universities*

Schools and Universities can be hotspots for sexual harassment either from peers or from teachers and professors. Incidents often go unreported especially when teaching staff is involved for the fear of disadvantages and punishments. For incidents between students often guidelines exist of how the case should be handled by the staff. But often they appear to be overwhelmed or simply not qualified to deal properly with these sensitive issues. In Kosovo, for example, the Law on Pre-University Education obliges educational directorates in municipalities, in cooperation with police, parents, and other relevant institutions, to react if an offense happens in or near schools. But a study from eight municipalities showed that these policies were not implemented and only a few school teachers, pedagogues, and psychologists had knowledge about which laws even protect citizens from sexual harassment. It concludes that the general lack of knowledge about what sexual harassment entails and how to respond to it is likely to undermine the efforts of preventing and address the issue effectively.<sup>312</sup>

Despite these issues, it is important to notice that education plays an important role in the prevention of sexual harassment. It is crucial to teach and sensitize young students for the topic in order to reduce cases, promote respectful behavior and to encourage students to report incidents to the respective authorities (teacher, parents, police etc.). Early age educational prevention must be considered much more effective than applying repressive measures when students are at a later stage of their development.

### *COP Responses to Sexual Harassment*

The role COP can play in the prevention of Sexual Harassment aside from educational activities is rather limited. In western countries, for example, the presence of police has increased significantly the past years to address problems of crimes, trancies, bullying and other antisocial behavior including sexual harassment. In addition, the safeguarding of children at risk of violent extremism came into focus in recent times. Police presence in schools remains a controversial strategy whose effectiveness particularly with a view to sexual harassment incidents is contested by criminologists. In the UK, for example, the Safer School Partnerships were introduced involving police officers working in a school on a regular basis with the aim intervene early with students at risk of offending and improve relations between pupils,

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<sup>312</sup> Kosovo Women's Network 2016: Sexual Harassment in Kosovo, 38.

the police, and the wider community.<sup>313</sup> The success of these partnerships depends heavily on the individual expertise and enthusiasm of the police officers and their ability and personal skills to engage with children and youngsters. Evaluations of the program pointed to the fact that officers can quickly become isolated in the school environment and trust-based relationships with pupils are hard to create and maintain.



### Reporting to the Police

Data collected from civil society initiatives can be very valuable for the police. Reporting apps like the aforementioned are not restricted to sexual harassment but can be applied to all sorts of criminal conduct. The question is how police could be involved in reporting apps like this. A mobile application reporting directly to the police is likely to be less efficient. Trust in the police is typically low in post-conflict countries so that citizens might be reluctant to use a reporting app. In addition, the problem arises of how police deal with the collected data which not necessarily include criminal conduct (i.e. whistling). Also, it lacks a mechanism to differentiate between genuine and wrongful accusations.

Question to ask: How can the police involve themselves in civil society initiatives to an extent that the outcome is not impacted?

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313 Police Foundation 2011: Safer School Partnerships, 2.



**Recommended Readings**

This study gives a good overview of the perception of safety in Kosovo schools: UNDP 2015: Action Paper on violence and security in public schools of the Municipality of Pristina. This Report is older but still gives some valuable insights into the topic: UNICEF 2005: Research into violence against Children in Schools in Kosovo.

For a recent data on sexual harassment in Kosovo see: Kosovo Women's Network 2016: Sexual Harassment in Kosovo

An illustrative guide on the problem of gender-based violence is provided by UN Women 2016: Global Guidance on addressing School-related gender-based Violence <http://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2016/12/global-guidance-on-addressing-school-related-gender-based-violence#view>.

For the issue of police officers in schools see Police Foundation 2011: Safer School Partnerships: The Briefing, Series 2, Edition 2. The briefing can be downloaded here: <http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/publications/briefings/safer-school-partnerships>

## 7. COP and Corruption

### *Summary*

*Corruptive practices of police officers can have devastating effects with a view to the perception of the police. This is particularly true for COP which is based on trust and sustainable cooperation with the public. A few 'rotten apples' within the police force can impact the image of police organizations as a whole. It remains controversial if COP strategies might even foster corruptive practices, nepotism, and favoritism in the long run. Corruption in the Western Balkans remains a pressing issue not only within police but in all segments of society including the international presence. Various reporting mobile applications have been developed in the past years whose potential in tackling the issue is to be seen.*

### **Introduction**

Corruption comes in a variety of forms, such as nepotism, bribery, favoritism, extortion (including sexual extortion) and others. A Handbook on COP should and cannot be the place to deal with this topic in an exhaustive way. There are a number of Handbooks available that solely deal with corruption extensively and in a more profound way than we could do it here.<sup>314</sup> Nevertheless, we decided to include corruption from a community policing point of view for the reason that a Handbook about policing not addressing this sensitive matter would be incomplete. After all, corruptive practices within the police force are one of the most important factors to undermine trust in the integrity of the police. But without police integrity community policing strategies are bound to fail.

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<sup>314</sup> See the recommended readings at the end of this chapter.

**Definition: Corruption**

Corruptive practices of the police can take various forms on different levels. It is important to understand that not all forms of misbehavior or self-enrichment are corruptive practices.

Street-level corruption: A form of corruption where police officers abuse their power in their day-to-day interactions with citizens to obtain money in exchange for not reporting illegal activities or expediting bureaucratic procedures. In some cases, this can also take the form of extortion when police officers threaten to fine or arrest citizens under false pretense in order to collect bribes.<sup>315</sup>

Political corruption: This form of corruption has been defined as the manipulation of policies, institutions, and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers.<sup>316</sup>

It remains widely unclear how COP impacts and is impacted by corruption. Some experts argue that the closer the relationship between police and communities the higher is the scrutiny under which police officers find themselves leading to an increased accountability. If citizens are granted a voice in the planning and evaluation of police work, they may feel more inclined to address corruptive practices.

Others, however, argue that COP is bound to create more opportunities for unethical behavior and corruptive practices. Long-term personal interactions, preferential treatments and the development of corrupt networks may be fostered over time through police engagement in communities. Small gifts in exchange for favor policing or the selective applying of the law may become common. The privileged or elites of communities might find ways to benefit more than others from police services reaching so far that influential members of the communities use police forces as the personal security guards.<sup>317</sup>

*“And in a way, the impression that we got the corruption has been covered the entire system including the civil society. And that is the reason why today, although you have a master degree or BA degree in a specific field you cannot find a workplace because everything depends on nepotism.”<sup>318</sup>*

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<sup>315</sup> Anti-Corruption Resource Center 2012: Community Policing as a tool against corruption, 2.

<sup>316</sup> Transparency International 2014: Kosovo – Overview of political corruption, 1.

<sup>317</sup> Anti-Corruption Resource Center 2012: Community Policing as a tool against corruption, 4-5.

<sup>318</sup> Interview Social Scientist Migration and Security UNDP.

### Corruption in the Western Balkans

Widespread corruption in the Western Balkans is a pressing issue. For example, according to Transparency International, political corruption is one of the biggest challenges in Kosovo as it has pervasive consequences for the country's social and economic development. It has taken up considerably more attention the corruption in the civil services. Citizens rank corruption as one of the most significant problems facing Kosovo (18%) after unemployment (39%).<sup>319</sup>

Large-scale corruption can be prevalent in various institutions. For example, in Kosovo the Institutions that are perceived to be the most corrupt are, for example, the healthcare providers, Kosovo Electronic Cooperation, Courts, Customs, Central Administration, the Privatization Agency of Kosovo, international institutions, banks and so on.<sup>320</sup> More important for the context of this Handbook is corruption in the civil service to which Police Officers belong. The civil service, as the administrative arm of institutions is bound by codes of conduct, policies, laws, and regulations which promote a transparent and fair working environment with good working conditions for men and women. All countries in the Western Balkans have put in place political strategies and legislation to fight corruption.<sup>321</sup> Corrupt practices directly violate these laws and regulations and are bound to damage the trust in institutions, to diminish the professional profile of the civil service and cost taxpayers a lot of money.<sup>322</sup>

The Problem with the aforementioned political corruption is the devastating effect it has on attitudes towards corruption by the citizens. Although everyone condemns corruption it triggers a certain dynamic where individuals justify own corruptive practices with the question "If even they up there are doing it, why shouldn't I?" Simply put: Corruption is not only a problem of the political elite or civil servants but has rather infested large parts of the society.<sup>323</sup>

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<sup>319</sup> UNDP 2016: Public Pulse on corruption, 2.

<sup>320</sup> UNDP 2015: Public Pulse X, 9.

<sup>321</sup> See for example for Serbia OSCE: Handbook on combating corruption, 36.

<sup>322</sup> UNDP 2014: Gender Equality related Corruption Risks and Vulnerabilities in civil service in Kosovo, 9.

<sup>323</sup> See for example for corruption in the Health Sector in Kosovo UNDP 2014: Corruption Risk Assessment in the Health Sector in Kosovo.

*"Corruption is also as a psychological problem. We say that the best way to learn some behaviors is by modeling other behaviors. People try to imitate these models in detail and when someone approaches you and say that he or she gets the job somewhere in a ministry only by paying a thousand euro to a guy, of course, the other person who is deadly searching for a job will also do this. [...] I do not blame them, but I blame the system."*<sup>324</sup>

### *Corruption and the Police*

Corruption in the police force is a very sensitive matter. Police integrity is one of the most important features of police forces. This is even more true for community policing which is based on mutual trust relations between the police force and communities. But community policing is particularly prone to corrupt practices. Corruption is strongly based on networks that take time and effort to build and to a certain extent are based on mutual trust that the corrupt practices are treated discretely and secretively from both sides. Bluntly stated: corruption appears where people know and trust each other. This is even more true for nepotism and favoritism that is based on the expectation that the favor will be returned at some point in time. The backbone of COP is long lasting and sustainable trust relations ideally between a community and a Police Officer. It is an ideal basis to engage in nepotism or corruption. But more importantly once a COP officer is caught of being corrupt the trust basis is shattered in the community and it is very unlikely that he or she will be able to continue effective work.

Not only corruption and nepotism between police officers and citizens may undermine the integrity of the police. The same counts for nepotism within the police force itself. A good example of the effects of nepotism inside the Police force is described by the Kosovo Women's Network in relation to the Training of the special Domestic Violence Investigation Units (DVIU).<sup>325</sup> All Kosovo police receive mandatory, one-week obligatory basic training on domestic violence at the Kosovo Police School. DVIU officers receive additional training on Standard Operation Procedures and the broader legal framework related to domestic violence specifically. For the purpose to "further develop the capacity of the Kosovo Police in order to change the approach towards violence, victims and perpetrators" as the National Action plan stated, several training courses were organized for police, including by

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<sup>324</sup> Interview Social Scientist Migration and Security UNDP.

<sup>325</sup> Kosovo Women's Network 2015: No more Excuses, 63-64

international organizations. However, some police officers expressed frustration that “only people with connections go to training sessions,” particularly study visits abroad, although these officers may not even deal directly with domestic violence cases. Practices like these have the potential of affecting the police performance and its professionalism negatively and by that, diminishing police integrity.



### Corruption and the Kosovo Police

According to the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Kosovo is regarded as being relatively more corrupt than neighboring countries. The CPI ranks countries on how corrupt the public sector is perceived to be. In 2013, Kosovo was ranked 111 out of 177 countries. A year later, in 2014, it was ranked 110th among 175 countries.<sup>326</sup> As useful this national ranking is to compare countries with each other it does not say much about corruptive practices in the police. In fact, the police are considered one of the most trusted and contacted law enforcement institutions in Kosovo. In addition, according to TI, the police force is considered the most active law enforcement institution in terms of investigating and reporting corruption.<sup>327</sup>

These findings are supported by research that let the citizens of Kosovo rank the police as the second least corrupted domestic institution in Kosovo. According to the Kosovo Security Barometer, a survey conducted by Kosovo Center for Security Studies 41% of the citizens shared the perception that KP is not corrupted. 28% claimed that KP is somehow corrupted whereas 27% considered the police corrupted. It is worth noting that according to this survey, more than half the citizens of Kosovo (55%) considers KP to be corrupt or somehow corrupt. The level of corruption varies strongly by the regions of Kosovo. Where in Mitrovica south only 12% of the respondents consider KP to be corrupt this number is nearly double as high in Pristina (23%) and the highest with 43% in Gjakova.<sup>328</sup>

The research shows that as KPS is considered one of the least corrupted institutions in Kosovo the perceived dimensions of corruption are still high compared to other countries and have to be considered as still problematic. This is the reason why the overall picture of corruption is of importance. One of the respondents in our research referred to KPS as the one-eyed under the blind. However, corruption is not only a problem of KPS as can be seen in the chapter on EULEX about corruption in the EU police mission.<sup>329</sup>

<sup>326</sup> Transparency International 2015: National Integrity System Assessment Kosovo, 28.

<sup>327</sup> Transparency International 2015: National Integrity System Assessment Kosovo, 92.

<sup>328</sup> Kosovo Center for Security Studies 2016: Kosovo Security Barometer – Citizens perception on police integrity in Kosovo, 19.

<sup>329</sup> Capussela 2015: State Building in Kosovo, 129

### *Corruption and EULEX*

*“When you go back to the expectations, people were hoping that the economic crimes, the corruption of political leaders would be solved. And that didn’t happen. I think that this is the biggest dissatisfaction with EULEX.”<sup>330</sup>*

*“Because, forget about corruption within Kosovo society, how much is corruption within EULEX?”<sup>331</sup>*

Allegations of corruptive within EULEX have been raised repeatedly and have contributed to the increasingly negative image of the mission. After all the EU Police Mission was established to fight corruption and organized crime not to take part in it. But the disastrous heritage the EU Police Mission took over from UNMIK has led to believe, that corruption of EULEX Police Officers is an endemic problem not only of some black sheep. According to a UNDP survey, 35,2% of Kosovars believed that EULEX is corrupt. In comparison, only 22,9% of the respondents believed that international Organizations in Kosovo were corrupt. The reasons for this bad image of EULEX is complex but simply interpreting it as a sign of displeasure with the mission might be shortsighted.<sup>332</sup> Particularly corruption cases of EULEX judges and prosecutors as part of the judicial branch of the mission had a negative impact on public perception. This is not to be confused with the Police branch of EULEX with the task of monitoring and advising the Kosovo Police. The data is scarce in that matter and perceptions of corruption and the actual corruption are not necessarily congruent. However, it is a good example of how devastating effects corruptive practices can enfold within peace missions.

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<sup>330</sup> Interview Representative LPSC Prizren Region

<sup>331</sup> Interview Representative Kosovo Law Institute.

<sup>332</sup> Capussela 2015: State building in Kosovo, 129

### Corruption and Gender

A current debate is about the relationship between corruption and gender. In short, this debate is about the assumption that more women in public services equal less corruption. Based on a number of studies this assumes that men and women have different perceptions of corruption practices, and are more intrinsically honest or averse to corruption than men. Country studies reveal that higher levels of women's public and political participation can lead to lower levels of corruption.<sup>333</sup> This lead to an anti-corruption strategy based on the approach of employing more women in public services. For Kosovo, UNDP concludes that "Implementing fair employment practices and strong accountability measures within the civil service minimise the temptation for corruption and maximise the incentives for ethical behavior."<sup>334</sup>

However, this assumption has been challenged by a number of studies stating that a "fairer system," characterized by liberal democracies that provide equal rights for women and better governance, explains why corruption is lower when more women are in government.<sup>335</sup> Also, women are not necessarily morally better than men but rather more risk averted. However, an alternative explanation could be that dismantling networks of corruption in civil service are not necessarily related to gender-sensitive inclusions. But rather introducing new actors to different positions, regardless of their gender, simply disrupts existing networks of corruption which serves to reduce corruption.

### Corruption and ICT

Internet-based corruption reporting systems have been implemented for years all around the world. These systems allow people to report corruption cases anonymously and to enter into and maintain a dialogue with investigators. According to the OSCE, a system used in Germany, Austria, Kenya, and Morocco uses several layers of encryption so that no one, either within or outside the police service, can detect the identity of anyone who has opted to remain anonymous. The distinguishing feature of the system is this combination of secured anonymity and unlimited bi-directional communication. The system operates like a 'blind' letterbox where both

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<sup>333</sup> UNDP 2010: Corruption accountability and Gender: Understanding the connections, 19

<sup>334</sup> UNDP 2014: Gender Equality related Corruption Risks and Vulnerabilities in civil service in Kosovo, 9.

<sup>335</sup> UNDP 2010: Corruption accountability and Gender: Understanding the connections, 20



parties can drop off messages. It is estimated that the average quality of online-generated reports is better than those from other channels, such as whistleblower hotlines that are far less efficient in securing the anonymity.<sup>336</sup>

In recent years Corruption reporting apps have become more and more popular. Different Projects of testing these apps were launched all over the world, such as in Honduras, Venezuela, and Ukraine. In the Balkans Macedonia was the first country where an app was made available in the Albanian language by a platform called Prijavi Korupcija and with the support of transparency international. According to the latter, in the period from January 2012 to January 2017 citizens submitted 720 reports on alleged corruptive practices on the online platform.

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<sup>336</sup> OSCE 2016: Handbook on combating corruption, 136.



### Corruption Reporting app

Corruption reporting apps have become more and more popular over the past years. Different Projects of testing these apps were launched all over the world, such as in Honduras, Venezuela, and Ukraine. In the Balkans, Macedonia was the first country where an app was made available in the Albanian language by a platform called Prijavi Korupcija and with the support of transparency international. A few years later, Kosovo followed with an app called kallxo.

The way these apps functions is very similar. As soon as a user witnesses an act of corruption he can report the case via this app. In addition, more traditional means of reporting, such as telephone, webpage or SMS, can be used. Some apps even allow sending a photo of the alleged case of corruption.

The aim of these apps is to enhance access to information to increase government accountability to citizens and reduce opportunities for corruption to take place. The most crucial part of these reporting apps is not so much the reporting but rather the way these cases are treated as soon as they have been reported. An issue of utmost importance is the data protection of users (see technology trust nexus). The second issue is how the data is further processed. In Kosovo, users can view a map categorized, for example, by the type of corruption and by the geographic area and municipality. However, more importantly, is that each case is carefully reviewed by a trusted and independent person before published. Whereas in Macedonia transparency international takes over this role in Kosovo an organization called kallxo is taking over this role. The publish cases of corruption online but not by individually blaming the perpetrators but rather by giving an overview of the cases

All apps claim to protect the anonymity of the users. The question remains how these apps impact corruption as a societal phenomenon. Giving a clearer picture of the extent and distribution of different forms of corruptive practices in daily life might raise awareness among citizens and policymakers. But the simple reporting of corruption cases does not mean that these cases are brought to justice. Our research showed that most people are aware of the dimension of corruption in society is quite high. But in opposition to the sexual harassment app, a heat map of places where corruption has taken place is of no use to avoid the most dangerous places or enhance police presence there.

**Recommended Readings**

For an extensive overview of the phenomenon of corruption see the OSCE – Handbook on combating Corruption 2016.

This UNDP Publication explores the relation of Corruption and Gender in Kosovo in more detail: UNDP 2014: Gender Equality related Corruption Risks and Vulnerabilities in civil service in Kosovo. For more information on this issue see UNDP 2010: Corruption accountability and Gender: Understanding the connections, 19

This Transparency International Report gives a detailed account of corruption in Kosovo: Transparency International 2015: National Integrity System Assessment Kosovo

The Security Barometer gives some interesting insights on the perception of the police by Kosovars: Kosovo Center for Security Studies 2016: Kosovo Security Barometer – Citizens perception on police integrity in Kosovo.

## 8. COP and Domestic Violence

### *Summary*

*Domestic violence is one of the crucial societal problems worldwide. The negative psychological, emotional and even economical effects are devastating. Nevertheless, domestic violence remains a relatively low priority for policing especially in developing countries. The reasons for that are manifold and cannot be explained by a single factor. Current data suggests that domestic violence is a widespread phenomenon in Kosovo although public awareness is relatively low. Nevertheless, different initiatives address the issue including the establishment of Domestic Violence Investigation Units by the Kosovo Police. A variety of ICT developments deals with the issue, such as telephone hotlines as well panic button and reporting apps.*

### **Introduction**

Domestic violence cuts across lines of income, class, and culture.<sup>337</sup> The OSCE declares violence against women and girls a “global epidemic, that devastates the lives of millions of women and girls and hampers progress towards comprehensive security for all”.<sup>338</sup> Nevertheless, in public discourse, there seems to be a pervasive attitude that particularly in post-conflict countries one should deal with more serious matters, such as the economic and social crisis, the consequences of the war and the transition. Respectively the police are under high pressure to tackle more serious crime phenomenon, such as organized crimes and terrorism. Domestic violence is only a secondary issue and consequently, resources remain scarce.<sup>339</sup> But with regards to the scale of the problem of domestic violence, this view ignores the fact that human security has its starting point in the very intimate sphere of family homes.

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<sup>337</sup> UN Statistic division 2015: The world's Woman, 139.

<sup>338</sup> OSCE 2016: Combating violence against women in the OSCE Region, 4.

<sup>339</sup> ICVA 2011: Roma women for life without violence – Response of institutions to domestic violence, 5.

**Definition: Domestic Violence**

Domestic violence is a pattern of behavior which involves abuse or other forms of violence by one person against another in a domestic or family-setting. It can include various forms, such as physical verbal emotional and sexual abuse. It is part of a systematic pattern of power and control exercised by the perpetrator over the victim. Very often it takes place in partnerships where the women are victimized but generally, all forms of family relationships are relevant (for example children as victims). Domestic violence and Sexual harassment are often interrelated.

It is important to note that Domestic violence and violence against women are not the same although they are very often used synonymously. Domestic violence is broader and, in fact, a number of men experience domestic violence during their lifetime mostly by violent acts from parents or emotional abuse by their spouses and partners. Without diminishing the serious effects of violence against children and men this chapter will put a focus on domestic violence as violence against women and girls.

**Extent and Impact of Domestic Violence**

Domestic violence must be considered a reflection of discrimination and pervasive power imbalances between men and women. The effects on the victims can be very serious, long lasting and a hard to quantify. Besides physical and health problems there is a psychological, emotional and even economical dimension to it. The UN names a variety of effects such as a higher likelihood of women who suffered from intimate partner violence to give birth to a low-birth-weight baby, have an abortion and experience depression. Violence can lead to indirect economic cost such a reduced ability of a woman to work, care for her family and contribute to society. Direct economic costs include those associated with the police, hospital and other health services, legal costs, and costs associated with housing, social and support services. Conservative estimates of lost productivity resulting from domestic violence range between 1 and 2% of the gross domestic product.<sup>340</sup>

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<sup>340</sup> The world's Woman 2015: Trends and Statistics 2015, 141.



### Domestic Violence across the World

The UN estimates that 1 in 3 women worldwide has experienced violence at some point in their lives. In European countries, the number of women experiencing violence varies between 13% and 46%. Interestingly no connection between violence against women and the wealth of the countries can be detected. Denmark, Finland, UK, and Netherlands are with each 40% of women experiencing at least once violence during their lifetime at the top of the ranking. At the end of the spectrum with under 20% are Malta, Croatia, Poland, and Austria.<sup>341</sup>

Domestic violence is very often considered as a form of violence that victimizes women. But the case of Kosovo demonstrates that there is more to it than violence against women. A recent study conducted by the Kosovo Women's network shows, that 68% of women in Kosovo have experienced domestic violence during their lifetimes. This would count for over 20% more than the highest ranked country in the EU. But at the same time, 56% of Kosovo men report having experienced domestic violence in their lifetimes. The conclusion that women are statistically more likely to experience domestic violence can in view of this data not be drawn, at least not for Kosovo. Even though men report a higher percentage of violence experienced by parents than from their partners.

It gets even more complicated when one takes the attitudes of domestic violence into consideration. According to the same study, 21% of women and 22% of men agree that "sometimes it is okay for a husband to hit his wife". Nearly 25% of the respondents believe that sexual intercourse can never be violence if it happens between two adults who are married". Nearly 30% believe that violence is a normal part of any relationship and in society, in general, accepts the violence happens sometimes".<sup>342</sup> These might be reasons for the fact, that only 11% of women in OSCE countries who experience sexual assault report it.<sup>343</sup> However, one might interpret these findings they show that there are no easy ways of tackling the issue. How to solve a problem that is probably not even considered a problem by a substantial part of the communities? More education, more sensitizing for the issue might be a way to go.

<sup>341</sup> The world's Woman 2015, Trends and Statistics 2015, 143.

<sup>342</sup> Kosovo Women's Network 2015: No more excuses, 5-6.

<sup>343</sup> OSCE 2016: Combating violence against women in the OSCE Region, 8

A crucial problem when it comes to estimating the scale of domestic violence, as well as sexual harassment, is the collection of viable data. In a research study in Kosovo estimated that about 30% of the respondents may have been dishonest in one or more of their responses to the survey.<sup>344</sup> How the researchers came to this estimation is not explained as well as lying about sexual harassment means to downplay or to dramatize it. During the project with community-based paralegals for minorities in Kosovo presented above, the paralegals were confronted with the fact that when asked only a few cases of domestic violence were reported by the women.<sup>345</sup> But everyone seemed to know someone else from their community that experienced domestic violence. This might indicate that women who experienced domestic violence are not comfortable to talk about it but prefer to wrap up their experiences in a story from hearsay. One might conclude that every of this woman actually experienced violence themselves. But it could also indicate that the women tell the truth and there have been one or a few cases of domestic violence in the community that all women had heard of. After all in small communities social bonds tend to be tight and intimate information circle.

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<sup>344</sup> Kosovo Women's Network 2016: Sexual Harassment in Kosovo, 50.

<sup>345</sup> Our Interview partner reported: "There weren't many cases because I don't think the women felt comfortable to share their problems." Project assistant European Center for Minority Issues.



### Victimization Surveys

Victimization surveys consist of a set of questions that directly consults on occurrences of crime, individuals' perceptions of insecurity and their confidence in law enforcement agencies.<sup>346</sup> This special type of survey asks a sample of people for example from a community which crimes have been committed against them over a fixed period of time and whether or not they have been reported to the police. The surveys are a tool to determine the so-called dark figure of crime i.e. the number of unreported and undiscovered crime particularly in cases of abuse or domestic violence.

Compared to the official crime statistics victimization survey provide often more diversified and precise information on the actual amount of crime and insecurities in communities. Very often the surveys are conducted by independent local NGOs or research institutes to ensure truthful responses. It is an important tool to facilitate a better understanding of the specific crime problems in communities, for a better design and assessment of prevention strategies and an important part of evidence-based policing. Moreover, it can be useful for the mapping of crime.

According to UNODC, the information collected from victimization survey provides information on the following:

- The characteristics of victims and perpetrators;
- Changes in the level of crime over time;
- The changing perceptions of safety over time;
- The rate of crime reported to authorities and reasons if reporting is low;
- The effectiveness of crime prevention policies;
- Identify a possible relationship between fear of crime and actual levels of crime;

For more information see UNODC/UNECE (2010): Manual on Victimization Surveys.

### *Domestic Violence and Vulnerable Groups*

Women and girls from vulnerable groups, such as migrants, refugees or minorities, face a much higher risk of being victimized by gender-based violence including early and forced marriages, transactional sex, and sexual harassment. A survey from Bosnia estimates that 43% of Roma women had

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<sup>346</sup> UNODC 2013: Training Manual on Policing Urban Space, 36.



experienced physical violence. In addition, the risk of being exploited for labor, forced to prostitution and victims of human trafficking are much higher as well. For example, Roma women are confronted with multiple discrimination because of their minority status as women, their ethnic background, and their low social status.<sup>347</sup> In addition, limited access to education leaving particularly women with alarmingly low educational standards is manifested in a high unemployment rate and high economic dependency on partners and families.

The public interest and political will in tackling these issues minority women face are very low. Where resources are scarce majority issues remain on top of the political agenda. This is accompanied by the widespread attitude that minority problems are of much less or no concern at all of the majority society. Perceptions of domestic violence often remain in manifested stereotypes and misunderstandings of the problem leading to tolerated violence and criminal impunity.

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<sup>347</sup> ICVA 2011: Roma women for life without violence – Response of institutions to domestic violence, 11.



### Community Based Paralegals in Kosovo

Community paralegals can serve the purpose of helping to resolve disputes through mediation and community education. The advantage of community paralegals is that they live and work in the communities they serve, have a deep knowledge of the people and empower the people to become aware of their rights. Community-based paralegal programs can provide lasting empowerment to those who are otherwise disadvantaged and have been implemented in a number of countries with good results. In Kosovo, a project implemented by the European Center for minority studies addressed the problem of Gender-based Violence in Kosovar Minorities Groups respectively Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian and Serb minority women in four municipalities. In the initial phase of two years, project two female paralegals per municipality were trained to address the issue of gender-based violence and to support the access to adequate health and prevention services for victims. The paralegals went from door to door asking for experiences and building up trust relationships. Workshops were held for both women and men including important stakeholders, such as the police, imams, and representatives from the social welfare centers, to raise awareness for the domestic violence and related issues such as early marriages.

Although community-based paralegals projects have been implemented successfully in the past a number of challenges remain that should not be underestimated.

- It takes a substantial amount of time for the paralegals to build up trust even and particularly when working in their own communities. Sustainability is a key feature for these projects that might take longer than two years to produce visible results.
- It is of major importance to identify the problems and needs of a community rather than apply pre-identified problems. The scope of issues is broad and not reduced to domestic violence but can be extended to family issues, social welfare issues etc. A certain flexibility of the paralegals and the applied strategies is therefore important. Sometimes prioritizing certain needs and problems is necessary.
- Supporting and supervising the paralegals constantly is important. This is not limited to financial or educational support but includes psychological support as the work with victims can be exceptionally challenging.
- The paralegal project in Kosovo had to deal with the issue of a significant number of the people from the communities migrating to western countries. This undermined carefully build up trust relationships. In addition, a certain tiredness of minority groups in Kosovo of being subjected to community projects could be observed.<sup>348</sup>

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<sup>348</sup> The Open Society Foundations is an active stakeholder on the field of community-based paralegal projects and has published an extensive guide that can be downloaded on their webpage.



### Domestic Violence

Domestic violence cases are very challenging to handle for the Police. Very often witnesses are lacking, victim statements are revoked and it is unclear if certain behaviors cross the line and become criminal conduct. Some cases might be resolved with a warning other more severe cases require more drastic measures. This makes it even more important for police officers to have very clear procedures which measures should be taken when women report cases. One of the most important issues is to educate victims of their rights and offer safe houses. Victims should be treated with respect and female police officers should be prioritized when taking up witness statements. Police officers must be aware that domestic violence fosters a dynamic that is based on repetition meaning that women being victimized over and over again without being able of withdrawing themselves from their violent spouses or even actively returning back to them. Police work in these cases can be highly frustrating the caseload is high and prosecutors often drop the charges due to legal barriers. For community-based policing this means that preventive measures should be put in focus to raise awareness in the communities and promote a zero tolerance strategy for all forms of domestic violence.

### *Men, Boys and Gender Equality*

Successfully tackling domestic violence and enhancing gender equality cannot be achieved without including men and boys. Most perpetrators are male whereas men are also negatively affected by gender stereotypes and the results of gender-based violence.<sup>349</sup> But stigmatizing men as perpetrators and excluding them from all efforts to promote gender equality is inefficient. In fact, the OSCE launched a Men Engage Network in 2012 as a result of growing recognition that gender equality can only be achieved by engaging men, acknowledging the positive influence man can have on the issue and promoting positive role models for men and boys.

Taking account of the sometimes difficult situations men and boy find themselves confronted with in post-conflict settings is crucial for engaging them in equality efforts. In times of conflict, the roles of men and women often undergo radical change. Before conflicts break out men derive much of their sense of identity and self-consciousness from the fact that they consider

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<sup>349</sup> OSCE 2016: Combating violence against women in the OSCE Region, 24.

themselves as economic providers for their families. In most post-conflict situations, the economy is in shambles and a substantial number of men will remain unemployed. This is particularly the case for former fighters of the conflict parties a crucial problem for the societies of the Western Balkans. This may result in an experienced loss of identity and emotional stress, substance abuse, and a continuous cycle of violent behavior, including sexual and gender-based violence.<sup>350</sup> It is, therefore, crucial to engage young women and men together in resolving conflict, guide them to become agents of positive change and create platforms to promote healthy versions of masculinities and manhood.



#### **CARE's Young Men Initiative**

The Young Men Initiative (YMI) is a program engaging over 4000 young men between 14 and 18 throughout the Western Balkans in the promotion of gender equality and the prevention of violence. YMI combines a multisession curriculum, youth-led media campaigns, and structured gatherings that bring together youth from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo. It specifically addresses young men's behaviors and vulnerabilities from a gender perspective.

Background: As in many other settings, patriarchal and rigid norms around gender and masculinities are still prevalent in the Western Balkans. These norms influence young men's attitudes, behaviors, and relationships with other young men, young women, families, and larger communities. From an early age, many young men are taught being a provider for and protector of one's family and community. Boys and young men are often raised to be aggressive and competitive, in preparation for these social roles. Many boys and young men are also often raised to be self-reliant, to not worry about their health and do not reach out for help when they may need it. This is particularly true for the current generation of young men in the Western Balkans that are influenced by the fact that they were born during and immediately after the Yugoslav wars and have come of age in a time of tumultuous post-conflict recovery. In many settings in the region, militarized versions of masculinities are still very present, as are tensions around sociocultural and political identities.

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<sup>350</sup> United States Institute of Peace 2013: The Other Side of Gender – Men as critical Agents of change, 1.

The program is roughly divided into two phases. Phase I is the pilot phase (2007-2010) that adopted a program methodology/curriculum and tested it in 5 pilot schools. Phase II (2011-2013) applied the effective strategies of the first phase to expand the methodology to more schools, reach target groups outside of schools, extend its geographic coverage, and promote adoption of the program at the national level.<sup>351</sup>

Community Policing dealing with the prevention of domestic and gender-based violence has to keep the men in focus particularly the male youth. It is one of the findings of the program that a certain violence paradox exists among young men: although the majority of young men disapprove of violence against girls this attitude turns somehow at an older age and with more experience in relationships. This is particularly the case when women's behavior is considered as affecting men's honor. COP strategies have to take young men into consideration.

More Information on the program as well as a young men's training manual for educators and youth workers can be found on the CARE website at:

<http://www.youngmeninitiative.net/>

### State Response to Domestic Violence

Domestic violence is widely perceived as being a family matter and reporting to the police or other institutions, for example, by neighbors is considered inadequate. The state is therefore in a difficult position. Providing an effective legal framework is one thing. In Kosovo, for example, the Law on Protection against domestic violence (2008) and the Programme and Action plan against Domestic Violence 2011-2014 were issued. Another thing is how these laws are implemented and if and how they are enforced by law enforcement. Kosovo Women's Network argues that remaining challenges are among others: inadequate services available for persons who have suffered violence and perpetrators of violence, including rehabilitation and reintegration programs; insufficient sustainability of shelters; poor enforcement of measures, such as child alimony; insufficient human and financial resources in some institutions; a lack of professional psychologists; inadequate coordination among institutions in domestic violence case management; and traditional gender norms that contribute to "blaming the victim".<sup>352</sup> But one of the crucial challenges remains underreporting by citizens.

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<sup>351</sup> All information taken from CARE 2012: a young men initiative – A case study 2012.

<sup>352</sup> Kosovo Women's Network 2015: No more excuses, 5.

The latter aspect is not surprising. According to UN statistics, only a fraction of women experiencing violence seeks help. If they do, they are more likely turning to family and friends or health services. The portion of female victims seeking help from the police is less than 10 %. The UN identifies the low rate of female Police officers as one reason for the reluctance of women speaking with the police. Another reason is very often the economic dependency of women on their husbands leaving them with no other source of income.

Again the situation in Kosovo seems to be a bit differently. Over 70% of the respondents in the cited study said, that they would contact police in case of domestic violence. Seemingly before turning to other institutions, such as NGOs or Victims Advocates. The reason for this might be that the Kosovo Police is considered to be one of the most trusted state institutions in the country. However, it should be mentioned that according to the same study, approximately 25% of the respondents think, that “there is no point in calling the police when violence happens because police will not do anything.”<sup>353</sup>

*“But the police are there and they are willing to help. Each one, each main police station has a unit specifically for domestic violence. So it is just the problem the women being aware of it, the option to go and report these cases...”*<sup>354</sup>

### Implications for COP

Domestic Violence has a number of implications for community police work. For example, confidentiality is one of the main issues. Particularly in small communities where everyone knows everyone, this can be a major problem respectively for community police officers that tend to know the people in their communities. Avoid being put on public display is crucial for protection and wellbeing of victims. Strict confidentiality policies have to be put in place concerning identities of victims and suspects. Another issue is certain dynamics related to the behavior of traumatized victims with regards to the consistency in their stories. The potential for frustration among police officers is high when alleged victims withdraw or change incriminating statements during investigations or in court proceedings.

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<sup>353</sup> Kosovo Women's Network 2015: No more excuses, 65.

<sup>354</sup> Interview Project assistant European Center for Minority Issues

A key to successful police work in this field are Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) that clearly outline how to react in cases of Domestic violence. Special training for Police Officers and the establishment of special Domestic Violence Investigation Units consisting of a male and female Police Officer in each municipality have become more or less standard Kosovo wide. Nevertheless, the problem of considering domestic violence as acceptable, as well as victim blaming, remains a widely unsolved issue among Police Officer. Community Police Officers should use their strong ties to the community and inform about other institutions offering protection from Domestic violence. Safe houses or shelters play an important role in the matter of protecting and reintegrating victims of violence. There are currently six safe houses in Kosovo located mainly in larger cities, such as Pristina, Prizren, and Mitrovica-South. Referrals can be made by the police who is also obliged to accompany victims to the safe houses.<sup>355</sup>



#### **Cardiff Violence Prevention Programme (CVPP)<sup>356</sup>**

The Cardiff (Wales) Violence Prevention Programme (CVPP) is a multi-agency partnership designed to prevent all forms of violence and reduce violence-related, emergency room admissions. Through CVPP, city government representatives, police, city-licensing regulators, and an emergency-department consultant work together and use data collected in emergency departments and through police intelligence to inform targeted-policing efforts and other strategies. It is believed that including emergency departments leads to increased violence prevention, as emergency departments have the unique ability to share anonymized electronic data about the precise location, weapon use, assailants, and the day/time of the violence that is not always known to the police. The partners, including education and transport, met on a regular basis to discuss the data, exchange on prevention strategies and modify policing strategies. The programme led to a significant reduction in violence-related injury and was associated with an increase in police recording of minor assaults in the city.

For more information, see: <http://www.bmj.com/content/342/bmj.d3313>

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<sup>355</sup> Kosovo Women's Network 2015: No more excuses, 76.

<sup>356</sup> UNODC 2013: Training Manual on Policing Urban Space, 22.

### ICT and Domestic Violence

A number of smartphone and tablet applications have been created over the past years that address specifically the issue of domestic violence as well as related issues, such as sexual harassment, sexual assault, and stalking. The approaches to address these issues are manifold. Some of these apps provide general information for awareness raising purposes whereas others include screening tools to support in identifying whether abuse is occurring and provide resources for help. A number of apps function like personal safety tools that can be used to inform friends or even the police if assistance is needed. There is even an app that provides victims with 24-hour information on the custody status of an offender. According to [techsafety.org](http://techsafety.org), a very useful webpage that provides extensive information and reviews on these apps, different functional groups can be identified.

1. A substantial number of apps are directed towards survivors of abuse and allow for communication with another person or several persons. This is either done through the app itself or through the phone. Some apps allow messaging a trusted individual with information about the safety of the user or with evidence of the abuse. Others allow to quickly send a message to one or several trusted individuals to let them know assistance is needed in an emergency.
2. Some apps provide tools for collecting and documenting evidence of abuse that can then be shared from the app with a trusted individual or authorities. An app like this might help to build a case for pressing charges.
3. Some apps serve a mainly educational purpose by informing about how to detect violence and abuse and which individual measures can be taken.

In cases of domestic violence, these apps themselves can pose a risk to the victim as the abusive might gain access to the mobile device. Some of these apps address this issue by disguising themselves, for example, as a news app. Several of these apps are developed for specific countries, regions or populations. Particularly the reporting function to local police stations has to be widely not available in SE Europe. But also sometimes only specific populations are addressed such as college students and might be less relevant to other populations. A general issue that applies to all apps, that people tend to download them when they have identified domestic violence as a problem they experience themselves. But research has shown that very often domestic violence is justified as common behavior by the perpetrators



as well as by the victims themselves (research from Kosovo.) The best educational App cannot help as long as self-awareness of the victims is lacking the app is not downloaded.

### **Recommended Readings**

A good overview of the problem gives the OSCE Reader: Combating violence against women in the OSCE Region – A reader on the situation in the region, good practices and the way forward.

The Kosovo Women's Network publishes regularly data on the extent of domestic violence in Kosovo. See respectively the reports: No more excuses 2015 and Sexual Harassment in Kosovo 2016.

On how men can be involved in the fight against domestic violence see United States Institute of Peace: The Other Side of Gender – Men as critical Agents of change 2013. In this respect the CARE project is of particular interest CARE: a Young men initiative – A case study 2012.

For trends and statistics related to various issues on women see the website of the UN Statistics Division <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/gender/worldswomen.html>

## 9. Drug Abuse and COP

### *Summary*

*Drug use and misuse is a crucial problem in communities around the world. It is linked to various forms of crimes and marks a serious threat to human security. Especially young people are at high risk of using drugs. Nightlife settings are particular risk-factors for alcohol abuse often resulting in violent and disorderly behaviors. The Western Balkans, although located on one of the main drug smuggling routes to Europe, has a moderate number of hard drug abuse compared to the EU Member States. Instead, alcohol consumptions and tobacco use of young people are significantly higher compared to the other European countries. COP approaches to drug abuse are most effective when balanced between prevention, harm reduction, and law enforcement.*

### Introduction

Drug abuse in various forms is a phenomenon that affects all societies in the world. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated in its World Drug Report that a quarter of a billion people between the ages of 15 and 64 years, used at least one drug in 2014. It is estimated that in the same year 207,400 people died related to the use of drugs, a third of the cases as an effect of an overdose of opioids and related effects such as HIV transmissions. Nevertheless, cannabis remains the most commonly used drug at the global level, with an estimated 183 million people having used the drug in 2014. On the second rank are amphetamines followed by opioids with an estimated 33 million user, the latter remaining the biggest risk of harm and health consequences.<sup>357</sup>

Drugs are particularly used by young people and adolescents during phases of transition to adulthood. Peer-group-pressure, school-settings, and nightlife activities are factors or strong influence on drug use and misuse. This is the reason why we decided to include this Chapter in the youth section of this handbook. However, this is not to say that drug use is a sole problem of youths and no issue for the adult population. In contrary alcohol misuse is

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<sup>357</sup> UNODC 2016: World Drug Report 2016, ix-x.

widely spread among entire societies including young and old, male or female.

In this chapter, we will have a closer look at the different dimension of drug-related problems particularly as a threat to human security. Different community oriented prevention strategies will be analyzed before we cast a closer look at the situation in the Balkans and respectively Kosovo.

### *The Harm of Drugs*

Although the induced harm of strong drugs like cocaine, opioids, and amphetamines the health risks associated with weaker drugs such as cannabis in comparison to alcohol and tobacco is under debate. Cannabis use is widely perceived as being a relatively harmless drug and more and more justice systems legalize the substance for recreational use. But the effects of cannabis, especially when used frequently by adolescents during the time of their cognitive and emotional development should not be trivialized. The scientific literature offers well-documented data of adverse health effects of cannabis use associated with cognitive impairments or psychiatric symptoms.<sup>358</sup> Hence, the number of people seeking treatment related to cannabis disorders are high and estimated to occur in approximately 1 out of every 11 persons (9%) who have ever used cannabis. This number increases dramatically to one out of every six persons (17%) who started using cannabis in their teens. However, it is important to stress that the transition from drug use to drug dependence is significantly lower from cannabis than for the other named drugs.

The health risks of drugs like alcohol and tobacco are widely known. The impact on health systems and economic costs are immensely damaging. Although globally decreasing tobacco smoking remains the leading cause of premature death and in combination with obesity it counts for a significant part of health care costs. According to the WHO, alcohol is one of the leading risk factors for premature deaths and disabilities in the world with an estimated .5 million people worldwide died of alcohol-related causes in 2004, including 320.000 young people between 15 and 29 years of age.<sup>359</sup> Alcohol consumption is not only associated with health risks but with a number of additional problems, such as traffic accidents, crime, aggressive behavior,

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<sup>358</sup> UNODC 2016: World Drug Report 2016, 10.

<sup>359</sup> WHO 2010: Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol, 5.

and violence.<sup>360</sup> Especially this link between drug abuse and the related safety threats are relevant for the context of COP.

### *The Link between Crime and Drugs*

The link between drug and crime is widely debated in scientific literature. Some argue that drug abuse leads to crime while other argue that crime leads to drug abuse. According to the latter theory, criminal subcultures and individual delinquency provide opportunities and legitimacy for drug use. Others are of the view that the relationship between drugs and crime is coincidental, or that it can be explained by a combination of risk factors and common causes on the individual, relationship, and community level. The individual disposition includes, for example, mental health disorders or the search for sensation whereas on the relationship level particularly the family is a main risk factor for adolescent drug abuse. Family conflicts, parental drug abuse and the lack of supervision to only name some are assumed to be factors that make youths more inclined to the use of drugs. Moreover, low socioeconomic status and disordered communities with high availability of drugs increase the vulnerability to drug use.<sup>361</sup>

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<sup>360</sup> Tahiraj et. al. 2016: Prevalence and Factors Associated with Substance Use and Misuse among Kosovar Adolescents, 1-2.

<sup>361</sup> ICPC 2016: The 5th International Report Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 128-130.



### The Tripartite Model for Drugs and Crime

Kurt Goldstein's tripartite model is a classic explanation for the causal relationship between drugs and crime containing three explanatory models:

1. Psycho-pharmacological explanation: This explanation puts intoxication as a reason for aggressive and criminal behavior at the center. Certain substances contained by drugs provoke deviant behaviors by consumers. In the long-term substance abuse including alcohol can have modifying effects on social behaviors.
2. Economic-compulsive explanation: The second explanation assumes that crime is a mean of maintaining the drug habit. Drug-related crimes, such as theft, burglaries, and prostitution are conducted to achieve money for buying drugs. The high price of drugs, particularly the substances that are highly addictive, constitute an incentive for criminal activity. A number of scientific studies have indeed corroborated this explanatory model.
- 3) Systemic explanation: This explanation refers to the aggressive patterns of interactions within the system of drug traffic, distribution and use. Drug users become easily entangled in this culture of crime either as a victim or as the perpetrator.

The variety of different theoretical approaches linking crime and drug abuse show that there is no single and simple explanation. Nevertheless, aside this criminological debate one thing remains uncontested: drug use and crime correlate. This is illustrated by the drug use of prison populations. For example, in Canada and the USA, almost two-thirds of the prison population have disorders linked to drug addiction. This cannot solely be explained by the fact that prison-milieus are ideal environments to introduce non-users to drugs. However, it is important to acknowledge the fact that the majority of drug users never commit crimes.<sup>362</sup>

### *Young People and the Gender Gap in Drug Abuse*

Young people are particularly receptive to the use of drugs independent of their social status or socio-economic background. This receptiveness may have individual reasons including stress, euphoria, fleeing reality, rebellion or

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<sup>362</sup> ICPC 2016: The 5th International Report Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 129.

simple fun. The scientific research has identified peer group pressure as one of the most important reasons. Non-compliance with the use of drugs as an instrument of socializing and integration may lead to exclusion from the group. In addition, environmental factors may be an important trigger for engaging in risky behaviors. Particularly, night-life activities that are commonly accompanied by alcohol consumption play an important role in that matter. Alcohol remains an important gateway substance to further addictive behaviors.<sup>363</sup>

According to the UN World Drug Report, men are three times more likely than women to use cannabis, cocaine or amphetamines. Women, on the other hand, are more likely than men to engage in the nonmedical use of prescription opioids and tranquilizers. Differences in drug use are more attributable to opportunities and social environments than to the gender itself. As men are considered to have more opportunities the gender difference diminishes as soon as equal opportunities for the use of drugs appear.<sup>364</sup> Interestingly this gender divide is much narrower for young people. For example, in Europe for every two girls who use cannabis, there are three boys. For adults, this prevalence of cannabis is nearly twice as high among men than among women.

Besides opportunities, cultural reasons play a role as well to explain this gender gap. Patriarchal and rigid norms around gender and masculinities influence the attitudes and behaviors of young men. Boys and young men are often raised to be aggressive and competitive, in preparation for the social role of being a provider for and protector of one's family and community. This may favor the adoption of risky behavioral patterns including drinking and the use of other drugs. A study with young men from the Western Balkans the respondents reported that the 'vast majority' of their peers drink alcohol to 'exhibit their masculinity' and toughness. The same survey also found a significant association between violence and alcohol consumption among many young men.<sup>365</sup>

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<sup>363</sup> Jiménez et. al. 2014: Young people, drugs, prevention, and ICTs, 399.

<sup>364</sup> UNODC 2016: World Drug Report 2016, 13.

<sup>365</sup> YMI 2012: The Young Men Initiative: A Case Study 2012, 12.

But the gender gap also influences the effects of drug use. Women affected by drug dependence tend to be more vulnerable and more stigmatized than men, suffering from co-occurring mental health disorders to a greater and being more likely to become victims of violence and abuse. Often the burden of male family members being addicted to drugs is carried by women and girls being exposed to the risk of becoming victims of violent behaviors associated with drug abuse.<sup>366</sup>

### Drug Prevention Strategies

Drug prevention strategies around the world vary. For a long time and in many parts of the world the so-called 'war on drugs' dominated, defined by a militarization of the fight against narcotics aiming to eradicate crops and dismantle criminal organized groups. In recent years, more countries have started to question repressive drug policies based on prohibition and rather adopted more pragmatic approaches with the aim to reduce the harmful effects and to introduce decriminalization strategies for drug abuse. It is more and more it understood that a drug-free society remains an illusion and good drug policies first and foremost need to aim to reduce the harm of drug addiction. The reduction of drug-related crime is a byproduct of this approach.<sup>367</sup>

In the Netherlands, for example, this approach is implemented with the goal to create and maintain good contacts with difficult-to-reach drug users and to motivate them to participate in treatment programs to prevent their individual and social situation from worsening.<sup>368</sup> A number of conditions must be met in order for this approach to be effective including easy accessibility to the program, adaption to local conditions including the acceptance by law enforcement agencies and the entire local community must be both consulted and involved. Only then harm reduction programs can help decrease criminal behavior related to drugs and the feelings of insecurity in affected communities.<sup>369</sup>

Drug prevention strategies must be tailored to the local settings depending on various factors such as the identified problems if it is an urban or rural

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<sup>366</sup> UNODC 2016: World Drug Report 2016, xvii.

<sup>367</sup> ICPC 2016: The 5th International Report Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 132.

<sup>368</sup> EMCDDA: Harm reduction overview for Netherlands. Retrieved from <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/country-data/harm-reduction/Netherlands>

<sup>369</sup> ICPC 2016: The 5th International Report Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 136-137.

setting as well as the capacities available. Research suggests that the best results are achieved by promoting social inclusion and improving social and economic conditions by simultaneously reducing marginalization often associated with poverty and inequality. Strong family and community ties are crucial factors as well. The aim should be to support the links of drug addicts to their families and reintegrate them in communities rather than isolate them. Therefore, prevention policies are typically comprised of four approaches<sup>370</sup>:

*1. Awareness-raising campaigns:* These campaigns aim to educate people about the harmful consequences of drug use and to discourage it. The problem is that precise impact-evaluations are difficult to achieve. Critics also point to the risk of being counter-productive by the fact that informing on drugs may create interest and curiosity and lower the threshold for people to try them out.

*2. Interventions in schools:* Providing children with information on potential harm and health-risks in school has proven to produce the same limited or even counterproductive results as awareness raising campaigns. More effective are approaches that aim to strengthen the children's ability to resist peer pressure and avoid risky situations.

*3. Programmes with families:* Long-lasting Interventions focusing on entire families at an early stage of addiction have proven to be the most effective. Resilience to addictive behaviors very often is based on positive relationships with parents with values that are contrary to those of substance abuse and coherent supervision and discipline.

*4. Community-based interventions:* These aim to involve young people in activities while being most effective when focusing on more than one risk factor, involving the entire community and being implemented at an early age of children at risk.

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<sup>370</sup> Ibid, 135.





### Preventive Measures for COP<sup>371</sup>

According to current research, the creation of an effective prevention strategy in urban areas where drug problems typically are most pressing the following aspects are required:

- Local policies must be adapted to local issues, and municipalities must continue to be the leading players when it comes to developing innovative policies and programs.
- Municipalities must have clearly defined roles and responsibilities.
- Cities must have a certain amount of autonomy in relation to their regional and national governments when it comes to implementing urban drug policies.
- Drug addiction is a health problem; it is thus neither ethical nor scientifically justifiable to criminalize it.
- Public health and public safety are not contradictory objectives, and mechanisms must ensure there is coordination between the key players from both sectors.
- The decision-making process regarding policy must be evidenced-based.
- Good evaluation and follow-up mechanisms for policies, programs and initiatives must be set up.
- Information must be coordinated and shared – particularly via exchange platforms and partnerships – between local key players, as well as between the local, regional and national governments.
- Effective prevention strategies require a coordinated approach to the creation of inter-agency and multi-sector programs with integrated interventions working at the level of the individual, in terms of family and relationships, and at the community level.

### Drug Problems in the Western Balkans

The Western Balkans lies within one of the most established international supply routes for illicit drugs, especially for heroin, cocaine, and cannabis. The so-called 'Balkan-route' connects Afghanistan to the large markets of Russia and Western Europe mainly via two main axes: west through Albania towards Italy, and north towards Austria. The UNODC estimates that the annual market value of the Balkan route is at least 20 billion US-Dollars. Not only the geographical location but also the existence of strong organized

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<sup>371</sup> Cited after Ibid, 133.

crime networks makes some of the Balkan countries including Kosovo an important hub for illicit drug smuggling. Although reliable data is scarce this close proximity to the main drug trafficking route has seemingly not led to an increased use of illegal drugs in the region. The prevalence of drug use in the general population is quite comparable with EU countries. Cannabis is the drug most frequently reported as used in the western Balkans but at a level even below the EU average.<sup>372</sup>

The same counts for the estimated population who inject drugs. These drugs are particularly dangerous and due to the sharing of needles and often associated with infections like HIV and Hepatitis C. While official data from Kosovo is not available, estimates have suggested that there are 3.500 people who inject drugs in Kosovo, more than 8.000 in Albania, around 10.000 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, around 12.000 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and more than 30.000 in Serbia. This shows a considerable range in the prevalence of injectable drug varying between 1.8 to 5.0. per 1.000 of the population. This illustrates two things: firstly, drug uses vary between the Balkan countries significantly so that each country has to be looked at individually when designing and implementing prevention strategies. Secondly, compared to the EU member states these numbers are beyond average proving the popular assumption wrong that countries at main drug trafficking routes tend to develop a higher prevalence of drug use within the population than other countries.<sup>373</sup>

When comparing substance use and misuse among countries a number of different factors have to be taken into account: cultural, gender, ethnicity and socioeconomic aspects play a role. A generalization can hardly be made especially as the factors that favor substance use in one socio-cultural environment may be of no significance in another. For example, although the majority of Kosovars are Muslims this does not appear to be a factor in lower levels of alcohol consumption. The same counts for Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a recent study found a relatively high prevalence of alcohol consumption, regardless of the religious affiliation of the participants.<sup>374</sup> But then again when looked at in detail, studies from Kosovo and BiH support that among young girls the highest risk for harmful drinking behaviors is found among less religious girls whose mothers have an advanced education, and who experience high familial conflict and low parental monitoring. These

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<sup>372</sup> EMCDDA 2015: Drug use and its consequences in the Western Balkans 2006–14, 8-11.

<sup>373</sup> EMCDDA 2015: Drug use and its consequences in the Western Balkans 2006–14, 7.

<sup>374</sup> Tahiraj et. al. 2016: Prevalence and Factors Associated with Substance Use and Misuse among Kosovar Adolescents, 2-8.

points to the fact that more liberal family structures increase the likelihood of harmful alcohol consumption.<sup>375</sup>

### *Youth and Drug Use in Kosovo*

Although the limited available data suggest a moderate use of drugs in Kosovo it remains an important health and security issue. Consequently, in 2012 the Kosovo government has put into effect the National Anti-Drug Strategy and Action Plan for 2012–17. It aims to advance the fight against and tackle the negative impact of drugs by increasing cooperation amongst relevant stakeholders. The strategy is based on five pillars namely demand reduction and harm reduction; supply reduction; cooperation and coordination; support mechanisms; supervision and monitoring.

A number of scientific studies on the use and misuse of substances has been conducted in the Western Balkans and in Kosovo specifically. Most of these studies have focused on adolescents and young people for various reasons: young people are more susceptible to drug use, the negative impacts on their development and health are more severe and related problems occur more frequently. On the other side young people at their beginning of their lives are more receptive to prevention programs and measures than adults. If adolescents reach adulthood without misusing illegal drugs, alcohol or tobacco, the probability is high they will never develop a dependency problem.<sup>376</sup>

School performance and substance use are strongly correlated. Children and adolescents who frequently consume alcohol and drugs perform more often poorly in school. Surprisingly in Kosovo, this is even true for young people smoking cigarettes. The reasons for this are discussed controversially but one plausible explanation offered by Tahiraj et. al. is based on the assumption that adolescents who smoke and hence leaning toward substance use are often 'unconventional' and have general tendency to engage in problematic behaviors. This effect is reinforced by the Kosovar educational system which is not only based on objective indicators but on the behavioral grade largely depending on the instructors' subjective opinion of the students. Consequently, a poor behavioral grade may be related to smoking but not necessarily in low-grade point average that is more objectively based on the student's performance. A common misconception is

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<sup>375</sup> Sajbera et.al. 2016: Alcohol Drinking Among Kosovar Adolescents, 537.

<sup>376</sup> Carkaxhiu et.al. 2011: Problem of substance misuse and lack of national strategy in Kosovo, 112.

that the affiliation or active engagement in sports have a positive effect on the substance use of adolescents. Scientific studies suggest the opposite particularly with a view to alcohol consumption. In fact, an increased “prevalence of risky alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harm has been reported in members of sports groups compared with non-sports populations”. Post-game gatherings and out of home situations increase the likelihood of alcohol consumption.<sup>377</sup>



#### **Drug Use and Misuse among Adolescents in Kosovo<sup>378</sup>**

A recent Kosovo wide study with adolescents between 17 and 19 years identified a smoking prevalence of 41% among boys and 31% among girls (with 16% and 9%, respectively, being daily smokers). Compared to the rest of Europe where the highest prevalence is to be found in Austria with 20%–25%, the results from Kosovo are considered to be alarming. The same counts for alcohol where 41% of boys and 37% of girls engaged in harmful drinking behaviors. The consumption of other harmful drugs was among boys 17% and among girls with 9% in a normal range and reflected the typical gender gap.

As one important reason for this high figures in terms of alcohol and cigarettes are the low prices identified. For example, the price for tobacco products is 3-6 times lower than in EU countries and no strict regulations exist to prevent selling to minors. The situation is similar for alcohol products being 2-3 times cheaper than other European Countries.

#### *Nightlife and Drugs*

Bars, nightclubs, and discotheques are often concentrated in city centers offering concerts and dance parties frequented by young people and adolescents. Alcohol and the use of other drugs are very common in nightlife locations. Young people regularly participating in nightlife entertainment tend to have a significantly higher substance use compared to the rest of the population. A study assessing the drug and alcohol use among nightlife users in nine European cities found out, that over three-quarters of respondents had been drunk at least once in the past four weeks. Drug and Alcohol consumption as part of the nightlife is linked to a number of problems such

<sup>377</sup> Tahiraj et. al. 2016: Prevalence and Factors Associated with Substance Use and Misuse among Kosovar Adolescents, 9.

<sup>378</sup> Ibid.

as unsafe and unwanted sex, driving under the influence, violent behavior, disorderly conduct and others. Moreover, these problems are enforced and perpetuated by a tendency to trivialize alcohol intoxications and the use of drugs as normal part of nightlife behaviors. The European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) recommend to tackle the issue of nightlife-related drug and alcohol use and by that reduce the associated problems by implementing a balanced approach between prevention, harm reduction, and law enforcement.<sup>379</sup>

Prevention measure may include so-called brief screening and motivational feedback. These can be conducted, for example, via SMS or web-based sending short queries or information to youth at risk of binge drinking on weekends, particularly after being hospitalized for alcohol misuse.<sup>380</sup> Moreover, numerous personalized mobile applications are on the market for self-testing the blood alcohol level (BAC), for example, before driving by processing personal data and data on alcohol intake. A mobile app developed for marijuana consumers performs a number of tests with the user such as memorizing different numbers, holding the balance for a number of seconds or estimating a certain timespan. The developers claim that the mobile app is able to provide a precise assessment whether the user is in a condition to drive or not.<sup>381</sup> However, there remain some doubts with respect to the accuracy of these apps but there might be at least some positive awareness raising effects.<sup>382</sup> In general breath-testing campaigns by law enforcement agencies can be considered an important strategy for reducing alcohol-related crashes.

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<sup>379</sup> EMCDDA 2016: Responding to drug and alcohol use and related problems in nightlife settings, 4-8.

<sup>380</sup> Suffoletto et.al. 2014: A Text Message Alcohol Intervention for Young Adult Emergency Department Patients: A Randomized Clinical Trial.

<sup>381</sup> <http://smdorg.wordpress.com/my-canary/>

<sup>382</sup> Wilson et al. 2016: The Quality and Accuracy of Mobile Apps to Prevent Driving After Drinking Alcohol.



#### Detection of People with Mental Disabilities<sup>383</sup>

A problem police officers often face is to distinguish between people under the influence of drugs and persons with autism, mental illnesses or emotional disabilities. People with these impairments may be overwhelmed and unable to react appropriately to an encounter with the police and are often mistaken for being under the influence of drugs. These misunderstandings bare the high risk of resulting in the application of harsh measures by the police. The mobile app VITALS uses Bluetooth technology to send a signal from a beacon, card or cell phone with information about the person with autism to an officer's phone within the range of 40 feet. This profile contains personal information as well as information on behaviors that trigger the user and things that calm him down. It is this specific information that can be of great value for police officers to resolve situational tensions properly and distinguish the app from a simple tracker. The technology can contribute to reducing bad contacts with the police and potentially be extended to other first responders giving out information on Alzheimer's or even diabetes. More information can be found under <http://awareservices.org/>

*"A good example would be young people gathering in one place using drugs which is quite common in a lot of municipalities. And this sometimes can disturb a lot the security of the community. This is not a short-term but a long-term issue because you have to address the youth. It is about education. [...] When you are doing that are you respecting the community, are you thinking about how bad this is? It is rough for them to evolve because it is difficult to change people. But to change the behavior and that will bring back some more safety."<sup>384</sup>*

<sup>383</sup> Retrieved from Social Media: the new DNA at <http://smdorg.wpengine.com/vitals/>. More information on the app can be found here: <http://awareservices.org/>

<sup>384</sup> Interview Representative EULEX, Chief regional advisor North Regional Directorate Mitrovica.

*COP Engagement in Nightlife Related Drug Prevention*

A key to the prevention of alcohol intoxication and all its related problems are drinking environments respectively the night venues. According to the EMCDDA, with respect to the nightlife, a number of factors may play a role, such as a permissive environment, discounted drinks, poor cleanliness, predominance of male patrons, crowding loud music and poor staff practice can contribute to higher levels of alcohol intoxication, drug use and related problems such as violence. Countermeasures from venues may involve crowd management, cool-down or chill-out rooms, serving food within venues, display of clear and visible house rules addressing behavioral standards, first aid services, responsible beverage service and preventing access to clubs by minors. In addition, the training of staff on alcohol legislation or the relation between alcohol and violence can be crucial. This includes the detection and prevention of serving alcohol to already intoxicated persons as they have a higher risk of engaging in disorderly behavior. Alcohol-focused training programs are most effective when embedded in a community program including community mobilization, policy work, increased enforcement, environmental changes and media advocacy and public relations work.

The community involvement, as well as legislative measures, are important aspects of the control of alcohol and drug misuse. Multi-component interventions by law enforcement in cooperation with communities have proven to be most effective to prevent harm in nightlife when strictly enforced. These include but are not limited to the following measures<sup>385</sup>:

- Legal measures that reduce the affordability and availability of alcohol, such as strict enforcement of age limits, licensing, and alcohol marketing regulations.
- Restrictions on the nightlife industry in promoting alcohol in form of happy hours or flat rate drinking. Obligations to use minimum drink prices and refuse serving alcohol to intoxicated people. The cheapest beverage offered in a venue must be non-alcoholic.
- High densities of nightclubs and bars in certain locations may increase the associated problems. City planning measures may help to prevent the appearance of hot spots.

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<sup>385</sup> See EMCDDA 2016: Responding to drug and alcohol use and related problems in nightlife settings, 11 ff.

- Reduction of opening hours of venues is likely to have a reductive effect on violent behaviors.
- Frequent police enforcement measures including police visits to high-risk nightlife venues and age verification checks.
- Imposing the responsibility of age checks to venue operators including sanctions and revocations of licenses in case of non-compliance.
- Community mobilization including awareness campaigns, creating support amongst stakeholders and the general public.



#### **Youth@Night Project in Switzerland**

A crucial factor for the mentioned prevention measures is a thorough understanding of the dynamics of nightlife in a respective city or community. Whereas most often this is common knowledge sometimes it is more difficult to get a clear picture of these social dynamics. The youth@Night research project conducted in Lausanne and Zurich set out to increase the knowledge on young adults' alcohol consumption habits in Switzerland during nights out examining the places they go to and the types of drinks consumed. This could be private settings, closed spaces like bars or nightclubs, and also public places e.g. in front of nightclubs, in parks, or simply on the street. Usually, most of the information young adults' behavior on nights out is retrieved from the media with a tendency to highlight stories of violence or other problems related to excessive alcohol consumption. This often creates a distorted image of reality.

To understand more clearly the way young adults use public and private spaces in nightlife settings and to analyze the influence of context (place, luminosity, loudness) on alcohol consumption throughout the evening the project used a set of ICT applications. Through a smartphone app data was captured where young people hang out, their social context, their activities during night time and their drinking habits. Moreover, the study took into account the role of urban structure (e.g. places of consumption, comings, and goings) on consumption habits on an individual and collective level. With this mobile app videos and photos could be uploaded to gain a detailed view of the physical and social experience of youth nightlife.

The results of the study are less relevant for the context of this handbook as they can be hardly generalized or applied to other places. More interesting, however, is the unique crowdsourcing research methodology relying heavily on ICT to achieve a clearer picture of nightlife behavior patterns of adolescents and young adults. Mobile crowdsourcing provides the possibility to study questions in cities related to populations and their environments that have been elusive in the past. Two directions



to collect crowdsourced data on the everyday life of people can be identified: The first one being relying crowdsensing using the sensors in mobile devices to collect data e.g. location. A second trend involves the requesting of explicit actions from crowd workers, including photo-taking and audio and video recording.<sup>386</sup>

More information about the project can be found on [www.youth-night.ch](http://www.youth-night.ch)

### Recommended Readings

The Healthy Nightlife Toolbox (HNT) is an international initiative that focuses on the reduction of harm from alcohol and drug use among young people. The website provides a number of useful links related to drug use and nightlife including further literature and other websites. <http://www.hntinfo.eu/links>

The Best Practice of EMCDDA gives an overview of what works (and what doesn't work) in the areas of drug prevention, treatment, harm reduction and social reintegration. <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/best-practice>

UNODC offers a number of related publications among other an Ebook called Compilation of Evidence-Based Family Skills Training Programmes featuring a number of drug-related projects. <https://www.unodc.org/documents/prevention/family-compilation.pdf>

The ICPC offers a good overview of drug-related issues in urban settings see chapter 5 of 5th International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda available at <http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/nc/en/publications.html>

The EMCDDA offers a report on Drug use and its consequences in the Western Balkans 2006–14 <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/technical-reports/western-balkans-report>

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<sup>386</sup> Santani et.al. 2016: The Night is Young: Urban Crowdsourcing of Nightlife Patterns. Retrieved from <https://www.youth-night.ch/publications>

## 10. COP and Radicalization

### *Summary*

*Radicalization is a growing problem affecting societies in various ways. Especially the increasing number of young people leaving western countries to support terror organizations in conflict zones has attracted the attention of law enforcement agencies. This is particularly true for the Western Balkans that account for the – in relation to their population – largest number of the so-called ‘foreign fighters’. The role of the internet and social media in the radicalization and recruitment processes cannot be underestimated. The web-strategies to promote the global jihad have become increasingly elaborate and with the anonymity of the Dark Web, the counterterrorism measures are limited. Community resilience and early prevention measures have become core concepts to tackle radicalization. But little is known of how these counter-strategies can be implemented effectively. COP approaches to radicalization run the risk of blurring the lines between cooperative strategies and gathering intelligence for counter-terrorism measures and securitizing the relationships with communities.*

### Introduction

The threats from radicalization and extremism in various forms are perceived as one of the major security concerns in societies. COP can play an important role in the prevention, detection and fight against extremism, especially by approaching the strongly related phenomenon of religious radicalization. However, it should be noted that extremism leading to terrorism is not monopolized by the radical Islam, also political right and left wing terrorism has risen to serious threats, especially for western societies.<sup>387</sup> However, a lot has been written on the topic over the past years without ever agreeing on a clear definition of terrorism. Therefore, with a view to the thematic context of this handbook, we will focus on the radicalization processes leading up to the engagement in terroristic acts, as these are most relevant for COP. Moreover, with a view to the region-specific context, we will focus on Islamic radicalization and on the phenomenon known as ‘home-grown terrorism’. The term refers to the fact that the vast majority of radicalized individuals

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<sup>387</sup> For a good overview on the phenomenon see ICPC 2016: 5th International Report: Crime prevention and community safety - Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 158ff.

active in Western countries were born or have lived most of their lives in the West.<sup>388</sup> Often they are also referred to as “lone wolves” and if the radicalization process has reached the stage of active engagement, as “foreign fighters.” The latter phenomenon has become an increasing problem over the past years, respectively in the Western Balkans, and will, therefore, be at the center of this chapter.

### Definitions

The term “lone wolf” refers to a self-radicalized individual, promoting violent acts based on a cause or beliefs. According to scientists, there exist three types of lone wolfs:

1. Individual terrorists who operate autonomously and independently of a group in terms of training, preparation and selection of targets.
2. Individual terrorists who maintain links with organizations and who have received training and equipment but ultimately act autonomously.

Thirdly, isolated dyads of individuals who operate independently of a group.<sup>389</sup>

Foreign fighters are, according to the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2178, “nationals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training.”<sup>390</sup>

The conflicts in Syria and Iraq have attracted thousands of volunteer combatants from over hundred different countries. Although foreign fighters are no new phenomenon and have been a well-known feature in conflicts like Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Herzegovina and very recently Ukraine, the dimension of the problem is historically unprecedented. It is estimated that more than 36.500 individuals, including at least 6.600 from Western countries, have joined these current conflicts since 2012.<sup>391</sup> It is, however, important to acknowledge that not all processes of religious radicalization

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<sup>388</sup> Ibid, 156.

<sup>389</sup> ICPC 2016: 5th International Report: Crime prevention and community safety - Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 160.

<sup>390</sup> UNSC, 2014: Security Council resolution 2178 [on threats to international peace and security caused by foreign terrorist fighters], Pub. L. No. S/RES/2178 (2014).

<sup>391</sup> Shtuni 2016: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo, 2.

consequently have to end up in a violent attack or a travel to Syria or Iraq, joining ISIS. Particularly for fighters from post-conflict settings religious motivation is not the sole or a factor at all for recruitment. Often monetary incentives or even humanitarian reasons may play an important role in the decision to travel abroad.<sup>392</sup> Radicalization is a broad-based phenomenon that can take various forms, and its roots are increasingly linked to problems of migration, integration, and discrimination in communities.

### Radicalization Processes

Radicalization and the factors that explain it have become the focus of research over the past years. A lot has been written about it but still relatively little is actually known about the phenomenon. Up to date, there is no consensus on common characteristics of radicalized individuals or a specific pathway of radicalization. Nevertheless, effective COP approaches to prevention of radicalization have to take into account as much as possible the known factors promoting it. Radicalization can predominately be explained by the links individuals of more or less the same age, sharing similar experiences and political/religious views, establish and maintain with each other, often within isolated communities. These processes often appear secretive and are highly independent of terrorist networks, making detection by law enforcement agencies so difficult. The role of recruiters or gatekeepers is crucial, the latter being former jihadists with experiences in conflict regions functioning as bridges between different cells and extremist groups. They are people of trust and sources of expertise in religious questions as much as in questions related to global jihadism.<sup>393</sup>

Religious beliefs are commonly seen as an important if not the driving factor in radicalization processes. But the association between both is complex and radicalized individuals do not necessarily have a traditional or narrow-minded interpretation of Islam. Especially second-generation immigrants have a more intellectual or individual access to Islam and in combination with individualization, personal experiences, socio-economic and structural factors this may foster radicalization. The complexity of these processes shows that a clear profile of radicalized individuals or a pathway to radicalization does not exist. For example, different studies assessing the profile of foreign fighters have produced different results. Some of them report an average good educational level and middle-class origin with no

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
<sup>392</sup> Shtuni 2016: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo, 10.

<sup>393</sup> ICPC 2016: 5th International Report: Crime prevention and community safety - Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 161-162.

prior criminal record whereas other studies found that radicalized individuals where generally from working-class backgrounds, many of them having previously conducted crimes.<sup>394</sup> In that matter, data from Kosovo suggest that nearly all of the foreign fighters (97%) have secondary or tertiary education, thus a higher education level than the general population, and stem mainly from middle-class backgrounds. In contrast, the foreign fighters contingent from Bosnia and Herzegovina appear to be less educated, the majority having only a primary-level education.<sup>395</sup>

However, one of the main reason for this very unclear picture we still have of the phenomenon is the fact that data is scarcely available or, if existing, might be withheld by the authorities.

*Conditions conducive to terrorist radicalization in an individual case according to OSCE*<sup>396</sup>



<sup>394</sup> Ibid.

<sup>395</sup> Shtuni 2016: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo, 4.

<sup>396</sup> OSCE 2014: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach, 38.

*Gender, Radicalization, and Motivation*

In terms of the demographics, Islamic radicalization is today a phenomenon that pertains especially to young men between 15-35 years, mostly stemming from patriarchal societies. Nevertheless, in recent years, the role of women and respectively young girls in radical Islam has become of growing importance. Although reliable data is scarce research suggests that the number of women from EU member states joining the jihad makes up for 18% of all foreign fighters. These so-called 'jihadi brides', often very young girls recruited via social media, are a relatively new phenomenon. They are a source of concern related to both, their return and the possibility of them not returning. The motivations for this unknown scale of female migration to conflict zones vary and include religious, political, and personal reasons, such as problems at home or at school, or feelings of exclusion, very often accompanied by a certain amount of naivety. Not seldom they become engaged in the recruitment of their "sisters" back home, increasing the risk that even more young girls become trapped by the global Jihad and its romanticized image of a life under the Caliphate.<sup>397</sup> Once socialized in radicalized circles, they are at the risk of becoming victims of crimes and sexual abuse due to the inferior role they inhabit within the ideology of radical Islam. In fact, the disrespect of some men towards women is considered an indicator for identifying radicalized individuals.<sup>398</sup>

The exposure to ideas and narratives that legitimize terrorism and foster its appeal are considered of being critical pull factors for young people. Different narratives that legitimize violence and enhance the appeal of terrorism are skillfully disseminated. According to the OSCE, these narratives include<sup>399</sup>:

- using the logic that the ends justify the means, arguing that violence is a necessity in the pursuit of an imperative social, ideological, political or other goals, and that there is no alternative;
- dehumanizing intended victims on the basis of intolerance, hate, and denial of universal human dignity;

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<sup>397</sup> Bakker, de Leede 2015: European Female Jihadists in Syria: Exploring an Under-Researched Topic, 1-10.

<sup>398</sup> ICPC 2016: 5th International Report: Crime prevention and community safety - Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 160.

<sup>399</sup> OSCE 2014: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach, 38.

- presenting terrorism as something exciting, counter-cultural or anti-establishment; and
- building on the charisma and/or perceived legitimacy of terrorists and, in particular, their leaders.

The adoption of a religious belief system provides a sense of belonging to a broader cultural and religious community which has to be protected against western aggression by the will of God. An insightful study of Kosovar foreign fighters conducted by Shtuni demonstrates how the idea of a humanitarian jihad is strongly interwoven in the narratives of these fighters and reconnected to the contemporary history of Kosovo.<sup>400</sup> A young seemingly disillusioned foreign fighter from Kosovo is quoted with the words: "When the Arab Spring began, I wanted to help the Syrian people. I have experienced war and horrific raids firsthand as a child in Kosovo, and wanted to help those children, the families." Another man who had returned to Kosovo from Syria in 2014 apparently said the following: "I spent time watching videos of Assad's cruelties against Syrian children. I wanted to fight against that criminal man. I also wanted to experience war. During the Kosovo War, I was too young to fight, which made me feel like I was incomplete."

Whatever motivates young people, men and women to join global jihad, it should be clear that the real problem of reintegrating returnees in their communities will be a major issue for the coming years. It remains widely unclear if they will be accepted back by their communities and to what extent they are able and willing to disengage from their radical ideology.<sup>401</sup>

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<sup>400</sup> Shtuni 2016: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo, 10.

<sup>401</sup> Bakker, de Leede 2015: European Female Jihadists in Syria: Exploring an Under-Researched Topic, 10.

**Quebec's Prevention Model and Telephone Hotline<sup>402</sup>**

Research findings suggest that friends, family, and coworkers can play an important role in efforts that seek to prevent or disrupt lone-actor terrorist plots.<sup>403</sup> Very often those aware of the individual's intent to engage in violence refrain from reporting to the authorities for various reasons. To address the issue of an increasing number of young people departing for the Middle East to take part in terrorist activities, a free telephone helpline was launched in Montreal, Canada, "that would allow concerned parents, citizens or any member of the community to receive information, request assistance pertaining to violent radicalization or voice their concerns regarding a friend, a close family member or any individual experiencing a potential radicalization situation." Previous approaches of tackling radicalization relied mainly on law enforcement measures creating the problem that it left little choice to parents and concerned community members to report to national security agencies their concerns about individuals suspected of being in the process of radicalization. Especially relatives were considerably hesitant to report individuals at risk to the criminal justice system. A crucial factor for the success of the hotline was that it was being hosted by an independent institution, the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV), dispensed from any law enforcement oversight. Otherwise, the mere perception of being linked to the authorities as a detection device would have undermined the willingness of concerned parents to share information.

Each assistance request is analyzed in order to determine the level of danger the individual in question poses. Those cases where a serious mental health issue or an imminent danger, either to the individual or the public at large, is detected are forwarded to responsible authorities. If a case is not dismissed as irrelevant, a decision is made how to best engage with the individual and his/her immediate social circle. Interventions have to be specifically tailored to each case as typical profiles of radicalized individuals do not exist. Initial meetings with the individual and/or the family are conducted to further assess the individual's state of mind, specific needs, and the environmental portrait. Cases are looked into in cooperation with relevant stakeholders, healthcare professionals, and social services, and follow-ups with the individual are conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention.

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<sup>402</sup> This case example is featured by ICPC 2016: 5th International Report: Crime prevention and community safety - Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 174-175. More Information can be found on the website under <https://info-radical.org/en/>

<sup>403</sup> Gill et. al. 2014: Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists, 434.



*The Role of ICT in Radicalization Processes*

Today, terror organizations heavily rely on ICT and social media channels for various strategic purposes. These include information collection, target selection, propaganda, recruitment, and fundraising, as well as the strategic facilitation and dissemination of global jihad narratives.<sup>404</sup> Group cohesion is promoted and informal communication and socialization between members are facilitated. Moreover, social media platforms provide a way of “spreading propaganda outside of core group membership and into other online communities, particularly semi-radicalized individuals, extremist sympathizers, people vulnerable to radicalization and the media.”<sup>405</sup> For example, one of the most influential pro-IS Twitter account has over 17.700 followers with tweets being viewed two million times per month.<sup>406</sup> Even mobile apps, online magazines, and video games are available for both, radicalization and recruitment. For example, an app called ‘The Dawn of Glad Tidings’ was an official Isis Arabic-language Twitter app, promoted by some of the organization's leading figures and is used to give updates about the group and spreads propaganda to other users.<sup>407</sup>

These social media campaigns have become increasingly professional. They use instruments and narratives that are far more complex than the one-sided and brutal perception of fighters portrayed in western media. Besides the dissemination of beheadings, mass-graves and killings of hostages, images of social engagements, like delivering food to conflict zones or even the depiction of an apparent love for cute kittens by IS-fighters, create a more human image of them. Moreover, different social media accounts are used to target different populations. Besides top-level accounts, there exist second level accounts, targeting a regional or local level, and individual accounts of fighters posting updates on personal experiences.<sup>408</sup> The propaganda efforts have been very successful, bringing in new recruits from at least 86 countries and doubling the number of foreign recruits between 2014 and 2015 to approximately 30.000 people.<sup>409</sup>

Western intelligence services, as well as the main social media providers, regularly take propaganda sites down but new ones appear and advanced methods of deception are used to evade deletion. Consequently, the removal

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<sup>404</sup> Nissen 2014: Terror.com - IS's Social Media Warfare in Syria and Iraq, 2.

<sup>405</sup> Bartlett, Reynolds 2015: the state of the art 2015 - A literature review of social media intelligence capabilities for counterterrorism, 14.

<sup>406</sup> Medi@4Sec 2016: Report on State of the Art Review, 11.

<sup>407</sup> <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iraq-crisis-isis-launch-twitter-app-recruit-radicalise-raise-funds-1453154>

<sup>408</sup> Nissen 2014: Terror.com - IS's Social Media Warfare in Syria and Iraq, 2-5.

<sup>409</sup> LeFebvre 2016: Leveraging the Voices of Social Media for Peace and Security, 233.

or censorship of content is of little or no effect at all. Therefore, in recent years, countermeasures against hate speech increasingly included so-called 'counterspeech'. Different initiatives have been launched since then countering the romanticized view by disseminating a more realistic picture of the jihad or even engaging in arguments with high profile jihadist accounts.<sup>410</sup> Even the social media platforms themselves engaged in these efforts. Facebook, for example, offered add credits of up to \$1.000 to certain counter speakers and partnered with the U.S. State Department to run a competition for college students to create messages that counter extremism.<sup>411</sup> However, it remains difficult to estimate how effective these measures really have been. After the Paris attacks in November 2015, the IS announced to move its propagandistic effort to the Dark Web which was counted as a success since it made the propaganda much less visible. Since then, an increasing amount of propagandistic activities have been moved which makes it much harder for law enforcement agencies to monitor them (see below). However, although the important role of the internet for terroristic purposes is undeniable, critics argue that the web only has a limited influence with regard to individual radicalization processes. In this view, the internet is more of a facilitator and only one of many elements of producing radicalization paths, being mere of use in the recruitment phase.<sup>412</sup> The actual radicalization is mainly fostered by individual contacts, interaction with peers and indoctrination by religious leaders.

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<sup>410</sup> Bartlett, Reynolds 2015: the state of the art 2015 - A literature review of social media intelligence capabilities for counterterrorism, 22.

<sup>411</sup> LeFebvre 2016: Leveraging the Voices of Social Media for Peace and Security, 233.

<sup>412</sup> ICPC 2016: 5th International Report: Crime prevention and community safety - Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 161.



### SOCMINT

Content provided by terrorist organizations can also offer valuable insights into the operational strategies of the group. For example, the IS in Syria and Iraq has repeatedly posted footage of their weapon arsenal to demonstrate their military power. Information like this can be of great use for counter-terrorism operations, providing a clearer picture of what they might be confronted with.<sup>413</sup> Retrieving data from social media for the purpose of counter-terrorism and public security efforts is called SOCMINT (social media intelligence). SOCMINT is a process in which intelligence agencies produce relevant intelligence for national security by identifying, collecting, corroborating data and information from social media.<sup>414</sup> The approach comprises different capabilities and applications for the purpose of countering terrorism that varies in their effectiveness. Bartlett and Reynolds, for example, name the following as the most promising:<sup>415</sup>

- Natural language processing is a branch of artificial intelligence involving the computational analysis of 'natural' language on social media platforms. This analytical method is becoming increasingly accurate and is most effectively used in the immediate aftermath or during a terrorist incident. It provides a tool for analysts to quickly and accurately identify and process important information as it is posted which can be useful for immediate response and intelligence collection purposes.
- Data mining and big data analytics, the statistical analysis or 'mining' of unprecedentedly large ('big data') sets has become increasingly important over the past years. Several ways of accessing and processing very large data sets directly from social media platforms via Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) exist. However, the terms of use, data format, and usefulness of data vary greatly from platform to platform. Alongside 'big data' methods, the more detailed 'netnography' – ethnography on the internet – is an emerging discipline which puts a focus on smaller online communities.
- Social network analysis is a technique to find a structure and topography of social networks, such as a network of sympathizers. This can be useful for better understanding the broad structure and behavior of online networks and the sorts of information and ideas being shared within a group or movement.
- Citizen journalists i.e. those at the scene of an incident or collecting and collating other sources of social media information are likely to be an increasingly important source for SOCMINT capabilities. It is important to keep in mind that a number of these SOCMINT measures have been criticized for the lack of legal clarity and for concerns about origins and circulations of content.<sup>416</sup>

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<sup>413</sup> Bartlett, Reynolds 2015: the state of the art 2015 - A literature review of social media intelligence capabilities for counterterrorism, 19.

<sup>414</sup> Medi@4Sec 2016: Report on State of the Art Review, 32.

<sup>415</sup> Bartlett, Reynolds 2015: the state of the art 2015 - A literature review of social media intelligence capabilities for counterterrorism, 25-27.

<sup>416</sup> Medi@4Sec 2016: Report on State of the Art Review, 33.

*Radicalization and Terrorism in the Dark Web*

As the surface web has been increasingly monitored by law enforcement agencies over the past years and hence becoming too risky for terrorist activities, a large portion of their activities has been migrated to the anonymity of the Dark Web.

**Definition: Dark Web**

The internet consists of several layers with the first layer being called the surface web, accessible by usual search engines. The second layer, called the Deep Web, consists of all the data that is not to be found via traditional search engines, such as bank transactions or closed WhatsApp groups.<sup>417</sup> The deepest layers of the Deep Web is comprised of the Dark Web, containing content that is intentionally concealed, where users can surf anonymously. It generally contains illegal and anti-social information and can only be accessed through specialized browsers. The Dark Web is to a great extent used for illicit activities, such as child pornography, unauthorized leaks of sensitive information, money laundering, copyright infringement, credit card fraud, identity theft, illegal sales of weapons and drugs, including services, such as murder for hire, human trafficking or hacking on market platforms.<sup>418</sup> However, it is important to acknowledge the fact that the Deep Web, including the Dark Web, is also used for legitimate purposes, for example, by journalists, whistleblowers or political activists to avoid identification and censorship.

Terrorist activities in the Dark Web are similar to those on the surface web, comprising the provision of information to fellow terrorists, to recruit and radicalize, to spread propaganda, to raise funds and to coordinate actions and attacks. But the Dark Web provides the opportunity to do this in a much safer way. In 2015, for example, a massive migration of jihadists from social media sites, notably twitter, took place to an encrypted messenger service called 'telegram' which allows users to broadcast their messages to an unlimited number of members. In March 2016 alone, according to a report, 700 new channels identified with the so-called 'Islamic State' were opened.<sup>419</sup> A British teenager, convicted in October 2015, has used the app for planning an attack in Melbourne, Australia. He communicated with fellow IS sympathizers, discussing the logistics of the attack and possible killing methods. When arrested for another matter, the police came across his

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<sup>417</sup> Ibid, 40.

<sup>418</sup> Weimann 2016: Going Dark: Terrorism on the Dark Web, 196

<sup>419</sup> Weimann 2016: Terrorist Migration to the Dark Web, 41-42.

communications by chance. When confronted with these issues, the telegram CEO Pavel Durov commented: “I think that privacy, ultimately, and our right for privacy is more important than our fear of bad things happening, like terrorism.”<sup>420</sup>

So-called cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoins, play an important part in fundraising, money transfers and the purchase of explosives and weapons via the Dark Web. For example, the weapons used during the Paris terror attacks were purchased from a German Dark Web vendor. According to some sources, the Dark Web has even become a medium for terrorist organizations to sell human organs, stolen oil and smuggled antiquities looted from ancient cities.<sup>421</sup>

In sum and by noticing that the Dark Web may lack the appeal of the surface web, it is easy to understand Chertoff & Simons' assertion that “the Dark Web and terrorists seem to complement each other — the latter need an anonymous network that is readily available yet generally inaccessible. It would be hard for terrorists to keep up a presence on the surface Web because of the ease with which their sites could be shut down and, more importantly, tracked back to the original poster.”<sup>422</sup> The future will show if and how law enforcement agencies will be able to tackle, monitor and at least partly regain control of illicit activities in the Dark Web.

### **Radicalization and Foreign Fighters in the Western Balkans**

In recent years, the western Balkans have struggled with the problem of radicalization, violent extremism and foreign fighters. It is estimated that more than a thousand nationals of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia have traveled to the battlefields of Syria and Iraq since 2012. Hence the mobilization rate, particularly in Kosovo, BiH, and Macedonia are far higher than in other European countries, making the region a prime source of foreign fighters for the conflict in Syria.<sup>423</sup> However, comparing countries like Kosovo, where the vast majority of the population is Muslim, to countries with only a Muslim minority, such as in Western Europe, does only present a blurred picture. The total number of foreign fighters from Kosovo is officially estimated with 314 by May 2016, mainly

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<sup>420</sup> Weimann 2016: Going Dark: Terrorism on the Dark Web, 202.

<sup>421</sup> Weimann 2016: Terrorist Migration to the Dark Web, 42-43.

<sup>422</sup> Chertoff, Simon 2015: The Impact of the Dark Web on Internet Governance and Cyber Security, 4-5

<sup>423</sup> Shtuni 2016: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo, 2.

consisting of young men between 17-30 years. But compared to the general population of the country, this number is almost negligible.

However, it would be a mistake to underestimate the problem. One must take into account that the official numbers only account for the tip of the iceberg, respectively with a view to the “extensive network of like-minded militants, supporters, and enablers who not only openly share the same ideology but are also actively engaged in its dissemination and recruitment efforts through physical and virtual social networks.”<sup>424</sup> According to Shtuni, it is estimated that the number of supporters in Kosovo for the cause of terrorist organizations, such as the so-called ‘Islamic State’ and al-Qaeda is in the thousands. For example, the Facebook page “Halal Channel” run from Pristina by Islamic State supporters had more than eight thousand followers at the time it was shut down in July 2016. The Jabhat Fateh al-Sham page “Minarja e Bardhe” or “The White Minaret” (also run from Pristina) had almost four thousand followers before being shut down in June 2016, only to reopen again shortly thereafter. Although foreign fighter recruits predominantly originate from the municipalities of Pristina and Prizren, the highest mobilization rate is found in five municipalities namely, Mitrovica, Gjilan, Viti, Hani i Elezit and Kaçanik. To be put in perspective: The latter two located in the border region of Macedonia have a significantly higher mobilization rate than the Belgian municipality of Sint-Jans-Molenbeek, which has the image of being one of Europe’s most prolific jihadist hotbeds.<sup>425</sup>

### Regional and Historic Factors Facilitating Radicalization

As already stated above, radicalization often but not necessarily culminating in the traveling to conflict zones to support terrorist organizations, has different roots. This is particularly true for the Western Balkans with its complex history and multi-ethnic and religious societies. Historically, Islamic traditions on the Balkans had less of extremist tendencies but were rather marked by more liberal and secular interpretations. The fact that the Western Balkans have become a hub for terrorist recruitment is based on a number of religious cultural and historical factors that cannot and should not be dealt with in detail in this handbook. Only to name a few:

- During the 1990s about thousands of Arab mujahedeen fighters came to fight during the Yugoslav war and Kosovo Conflict. A significant number

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<sup>424</sup> Shtuni 2016: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo, 2.

<sup>425</sup> Ibid, 4-11.

stayed after the conflicts, living isolated and in parallel social structures respectively in rural areas.<sup>426</sup>

- Countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, are using different means of soft diplomacy to promote a form of Islam that runs counter to more moderate interpretations. Salafists, mostly supported by Saudi funds, spread their ideas across the Balkans, mainly through mosques, Islamic humanitarian centers, and non-governmental organizations. For example, it is estimated that of over 800 million Dollars from Saudi which entered BiH since the end of the conflict "100 million is 'untraceable', lost in a maze of charity organizations and possibly used to fund Islamic extremism."<sup>427</sup>

- In Kosovo, Middle Eastern charities are often accused of actively spreading Wahhabism and building an extensive network of unlicensed mosques across the country. Koranic schools are sponsored and scholarships are awarded to young Kosovars to study abroad in religious institutions in the Middle East.<sup>428</sup> Disguised as humanitarian aid, many of these organizations have exploited the difficult economic conditions and widespread poverty of Kosovar Albanians, especially from rural areas.<sup>429</sup>

- In addition, a sense of isolation and alienation from the rest of Europe might have played a role for the strengthening of radical beliefs in Kosovo, remaining the only country not enjoying visa-free travel to the EU. Studies suggest that rising and frustrated expectations may play a far more driving role towards radicalization than it is the case with the problematic socio-economic situation in this region.

- In addition, patriarchal mindsets, the clan-based structures as well as a certain degree of militarization among the civil society after the conflict may be contributing effects to these developments.<sup>430</sup>

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<sup>426</sup> Petrović 2016: Islamic radicalism in the Balkans, 1.

<sup>427</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>428</sup> Shtuni 2016: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo, 7.

<sup>429</sup> KIPRED 2016: What happened to Kosovo Albanians: The impact of religion on the ethnic identity in the state building-period, 2016.

<sup>430</sup> Shtuni 2016: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo, 6-10.



### Anti-Terrorism Activities in the Western Balkans

On basis of the UN Resolution 2178 and with a view to the EU aspirations, the Balkan states have adopted legislation to combat terrorism including the financing of terrorist activities and traveling to combat zones.<sup>431</sup> This has resulted in a growing number of arrests and prosecutions of terrorist suspects. In Kosovo alone, between 2013 and 2016 criminal charges have been brought against 219 individuals and indictments have been filed against 92 of them. Four of the most prominent conservative clerics and the leader of an Islamist political party in Kosovo were indicted in mid-September 2016. Kosovar law enforcement agencies have strongly focused the counterterrorism activities on fundamentalist clerics due to the fact that religious leaders play a crucial part in radicalization, recruitment and mobilization dynamics either on the ground and on social media.<sup>432</sup> However, the problem remains in the region that response strategies to terrorism have so far paid less attention to prevention measures. In the past, mechanisms to link various law enforcement agencies with local actors, such as schools, local authorities, sports centers and moderate religious institutions to foster the early detection of radicalization and to provide assistance, were widely underdeveloped.<sup>433</sup> However, with the adaption of the new community policing strategy in Kosovo, there are signs that this strategic approach is slowly changing.

*"Having in mind the number of foreign fighters from Kosovo. [...] We want to do more to prevent them fighting. [...] We go to the schools but the first step has been we go to the civic councils, meeting with the citizens and organizing roundtables. [...] At the second step the minister has started with our support in each municipality a referral mechanism. This is going to be a body which will be established by the municipality composed of police, education, social services, psychologists, doctors, religious leaders. And they are going to identify early signs of individuals or groups at risk and address those."<sup>434</sup>*

<sup>431</sup> UNSC. 2014: Security Council resolution 2178 [on threats to international peace and security caused by foreign terrorist fighters], Pub. L. No. S/RES/2178 (2014).

<sup>432</sup> Shtuni 2016: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo, 11.

<sup>433</sup> Petrović 2016: Islamic radicalism in the Balkans, 2.

<sup>434</sup> Interview ICITAP National advisor on community safety



### **COP Strategies against Terrorism and Radicalization**

Different policy approaches exist to tackle the problem of radicalization. The ICPC identifies four policies, notably those which focus on public security, those which outline broad-based integration strategies, strategies which specifically focus on the prevention of radicalization, and those which focus on the rehabilitation or de-radicalization of extremists.<sup>435</sup> The strategies have in common the mixed approach, targeting both security and prevention and are based on the integration of communities, social cohesion, the fight against discrimination and community resilience. Community-based approaches countering radicalization have become increasingly focused on building these resilient communities that reject violent extremist, terrorist ideologies, and propagandists and to mobilize citizens, individuals and groups in society in support of counterterrorism goals. This goes beyond a mere technical resilience, for example, by protecting critical infrastructure and strengthening emergency response but include a level of ideas to counteract the appeal of violent extremism and terrorism.<sup>436</sup>

Depending on the strategy, it has far-reaching implications on community policing approaches.

For example, inter-sector coordination is a key component of all the mentioned strategies by including key stakeholders at the local level, such as local governments, social services, schools, social workers and non-governmental organizations in reaching an agreement on common objectives.<sup>437</sup> It includes training and awareness-raising campaigns for teachers, social workers, parents and young people to foster the ability to detect radicalization processes. Cooperation with religious leaders, such as moderate imams, are of great importance. Mentoring programs for young people at risk of radicalization or for those who want to leave radical groups have to be established. The same counts for de-radicalization programs, focusing on changing belief systems and enabling individuals at risk to refute extremist ideologies.

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<sup>435</sup> ICPC 2016: 5th International Report: Crime prevention and community safety - Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 168.

<sup>436</sup> OSCE 2014: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach, 66.

<sup>437</sup> ICPC 2016: 5th International Report: Crime prevention and community safety - Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 171.

### Limits and Risks of COP in Terrorism Prevention according to the OSCE

Considering the scale of terrorist threats to societies and the potential harm not only to human life but also its political implications have left counter-terrorism measures mainly in the hand of specialized police forces and law enforcement agencies. Hence, COP approaches are mainly focused on early stages of radicalization, intelligence gathering, and prevention. According to the OSCE, even these early interventions are linked to some inherent risks<sup>438</sup>:

- *Over-reliance on community policing and realistic expectations:* With thorough planning and right implementation, COP can enhance wider security in communities and help to prevent terrorism. Nevertheless, terrorism by its very nature involves concealment, deception, misinformation, and secrecy, often resulting in the withdrawal from wider society by those who participate in it. In consequence, the abilities for local police officers are limited, especially as for a number of tasks, specialized counterterrorism teams are best deployed.
- *Stigmatizing particular communities through selective engagement:* Discriminatory profiling in surveillance activities or in stop-and-search practices - as inevitable they may sometimes be for an effective counterstrategy - must be anchored in the rule of law and human rights. Otherwise, they are likely to reinforce marginalization and stigmatization and prove counterproductive to the goals of a COP approach.
- *Using community policing to “spy” on communities:* Of particular importance when policing communities for the purpose of terrorist prevention is to distinguish very clearly between counterterrorism operations, purposeful intelligence gathering and community policing. If these lines are blurred, the effectiveness of COP is undermined or measures are even counterproductive. The same counts for evidence-based proportionality as well as effective oversight and accountability of police officers when it comes to counterterrorism measures. If these are not existing or ineffective, public confidence, especially by Muslim communities, can be undermined and by that the willingness to support preventive measures.<sup>439</sup>

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<sup>438</sup> OSCE 2014: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach, 22.

<sup>439</sup> OSCE 2014: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach, 33.

- *Other Risks and limits:* COP strategies countering terrorism bear the risk of securitizing the relationships with communities and reducing them instead of using their full potentials. This may even set off a dynamic where community members may tend to avoid interaction with the police. Moreover, individuals engaging with the police may be put in danger as they might be viewed as traitors and be subjected to intimidation or even physical harm.

One of the crucial strategic starting points for COP is the ability to improve communication with the communities and make them understand the nature of the threat, how they should respond in an emergency, what their rights are, where to report information, and what the police are doing to protect them. After all, countering terrorism may appear simply irrelevant, remote or too sensitive to community members, and even foster suspicion and hostility towards the police in some communities. COP strategies, therefore, have to be designed to be engaged over a long period of time and with a high degree of sustainability, taken into account the general relationship and the level of democratic policing that is already existing. Communication strategies should include consultations with the public during formulation of policies and evaluations of the implementation. The OSCE even suggests the sharing of relevant documents on standard operating procedures that are too sensitive to be disseminated publicly with a small and trusted group of community representatives. These should consist of men and women that have undergone a vetting process and obtained the appropriate security clearance. However, "it must be made clear that such involvement is not intended to provide selected individuals with some form of privileged access to the police."<sup>440</sup> But the police should avoid to engage only with certain groups or self-proclaimed community representatives that are sympathetic to them but rather specifically target individuals or groups that are marginalized, hard to reach, or who display risk behaviors. This involvement of community members can go so far as to involve them in the design and participation in COP training.

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<sup>440</sup> OSCE 2014: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach, 100.



### Youth Engagement in Terrorism Prevention

Young people play a crucial role in prevention efforts towards radicalization. The OSCE suggests a number of approaches that target specifically youths<sup>441</sup>:

- Police officers can provide sports coaching, fitness training, art and other youth-focused activities as means of initiating contact, creating a platform for regular interaction and promoting peaceful modes of expression;
- Police officers can mainstream terrorism-prevention advice as part of general awareness-raising initiatives directed at youth about staying safe;
- Police can establish a presence on social media to engage with young people, including proactive dialogue on controversial incidents. Young activists should be empowered to run public information campaigns to counter radicalization online.
- Police officers can establish or support peer-mentoring schemes, whereby young people who have acquired some skills, perhaps in sports coaching, dance classes, community art projects or other activities, mentor and support members of their peer group or of younger age groups;
- Police can invite local young people to contribute to police training, especially in activities that tend to have a disproportionate impact on younger people, such as stop-and-searches. Such initiatives provide an opportunity for both young people and the police to understand each other better and to share views on how young people may be affected by some police measures;
- Police can organize events in which young men and women can learn about and experience police activities. This serves the purpose of demystifying police actions and approaches so that young people have a better understanding of police tactics to address crime;
- Police can establish educational programs or internships aimed at young people who may be interested in joining the police;
- Police can utilize the facilitation skills of individuals who have credibility with young people;
- Diverse community police teams that reflect the population, with sufficient experience and an appropriate gender balance, are far more likely to be successful in establishing constructive and positive relationships with young people.

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<sup>441</sup> Ibid, 138.

In recent years, early intervention approaches to address the issue of violent radicalization through police officers in schools have become increasingly popular. For example, in the UK police presence in schools was originally introduced to address crime issues and antisocial behavior. But then, the role was widened to identifying and referring information on students who might be involved in violent extremism. Risk assessments were developed, listing possible factors which might make pupils vulnerable to violent extremism, including peer pressure, identity confusion, or underachievement. The problem with identification strategies like these is that many of these factors arise in 'normal' schoolchildren and there will be only very subtle differences detectable in a vulnerable child.<sup>442</sup> As a consequence, identification is extremely difficult, requiring training and understanding of the triggers to disruptive behavior as well as some knowledge of child psychology. Moreover, the risk is high that children with Muslim family backgrounds are labeled as risk factors, singled out and exposed to segregation and discrimination.

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<sup>442</sup> Police Foundation 2011: Safer School Partnerships, 7.

### Concluding Remarks

It should not be overlooked that recent law enforcement measures have led to a drop in numbers of individuals from the Western Balkans seeking to fight for terror organizations in conflict zones. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to either assume that support for extremists has disappeared or that repressive measures alone can solve the problem. In view of the ethnic tensions and Kosovo's EU ambitions, Shtuni warns to overestimate the reactive measures implemented so far while downplaying the actual level of sympathy and support for extremists' views among the population. He stipulates that "the long-term cost of misdiagnosing and undertreating this critical social ill far outweighs any short-term public relations and political benefits."<sup>443</sup>

Community-based early-intervention and prevention programs based on cooperative approaches seem more promising. However, marginalization of communities, the lack of social cohesion, poor integration, discrimination, segregation, parallel structures and socio-economic factors are not only root causes of radicalization but also obstacles to the cooperation with state authorities. In the future, a strong focus must be put on the issue of deradicalizing and reintegrating men and women returning from conflict zones.

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<sup>443</sup> Shtuni 2016: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo, 13.

**Recommended Readings**

The OSCE has published a Handbook on Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism which can be found [here](#)

Find a good overview of the problem of radicalization in Kosovo written by Adrian Shtuni for the United States Institute for Peace: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo.

For a good overview of the problems related to radicalization and prevention measures see ICPC 2016: 5th International Report: Crime prevention and community safety - Cities and the New Urban Agenda, Chapter 5.

For interesting insights on the relation of Kosovars national identity in relation to religion see the study conducted by KIPRED 2016: What happened to Kosovo Albanians: The impact of religion on the ethnic identity in the state-building period.

For an overview of how social media can be used for counter-terrorism measures see Bartlett & Reynolds 2015: The state of the art 2015 - A literature review of social media intelligence capabilities for counterterrorism.

## 11. COP and Public Places

### Summary

*Policing of public spaces is one of the key components of COP. No matter if in rural areas, small villages or in the growing cities, COP is confronted with numerous problems related to the use of public spaces. With a view to Kosovo, this chapter focuses its scope on the most pressing issues of traffic safety, illegal dumping, and stray dogs. Recent studies suggest that these issues are among the top priorities when it comes to human security in Kosovo. Some of the most recent ICT applications are featured as case examples.*

### Introduction

To maintain and improve safety in public spaces is one of the major challenges for COP. Cities all over the world are growing and with them the societal problems. Urbanization and migration to urban areas are occurring faster than municipal infrastructure, spaces and services are able to adapt, resulting in inadequate delivery of urban infrastructure and services, affecting particularly vulnerable groups such as the poor.<sup>444</sup> This is not to be said, that rural areas and small villages encounter no problems at all. But in dense cities tensions tend to focus in a narrow spot and become much more visible and pressing. It is important to acknowledge that crime control and ensuring safety in public spaces is not so much about regulations and enforcing the law. It is rather about to understand the types of problems that have emerged in specific places, why the problems exist and how the problems can best be prevented and controlled.<sup>445</sup>

Urbanization and the related problems are an issue in Kosovo as well. Results of the 2011 census in Kosovo show that out of almost 1.8 million citizens, 41% live in cities and towns. A Saferworld survey from 2010 found out that the major security concerns of the Kosovars focused on pollution, traffic and infrastructure, and dangers posed by stray dogs.<sup>446</sup> A recent study from UNDP states that the number one threat to the safety of School children on

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<sup>444</sup> ICPC 2016: The 5th International Report Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 42.

<sup>445</sup> UNODC/UN HABITAT 2011: Introductory Handbook on Policing Urban Spaces, 53.

<sup>446</sup> Saferworld 2012: Still time to act: Rising conflict fears in Kosovo - Public perceptions of safety, security, and security and justice providers in Kosovo at the end of 2011. iii.



their way to school are traffic vehicles followed by stray dogs or other wild animals. 52% of parents and 45% of the students reported that this was the case.<sup>447</sup>


The perception had shifted away from post-conflict issues, such as weapons possession and inter-ethnic tensions, and even away from fear of crimes as crime rates had decreased significantly over the past years. The survey states that problems related to traffic topped the list of security problems faced by communities, highlighted by 37% of respondents. This trend even increased in 2011 with 41% of people listing traffic among their top three safety priorities. Moreover, poor infrastructure was a popular concern as well with 32% of respondents naming electricity supply, the condition of roads, and water and waste management systems an area of major concern.<sup>448</sup> This chapter will address some of these specific problems that are found in Kosovo related to public places namely street safety, illegal dumping and stray dogs. However, these smaller concerns that are not directly related to criminal behavior should be taken seriously by community police officers although not all of these problems can be solved by the police.

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<sup>447</sup> UNDP 2015: Action Paper on violence and security in public schools of the Municipality of Pristina, 10.

<sup>448</sup> Saferworld 2012: Still time to act: Rising conflict fears in Kosovo - Public perceptions of safety, security, and security and justice providers in Kosovo at the end of 2011. 9.

The three pillars of a safer city according to ICPC<sup>449</sup>



<sup>449</sup> Source ICPC The 5th International Report Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 49.



### Broken Windows Theory

A very popular and widely applied concept in contemporary criminal justice is the so-called “broken windows theory”. This approach is based on the assumption, that effective crime control by the police begins with consequently addressing minor disorders to communicate to (potential) offenders that the police are strictly enforcing the law. The underlying idea is that once smaller offenses, such as littering, speeding or graffiti, are tolerated this might trigger a certain spiraling dynamic resulting in the deprivation of the whole neighborhood. On basis of the theory aggressive policing strategies, such as the zero-tolerance approaches, were developed often resulting in high incarceration rates, discrimination towards minorities or other negative effects undermining the trust in police.

Critics of the theory argue that other factors than physical disorder have a more significant impact on crime rates, such as economic development and cohesion of residents. It is assumed that the broken windows theory promotes only short-term and superficial effects without addressing the underlying conditions of crime and disorder. In consequence, best results of the broken windows approach were achieved when implemented in conjunction with other strategies. Broader patterns of disorder and what Skogan called the “spiral of decay” have to be taken into consideration. According to this approach, neighborhoods fall out of control due to a wide variety of reasons and residents find them increasingly unable to maintain conditions or demand action taken by local governments. Basic order is therefore only one component of effective policing and is likely to be a result rather than a precondition of establishing effective ties within and among target communities.<sup>450</sup>

*“There are a lot of problems depending on the reality where they live. Stray dogs are the biggest problem, electricity, streetlights, speed bumps, crosswalks, various problems. It can be a playground for kids, it can be a fence around the school or pupil safety.”<sup>451</sup>*

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<sup>450</sup> UNODC/UN HABITAT 2011: Introductory Handbook on Policing Urban Spaces, 39-40.

<sup>451</sup> Interview KP Officer

### Traffic Safety

An important issue for COP is traffic safety respectively road safety. On a global scale, road traffic injuries are among the ten leading causes of deaths, for young people between 15-29 even the leading cause. Far over a million people die each year and even more are injured on this world's streets. The financial costs for healthcare systems amount to billions of dollars. Research suggests that in view of the increased traffic around the world the problem will aggravate over the next years.<sup>452</sup> Traffic-related deaths and injuries are a particular problem of low income and developing countries. In 1998 these countries accounted for more than 85% of all deaths due to road traffic crashes globally and for 96% of all children killed.

In view of this data, it comes as no surprise, that traffic is one of the crucial factors impacting human security in communities. As a result, enhancing road traffic safety is, for example, one of the priorities of UN Police missions. According to the UNPOL Guidelines of Operations, putting in place the foundations for an effective system of vehicle and road traffic safety is an important task of the United Nations police for fostering sustainable law and order.<sup>453</sup> The focus of activities is the tackling of reckless human behavior particularly in form of four key dangers: failure to wear seat belts; failure to wear helmets; excessive or unsuitable speeds; and driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The UN approach consists mainly of education, outreach to communities as well as rigorous enforcement.

A good guide for how to assess the various factors that contribute to injuries and severity in traffic is the so-called Haddon Matrix that is used by the UN. Developed by William Haddon in 1970 this matrix is helpful for the design of prevention strategies.<sup>454</sup>

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<sup>452</sup> WHO 2013: Status Report on Road Safety 2013 – Supporting a decade of action, vii.

<sup>453</sup> UNPOL 2016: Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, 24.

<sup>454</sup> Matrix derived from <https://www.safetylit.org/haddon.htm>

## Example: The Haddon Matrix For Motor Vehicle Occupant Safety

	<b>Personal Factors</b>	<b>Equipment Factors</b>	<b>Physical Environmental Factors</b>	<b>Social Environmental Factors</b>
<b>Phases</b>				
<b>Pre-event</b>	-Driver skills -Driver attentiveness -Sobriety	-Maintenance of brakes, tires, etc. -Windshield cleanliness	-Roadway condition -Darkness or glare	-Attitudes to drink driving and speeding, -Use of restraints
<b>Event</b>	-Human tolerances to crash forces -Wearing of seatbelts	-Vehicle crashworthiness -Energy absorbing design -Airbags	-Presence of fixed objects near roadway -Unsecured objects within the vehicle	-Enforcement of mandatory seatbelt and child restraint use
<b>Post-event</b>	-Crash victims general health status	-Petrol tanks designed to minimize likelihood of post-crash fire	-Availability of effective emergency response	-Public support for trauma care and rehabilitation

A number of traffic safety programs have been developed and implemented around the world, such as the “Vision Zero” in Scandinavia, the Safe System Approach in Austria Sustainable Safety strategies in the Netherlands. They all have in common that the realization, that as human errors will always happen road system designers have the responsibility to minimize these risks of accidents. However, the results of these approaches are mixed in their success rates.

*Police and Traffic law enforcement*

Among the most important factors that contribute to increased risks of accidents are traffic law violations particularly risky behaviors, such as speeding, drunk driving and failing to wear seatbelts. Most commonly, strict traffic enforcement by the police is considered to be one of the most

important ways of improving traffic safety and decreasing accidents by up to 50%. Efficient traffic law regulations and their enforcement are therefore important means of improving road users' behaviors especially when it comes to the reduction of speeding. The same counts for driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs where an increase in the number of police controls usually lead to a reduction of incidents. Research suggests that countries that have long traditions of enforcing drunk driving laws, low legally permitted blood alcohol concentrations, and a relatively high objective risk of detection and enforcement that is supported by the mass media have the lowest numbers of cases of driving under the influence of alcohol.<sup>455</sup> Similar effects can be viewed with seat belts where new laws generally increase the usage.

The problem with police enforcement measures is, that they usually are short-lived resulting in a modification of driving behaviors only for the period and locations where traffic controls are anticipated. To have a long-lasting changing effect on driving behaviors the police is forced to regularly keep up their enforcement measures ideally covering the entire road network. This, of course, would exceed the resources and manpower of the police significantly. Some sort of compromise has been introduced by the German Police conducting so-called Blitzer-Marathons (Speed-Camera Marathon): In 2014, the German police engaged more than 13.000 police officers at 7.500 control points countrywide for a whole day to identify speeding vehicles resulting in the detection of approx. 93.000 traffic violations. However, although these events are extensively covered by the media assumingly resulting in considerable awareness raising effects the effectiveness of campaigns like these is doubted by experts.

### *Traffic Safety in Kosovo*

*"Traffic in Summer is the biggest problem when we have all diaspora people coming in. From Germany and Switzerland. And for some reason when they get back here they think that there are no rules anymore and they get crazy."<sup>456</sup>*

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<sup>455</sup> Stojevic et. Al. 2013.: Influence of traffic enforcement on the attitudes and behavior of drivers, Accident Analysis and Prevention, 29-30

<sup>456</sup> Interview Representative LPSC Prizren Region.

Traffic-related deaths in Kosovo are, compared to the rest of Europe relatively high. The number of persons killed in relation to 1 million inhabitants is 101 and in relation to 1 million vehicles, it is 500. This adds up to approx. 120 killed people per year. Nevertheless, it is closer to the standard of the European Union than to other countries in transition. According to the Road Safety Strategy and Action Plan for Kosovo, two particular differences remain compared to the other Western European countries: firstly, there was a significant increase of fatalities in the last decade particularly with regards to the number of killed or injured pedestrians. And secondly among those victims were an exceptionally high number of injured or killed children and young people.<sup>457</sup> However, this statistical data is very rough and it must be considered that the number of vehicles in Kosovo varies significantly especially during the summer months when thousands of vehicles from returning diaspora Kosovars crowd the streets. Interestingly, traffic accidents also impact the crime statistics negatively. The police statistics for criminal acts recorded in 2009 and 2010, for example, showed that over 30% of all recorded crimes were related to traffic issues.<sup>458</sup>

Taking all these negative impacts into consideration it is not surprising that traffic problems rank as the first serious security issue perceived by Kosovar communities. A Saferworld study from 2011 found out that among all respondents, 36.5% stated 'traffic problems' as the most serious problem whereas in previous years this number was considerably lower (26.5 % in 2009, 14.4 % in 2008 and 14.3 % in 2007).<sup>459</sup> There are many reasons for this increase, one being assumingly the higher number of cars using the streets of Kosovo, although official data in that respect is not available.

Over the past decade, a number of traffic safety programs have been implemented in Kosovo such as by the World Bank in 2008, in 2009 in the framework Regional Road safety Strategy for SE European countries and in 2010 by the Road Transport Safety Council. In view of the data, the impacts of these programs must be considered relatively low. One reason might have been the lack of political will respectively the provision of sufficient human and financial recourses to improve the road safety situation. Another reason is up to date the very low awareness in the society for the need to improve traffic safety.<sup>460</sup>

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<sup>457</sup> Egis international 2012: Road Safety Strategy and Action Plan for Kosovo, 5.

<sup>458</sup> Ministry of Internal Affairs 2010: National Strategy and Action Plan for Community Safety 2011-2016, 11.

<sup>459</sup> Saferworld 2011: Public perceptions of safety and security in Kosovo: Time to act, 22.

<sup>460</sup> Egis international 2012: Road Safety Strategy and Action Plan for Kosovo, 5.



### Challenges and Opportunities for the Kosovo Traffic System <sup>461</sup>

A study managed by European Union Office in Kosovo (EUOK) identified a number of strengths and weaknesses of the traffic system in Kosovo that give some good insights into its current state.

#### Opportunities and Strengths

- The level of numbers of vehicles per population is still low.
- Essential parts of the infrastructure are not in the condition to allow extensive speeding.
- Kosovo population gets younger and better educated.
- Good progress in driver education and vehicle inspection
- There is a rising awareness of the risks in road transport
- With efficient enforcement, the situation can improve rapidly.
- With political support, the average age of vehicles could decrease considerably.
- Improving the social situation will increase mutual respect and valuation of personal safety.
- Traffic police have a good motivation and created a special department for road safety.
- Rising awareness to fight corruption.

#### Weaknesses

- The vehicle fleet is relatively old and will not get better with admitting import of very old cars.
- New or rehabilitated roads become dangerous because of speeding, insufficient equipment, and maintenance.
- Enforcement level is low.
- Post accident care is insufficient.
- Driving too fast and risky is still tolerated by the society (no risk no fun, car as a prestige and virility object).
- Without a strong political commitment to improve the road safety, the situation will become worse.
- There is mostly still the hierarchic system without individual initiatives and quality management.
- Employees in higher responsible function frequently sit and wait until some external consultant do their work and also brings the money (negative foreign aid syndrome).
- Corruption is still an issue.
- Concerning road safety, there is a very low potential of experts in this field, neither in the administration nor in the private sector. The latter is still underdeveloped.
- Poor cooperation between the administrative entities (esp. Municipalities).

<sup>461</sup> Ibid, 21.



*COP and traffic safety in Kosovo*

COP approaches to traffic safety are less oriented towards enforcement than rather raising awareness (among community member, drivers, and municipal leaders) and include the communities to increase safety. In concrete, this means to bring the relevant stakeholders of a community together and to identify and implement the measures that can help to reduce traffic accidents. Only if the cooperation can be ensured positive result can be expected.

For example, the CSAT program organized by OSCE and ICITAP presented above, has dealt extensively with traffic problems in communities in the past. The focus is put on two primary issues: increasing the level of traffic signage and raising youth awareness.<sup>462</sup> In fact, relatively simple measures improving the traffic infrastructure, such as the installment of road signs and traffic lights, the building of pavements and crosswalks, can have a significant impact on road safety in communities. A better infrastructure can, in turn, decrease the necessity for police traffic patrols. The youth awareness component is implemented through a collaboration of CSATs, KPS, and local schools by educating children and young people on road safety issues in class and events like bike races.<sup>463</sup> During our research in the Prizren area, we came across an example for a promising COP project addressing speeding: In cooperation between local police, schoolchildren set up informal checkpoints stopping speeding drivers to issue fake speeding tickets while compliant drivers were issued rewards in forms of chocolates.<sup>464</sup>

*Other Areas of Traffic Safety*

Although traffic accidents can be considered one of the most important issues of street safety, other issues more related to crime and the individual feeling of security are of importance as well. Not only streets but public places as well can pose various problems and risks to communities. Parks, for example, are generally open to the public and can be accessed around the clock even if authorities take precautions to install gates and close the area at a certain hour. Despite being a place of regeneration and retreat particularly in urban areas they can attract criminal activities. Foliage and bushes provide cover and limited patrolling may result in a concentration of

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<sup>462</sup> OSCE ICITAP 2011: Assessing the impact – Kosovo's Community Safety Action Teams, 18.

<sup>463</sup> Ibid, 22.

<sup>464</sup> Interview Representative LPSC Prizren Region.

illicit activities, such as loitering, drug use and dealing, prostitution or assaults, and robberies. The potential dangers for regular park users especially for children, elderly people and women are obvious. This can rapidly lead to a situation where a city park is perceived as a risky location that should be avoided especially in the dark. Through this dynamic a park can be turned into the opposite it was initially intended for i.e. being a space of people encounter and social activities. If a situation like the aforementioned arise the response by the police and the affected communities can take a variety of forms: the community police may start by assessing the particular problems that affect the location. This is best done by including local stakeholders, such as park rangers or caretakers, residents and neighborhood associations in the vicinity, local businesses, and schools or elder care facilities in the area whose clients regularly use the park.<sup>465</sup> Restrictions on use of the parks, earlier closing times, improved lighting, reduced vegetation or even neighborhood foot patrols might have positive effects. Sometimes in accordance with the broken windows theory, it might be sufficient to regularly clean the park.

For example, in Mexico, a countrywide park improvement program called *Rescate de Espacios Públicos* approached the problem of parks being increasingly used for illicit activities, by relying on natural public surveillance: Citizens were encouraged to use the spaces for social activities including sports and the arts and to promote community development. Sports and community centers were built, cleaning campaigns initiated, and all improvements were targeted to increase public use of the parks. A similar approach was successful in São Paulo, Brazil, where not only police patrols were increased in parks but also a series of collaborative activities with businesses, volunteers, and a local university were developed to clean and maintain the plaza and provide for events, such as games for children and a cinema, in order to make better use of the area and decrease opportunities for crime.<sup>466</sup>

But not only parks can be subject to problems but also markets, business areas, schools, stadiums and other parts of the city. Often some rather small improvements can have positive effects if implemented correctly.

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<sup>465</sup> UNODC/UN HABITAT 2011: *Introductory Handbook on Policing Urban Spaces*, 52-53

<sup>466</sup> *Ibid.*

*"Or another problem: street lighting in a given neighborhood there was no street lighting and as a result lots of thefts and insecurity in a park. So community drafted a project asked the municipality to assist and they put the lights on."<sup>467</sup>*

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<sup>467</sup> Interview ICITAP National advisor on community Safety.



### Street Lighting in the Community of Trg Heroja, Sarajevo, BiH

Saferworld implemented in 2006 a community project<sup>468</sup> in Trg Heroja an urban, residential community within the municipality of Novo Sarajevo. Many apartments remained abandoned there after the war and an influx of people from other parts of Bosnia accelerated the breakdown of old community bonds. The main safety and security problems were crime-related, with high rates of burglaries and muggings, drug abuse, occasional shootings mainly in bars that were a source of noise and anti-social behavior. Empty apartments and public areas, such as parks, were used for drug dealing and residents frequently expressed concerns about walking on the streets after dark as the old street lights did not provide sufficient lighting.

An Action plan was developed on basis of focus group discussions with older and younger residents addressing the most pressing problems. During an action planning workshop representatives from both groups, the local government and the police agreed that the way of reducing crime and the fear of crime would be approached among others by improving street lighting. A working group was established and with help of an NGO, funds were raised by identifying and approaching donors (the City of Sarajevo authorities and the Ministry of Urban Planning). As a result, the community was able to raise necessary funds for the installation of street lights. Saferworld claims that after this project member of the community feel more able to take action to address their security problems and to approach authorities and the police with their concerns. The community is more self-organized and citizens are more motivated to take an active part in the life of the community. Moreover, the community has begun to feel that the police and municipal authorities are working towards improving security in the area.

Crucial to the success of the project was the management of expectations. At the beginning of the project, there was a danger that the community could misunderstand the objectives of the process and expect a large amount of funding to be available automatically to match their demands. A considerable amount of time was invested to discuss the objectives of the process with the community to ensure full understanding that fundraising was the responsibility of the community to foster a proactive approach. A certain flexibility in the approach was ensured to avoid the feeling of citizens that predefined objectives were imposed on them by outside donors, but it was rather their own project. A crucial factor was the formation of the working group which was focused on achieving its goals and helping to maintain the pace of progress. Moreover, the project drew on an existing local government structure, the Community Office which proved useful in gaining and maintaining ongoing commitment from the community representatives and in providing a legitimate channel for extra resources to improve street lighting. Information on the sustainability of the project is not available.

<sup>468</sup> Saferworld 2006: Creating safer communities - Lessons from South Eastern Europe, 14ff.

*Public Safety Needs of Women*

International attention to Violence against women and girls in public urban spaces is a significant new trend in urban planning and policies. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, for example, states as a goal to “eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres [...]”<sup>469</sup> The safety feeling of women is strongly impacted by experiences, for example, of sexual harassments resulting in special safety needs for women in public spaces. This is the case for public parks but also in public transport systems. Here, they are particularly vulnerable to (sexual) harassments or other attacks. COP and other policing strategies should specifically take these vulnerabilities into account, for example by training public transport employees or create safe spaces for women. The police can also contribute by identifying crime hot spots or increased patrolling, and engage in a dialogue with stakeholders and officials which measures should best be taken.<sup>470</sup>

But efforts must go beyond infrastructural change and include laws, regulations, policies, educational and awareness raising to promote greater safety for women and girls in city life. According to the International Center for the prevention of Crime, a combination of longer-term situational and social prevention initiatives is required to effectively reduce Violence against women and girls in urban public spaces. Only this can change negative gender stereotypes and cultural norms that are the roots of gender-based discrimination and violence. Boys and men have to be included in this process as allies.<sup>471</sup>

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<sup>469</sup> UN 2015: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and sustainable development goals, 5.2. retrieved from <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>

<sup>470</sup> UNODC/UN HABITAT 2011: Introductory Handbook on Policing Urban Spaces, 57.

<sup>471</sup> ICPC 2016: The 5th International Report Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda, 48.



### SafetiPin

SafetiPin is a map based safety app developed for New Delhi and meanwhile available in a number of cities, such as Jakarta, Nairobi, and Bogota. The app was originally based on the idea to help woman making safer decisions. Through crowdsourcing, the app calculates the safety score of certain places and neighborhoods in a city. The parameters for this calculation that are updated by the users are:

- Lighting
- Visibility. Are there 'eyes on the street'? Can others see you?
- Diversity. Presence of women and children around?
- Crowd. How densely crowded is the area?
- Public Transport. How close is it?
- Walk Path. Is there a proper place to walk?
- Security. Are police or private security nearby?
- Openness. Can you see all around?
- Feeling. How safe do you feel?

By using a GPS locator, the app updates the user if he is currently in a safe location. Through a GPS tracker family and friends can keep track of the user whereabouts is. In addition, the developers cooperate with local taxi drivers that mount smartphone in their vehicles to take photos of streets by night to assess the street lighting in certain areas.

Using these parameters, the app helps to perform so-called safety audits of certain areas. Audits are also conducted by community volunteers and local police officers. Besides improving safety for individuals, the larger goal is to get stakeholders to enhance urban environments. According to the Saftipin website, the New Delhi government, in response to the collected data, has announced to illuminate over 7.000 dark spots across the city.

The app is a good example of how crowdsourcing data has the potential of influencing stakeholder decision. According to the developers of Saftipin, while authorities are responsive when comprehensive data is shared with them, it still remains a challenge to get them to respond

## Illegal Dumping and Littering

Waste problems are not specific problems in SE Europe but rather a global issue. Part of the waste problem is an inadequate and unsustainable waste management system, particularly as traditional systems of waste disposal, have proven ineffective. Modern integrated waste management systems are based on recycling and sustainability. They aim to reduce the amount of

natural resources consumed by ensuring, that any resources already taken from nature are reused many times and that the amount of residual waste produced is kept to a minimum and treated in an environmentally safe way. The processing of waste plays a key part in this.<sup>472</sup> But the high costs and the fact that very few models finance themselves while operating effectively makes it very often impossible for local authorities to introduce them, particularly in tensed economies of post-conflict settings.

However, the environmental problems of SE Europe and Kosovo, in particular, are manifold. Air pollution, water scarcity, and pollution, land degradation to name only some are pressing issues. But one of the most obvious and visible problems affecting communities negatively is illegal dumping. In Kosovo alone, it is estimated that 540 illegal dumpsites existed in 2016. In addition, large parts alongside the roads are trashed with all sorts of waste and garbage. The awareness that littering is more than a nuisance but a real problem to health and security is low among people.

There is, of course, a difference between systematic illegal dumping, for example, of toxic waste or normal waste in the landfill and the daily littering alongside roads and in the streets of cities and villages. But both can have devastating effects on people as well as flora and fauna. Plastic waste, in particular, does considerable damage to the environment and finds its way into the human food chain in the form of microparticles. Illegal dumpsites present hot spots for diseases, infections, environmental hazards and are by all means destroying the beauty of the landscape. Moreover, they attract stray dogs as well and they pose a significant danger to playing kids. The problem with illegal dump sites is, that is functions like a magnet or multiplier for even more trash. Therefore strict law enforcement, systematic inspections and severe penalties may be required to prevent dumpsites from occurring and growing.

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<sup>472</sup> BMZ 2014: Sustainable Waste management - Improving ecological, social and economic aspects of waste management,



### **Trash Out Mobile app**

Trash out is a mobile app enables the users to report illegal dumpsites. A photo of the site can be uploaded and the size of it can be defined. This report then will automatically appear in a trash map that maps out all illegal dumps in the region. This, of course, will not make the dumpsite disappear. Therefore, the developers claim to support local governments, environmental organizations and waste companies in different regions that action against the waste will be taken.

Also, the app is supposed to notify the user about the progress, if action has been taken and how the results turned out. This latter function is quite important and addresses an issue that equally law enforcement institutions, as well as technology provider, face: ensuring sustainable engagement of the user by providing a mechanism to follow up on the initiated process. If users suspect that their engagement is not processed properly they lose trust in the proper work of institutions and are more likely to not engage in any activity again.

When local community leaders get involved the awareness for this problem can be raised and a systematic approach to cleaning the dumpsites can be developed. For law enforcement purposes this app may be a useful tool as well. The sooner an illegal dump gets detected the higher is the chance of finding the people responsible for it. This again would have a preventive effect.

The cleaning up of litter garbage in villages and cities is a good example of how voluntarism may work and which challenges it encounters. With regards to the sheer amount of litter in the nature of Kosovo, it must be assumed that a substantial part of society is engaging in unintentionally or intentionally littering. So, it seems only to be consequent to engage people in cleaning up the mess on a voluntary basis. Voluntarism is an integral part of enhancing security and life quality of communities. Only if people understand that through their own engagement they will be able to make a difference a successful and, more importantly, sustainable results can be achieved.

In recent years a number of projects formed in Kosovo to address the problem of illegal dumping and littering. Opendata Kosovo launched a project in Gjakova visualizing illegal dumpsites by creating a heat map. This can be used to superimpose illegal dumping sites with garbage truck routes



and statistics on the garbage size and type are provided. The idea behind it is to support the municipality to tackle the problem of illegal dumping.<sup>473</sup>

In May 2016 Let's Do It! Kosova claimed that approximately 60.000 volunteers participated across 30 municipalities, covering 140 illegal dumpsites in just one single day. The project estimated that people collected 5.000 tons of trash during that day. This would add up to a sum of over 80 kilos of trash per participant which seems a bit exaggerated. But nevertheless, the awareness-raising effect of projects like this should not be underestimated. Awareness raising is crucial if long-term changes should be achieved. There is a certain discrepancy in cleaning projects like the aforementioned as the question has to be asked why not prevent people from littering in the first place? Therefore, education on environmental matters and the harmfulness of littering should begin at a very early stage in school.

*"Believe me I have cleaned my village more than 50 times. But they don't care. And 50 % of the people will say I don't care much about this. Others will say we should do it, but when the day of action is there, they have their reasons."*

<sup>474</sup>

## Stray Dogs

According to Saferworld, packs of stray dogs have always featured prominently in community safety and security concerns in Kosovo and the wider Western Balkans region. A survey from 2010 lists stray dogs as the top security concern for a third of the population. This figure declined somewhat in 2011 but has remained high being raised by 28% of respondents.<sup>475</sup> According to a recent study from UNDP with parents and students of schools in Pristina, around more than 30% of respondents consider stray dogs or wild animals as the second highest risk the pupils face on their way to or back home from school.<sup>476</sup> Stray dog attacks occur daily all across Kosovo. They pose a serious safety and health risk especially during winter months when food is scarce and they behave increasingly aggressive. They can be the

<sup>473</sup> <http://opendatakosovo.org/app/illegal-dumps/>

<sup>474</sup> Interview Representative LPSC Prizren Region.

<sup>475</sup> Saferworld 2012: Still time to act: Rising conflict fears in Kosovo - Public perceptions of safety, security, and security and justice providers in Kosovo at the end of 2011, 10.

<sup>476</sup> UNDP 2015: Action Paper on violence and security in public schools of the Municipality of Pristina, 9.

source for dangerous infections such as rabies, especially when medication is not available.

As mentioned above the issue of littering especially of household waste and stray dogs is strongly related. Campaigns for the reduction of stray dogs, therefore, are most likely to be effective if implemented in combination with cleanups and littering awareness measures. Interestingly, the problem of stray dogs worsened since the shootings of the animals ceased though not legally forbidden. But practically the restrictive legislation regarding weapons possession and use means that it is unlawful to shoot stray dogs.

However, a number of projects addressing the issue have been implemented so far, for example, by CSATs in cooperation with hunting associations setting out to control the numbers. But the challenges remain particularly in remote areas where access is limited. Furthermore, the high costs of euthanization of stray dogs by lethal injection have hindered the practical implementation of projects. Other projects focusing on dog shelters or sterilization of the animals have generated some positive results but remain singular cases due to financial reasons as well. In consequence, the successes have been moderate so far and the problem of stray dogs remain pressing.<sup>477</sup>

*“For example, one of the municipalities the people have identified they have a problem with stray dogs. So they went to the municipality and they gave them land and together with an NGO they opened a shelter.”<sup>478</sup>*

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<sup>477</sup> OSCE ICITAP 2011: Assessing the impact – Kosovo's Community Safety Action Teams, 26-29.

<sup>478</sup> Interview ICITAP National advisor on community safety.

### Recommended Readings

Although from 2011 this Saferworld report is not outdated and has some interesting insight into the situation in Kosovo Saferworld 2012: Still time to act: Rising conflict fears in Kosovo - Public perceptions of safety, security, and security and justice providers in Kosovo at the end of 2011.

This Handbook from the UNODC Criminal Justice Handbook series gives some useful insights into the policing of urban spaces: UNODC/UN-HABITAT 2011: Introductory Handbook on Policing Urban Spaces

For those interested in the global state of traffic safety this WHO report might offer some useful information WHO: Global Status Report on Road Safety 2015.

A detailed account of the community safety activities implemented by OSCE and ICITAP gives this report: Assessing the impact – Kosovo's Community Safety Action Teams.

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